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ABSTRACT 
This study investigates the relative impact of state sponsorship on the democratic effects of 
participation in the case of two Russian youth organisations – Nashi and the Young Guard, 
which were established with Kremlin support in 2005.  In doing so this study questions the 
assumption that state involvement necessarily has a corrosive influence on participation and 
asserts the value of studying state-sponsored participatory initiatives. It concludes that the 
potential democratic effects of state-sponsored participation should not be disregarded solely 
on the basis of state involvement for two reasons: Firstly, the impact of state sponsorship on 
the democratic effects of participation is shaped by other factors, including the socio-political 
environment and the agency of participants. The state may have a vested interest in supporting 
some positive democratic effects of participation to further its own aims. Secondly, there are 
limits to the state‘s power to determine the democratic effects of participation. In particular, 
the state is unable to control the significance attached to participation by those involved. 
Without rejecting scholarly work on the Kremlin‘s questionable democratic credentials or on 
the pro-regime youth movements‘ numerous negative tendencies, this study contends that 
there is much more to these Kremlin-sponsored youth movements than existing portrayals 
allow.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Scholarly work on participation and development in the last ten to fifteen years is remarkable 
for the efforts that it has made to debunk the notion that participatory initiatives coordinated 
by Non-Governmental Organisations are inherently democratising.
1
 However, by the same 
token, the equivalent imperative to re-evaluate the assumption that state-sponsored 
participation is necessarily a corrosive or undemocratic force remains rarely acknowledged.  
Consequently, state-sponsored participatory initiatives are all too often overlooked by 
scholars, who fail to recognise their complexity or that they are worthy of academic interest 
and scrutiny. This study investigates the democratic effects of state-sponsored participation in 
the case of two state-sponsored Russian youth organisations, Nashi (translated as ‗Ours‘ - 
hereafter referred to as ‗Nashi‘) and Molodaia Gvardiia Edinoi Rossii (the ‗Young Guard of 
United Russia‘ hereafter referred to as ‗the Young Guard‘),2 which are widely considered in 
the West and by the Russian liberal-democratic opposition to be symptomatic of creeping 
authoritarianism or at least democratic backsliding in Russia. It finds that in many ways state 
sponsorship for Nashi and the Young Guard has served to perpetuate and indeed exacerbate 
negative democratic tendencies in Russia. Yet, there are also several ways in which it is 
possible to say that having state sponsorship has supported some positive democratic effects 
as far as Nashi and the Young Guard are concerned. More importantly, this study finds that 
state-sponsorship has not been the only factor in determining the democratic effects (both 
positive and negative) of participation in the case of Nashi and the Young Guard. Indeed, the 
                                                 
1 For example, see Alvarez, Dagnino, & Escobar (1998, pp. 9-10, 36-43), Cornwall (2002 & 2004), Gaventa, 
(2004), and Cornwall & Coelho (2007).  
2 All Russian words in this thesis are denoted in English using the standard Library of Congress system of 
transliteration. Any translation from Russian to English in this study is the author’s own. 
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socio-political environment and the agency of youth leaders and participants themselves have 
had a considerable bearing on the relative impact of having state sponsorship on the 
democratic effects of Nashi and the Young Guard. Thus, to dismiss the potential democratic 
effects of participatory initiatives purely on the grounds that they have been sponsored by the 
state is shown to be fundamentally flawed, regardless of whether or not any positive 
democratic effects have in fact ensued.  
Formed in 2005 by Vasily Yakemenko, founder of the former pro-Putin youth 
movement Idushchie Vmeste (Walking Together), Nashi labels itself as a ‗democratic, anti-
fascist youth movement‘. Claiming upwards of 300,000 members in the run-up to the 2007-8 
electoral cycle, Nashi rapidly became the largest youth movement of its kind in Russia, 
infamous as much for its devotion to former President Putin as for its mass actions and grand 
public rallies. Also formed in 2005, the Young Guard is the youth branch of the dominant 
pro-regime political party, United Russia, and was an attempt to rebrand the previous youth 
wing of United Russia Molodezhnoe Edinstvo (Youth Unity). Marketing itself as a youth 
organisation aimed especially at those wishing to pursue a career in politics, the Young Guard 
had around 100,000 members in 2008. The development of  both Nashi and the Young Guard 
should be viewed as a response to the role played by the Ukrainian youth movement ‗Pora‘ in 
the run up to the events during the ‗Orange Revolution‘ in Ukraine and, in particular, as 
indicative of the Kremlin‘s attempt to invigorate pro-regime youth initiatives at this time. 
Both movements underwent significant reorganisation in 2008 to prepare them for the 
different challenges and new tasks facing them in the post-election period and, despite 
rumours of their imminent demise with the perceived decline in state interest after the 
completion of the 2007-8 electoral cycle, in early 2011 both were still fully functioning and 
were preparing for heightened activity in the run up to the 2011/12 electoral cycle.  
xi 
 
In investigating the specific impact of having state-sponsorship on the democratic 
effects of Nashi and the Young Guard this study grapples with complex issues such as the role 
of the active state as well as the development of civil society and political participation, each 
of which needs to be considered in the context of the contemporary socio-political 
environment in Russia. This study thus makes a significant cross-disciplinary contribution to 
the literature – being of possible interest to social movement scholars, area-based specialists 
and political scientists alike. The case-studies of Nashi and the Young Guard are divided into 
three parts, each exploring a different category of the movements‘ potential democratic effects 
– public sphere democratic effects, institutional democratic effects, and developmental 
democratic effects – as defined by Warren in his framework for assessing the relative 
democratic effects of associational life (2001). It is important to note, at this early stage, that 
when referring to the ‗democratic effects‘ of Nashi and the Young Guard, this author makes 
no presumption that state support for the development of Nashi and the Young Guard is 
conducive to democracy: The term ‗democratic effects‘ is simply used as short-hand to refer 
to the youth movements‘ impact on democracy, of which there may be both positive and/or 
negative democratic effects. Reference to the ‗democratic effects‘ of Nashi and the Young 
Guard throughout this thesis, therefore, does not entail a positive bias as it intends to denote 
potential positive and negative democratic effects.  
Part 1 of this thesis (comprising chapters 2-3) considers the public sphere democratic 
effects of state-sponsored participation in the case of Nashi and the Young Guard. Chapter 2 
evaluates the impact of state sponsorship on the youth movements‘ abilities to formulate a 
public agenda and gain publicity for their cause, while Chapter 3 explores the corresponding 
impact on the development of civil society as a whole. Under the heading of the institutional 
democratic effects of participation in Part 2, Chapter 4 outlines the significance of state 
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sponsorship for the impact of Nashi and the Young Guard‘s efforts to stimulate youth 
electoral participation on the legitimacy of political processes and institutions beyond 
securing the incumbent regime. Chapter 5 then assesses the extent to which having state 
support has enabled Nashi and the Young Guard to gain access to formal political institutions 
and decision-making bodies.  Finally, Part 3 considers the developmental democratic effects 
of Nashi and the Young Guard. Chapter 6 identifies the significance that young people 
themselves attach to participation and the associated shift in perceptions of the role of youth 
in Russian politics and society, while Chapter 7 finishes by investigating the ethos of Nashi 
and the Young Guard and any variation in the strategies and actions employed by the youth 
movements.  However, before proceeding with the case-study in chapters 2-7, Chapter 1 first 
establishes the rationale for this research by putting forward the case for studying state-
sponsored participation, setting the parameters for investigation, and detailing the 
methodological approach adopted in this study.  
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CHAPTER 1 – THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES 
The case for investigating the democratic effects of state-sponsored participation 
Several scholars commenting on the artificial academic polarisation of the state and civil 
society have pointed to the fact that the resurgence of interest in civil society in the 1980s and 
1990s was inspired by the rise of civil society in opposition to authoritarian regimes in 
Eastern Europe.
3
 This context, they argue, helps to explain why subsequent research into civil 
society has taken on a fundamentally anti-state stance. Undoubtedly, the success of 
movements such as Solidarnozh (‗Solidarity‘) in Poland buoyed the tendency to focus on the 
role of civil society in opposition to the state and deterred subsequent study of the potential 
democratic effects of state-sponsored participation, particularly in the former Soviet Union. 
However, this author asserts that the widespread exclusion of state-sponsored participatory 
initiatives from the literature on participation and democratisation is no mere oversight or 
accidental bias. Rather, it is the product of an entrenched conceptual disaggregation of the 
state and civil society such that it is inconceivable to many that state involvement in public 
participation could have any positive democratic effects.  
Stemming from Habermas‘ seminal work on the structural transformation of the 
public sphere in the 19
th
 century (Habermas, 1989), the liberal ideal of the separation of the 
state and civil society has defined academic understandings of public participation and led to 
the common perception that state-sponsored participatory initiatives are inherently damaging 
for civil society in general. Although the perceived ideal separation between the state and civil 
society is by no means unique to Habermas‘ work and indeed is more often attributed to 
                                                 
3 For example, see Schwartz & Pharr (2003, pp.322-3) or Howard (2003, p. 38).  
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DeTocqueville‘s earlier work, Democracy in America written in 1835 (DeTocqueville, 1946), 
the emphasis is placed on Habermas‘ work in this study because, unlike DeTocqueville, 
Habermas devotes his attention precisely to state infiltration of civil society and laments what 
he sees as the corrosive impact of this development on the functioning of the traditional public 
sphere. In keeping with Habermas‘ depiction of the classical ‗bourgeois public sphere‘ as an 
autonomous site of ‗rational discourse‘ wherein private individuals formulate ‗public opinion‘ 
to serve as a check on the state, ―it is precisely [the] extragovernmental character of the public 
sphere that confers an aura of independence, autonomy and legitimacy on the ‗public opinion‘ 
generated in it‖ (Fraser, 1993, p. 24). From this perspective, state involvement in public 
participation fundamentally prohibits the democratic development of civil society by 
undermining its basic autonomy. As a result, it is implicitly assumed that there can be no 
positive democratic effects of state-sponsored participation.  
 This chapter broaches the argument for studying the democratic effects of state-
sponsored participation and in doing so lays the theoretical platform, upon which examination 
of state-sponsored youth participation in the case of Nashi and the Young Guard will build. It 
begins by outlining how the belief that state-sponsored participation is inherently 
undemocratic has developed in the literature and why the perpetuation of such an assumption 
is damaging. It argues that presupposing that the state always has a corrosive influence upon 
civil society precludes the analytical process and thus imposes boundaries upon one‘s scope 
and conceptual ability. The state impacts upon all aspects of society and is often actively 
engaged in civil society. Therefore, to reject any involvement of the state in civil society as 
being an inherently negative democratic force without further scrutiny is to deny 
comprehensive study of the democratic effects of participation and to limit our understanding 
of modern society. The chapter then proceeds to interrogate the assumption that state-
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sponsored participation is inherently undemocratic. It contends that this assumption is flawed 
on two counts. Firstly, the assumption that state-sponsored participation is a negative force 
expressly due to the fact that the impetus and framework for participation originate from 
above imagines that the state is capable of acting in isolation from societal pressures. In 
reality, whether participation be state-sponsored or NGO-led, the ability of any architect of a 
participatory initiative to set the terms of play or shape its future course is limited by socio-
cultural norms and power structures as well as the political environment and participants‘ own 
agendas.  Thus, nothing can be prejudged based solely on the designs of those initiating 
participation. Secondly, while state sponsorship of political participation is undoubtedly not 
without its own agenda, it may well be the case that the state‘s end goals coincide with or 
necessitate forms of participation, which entail some positive democratic effects even when 
the state is pursuing non-democratic outcomes. When this is the case the administrative 
resources and policy instruments available to the state may render those positive democratic 
effects more powerful, for example offering unique opportunities for formal representation or 
access to legislative and decision-making processes. Thus not only is it possible that there 
may be some positive democratic effects in spite of state sponsorship that the state is unable 
to control, but, in direct contention with the afore-mentioned assumption of the injury 
inflicted by state intervention in civil society, it is entirely possible that state support itself 
might promote and enhance certain positive democratic effects of participation. The 
subsequent detailed case study of the impact of having state sponsorship on the democratic 
effects of Nashi and the Young Guard in Chapters 2 to 7 of this thesis will test these 
hypotheses and ultimately evaluate the relative significance of whether or not an organisation 
has state sponsorship for determining the democratic effects of participation. 
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‘The state is the problem, not the solution’: Delineating the boundaries of 
academic thought and policy development  
Habermas‘ public sphere emerged with the expansion of what constitutes the public interest 
(which had hitherto been dominated entirely by the state and the church) to include discussion 
and input from private citizens. The essence of Habermas‘ conception of the public sphere 
rests on recognition of the relevance of public agenda formation to the lives of private citizens 
and the significance of discursive challenges to the state on fundamental issues and matters of 
common concern. Habermas laments the development of a public consensus based on 
compromise between different interests, which he argues has effectively depoliticised the 
public sphere and allowed the authorities to resume the mantle of guarantor of the public 
interest. Widespread acceptance of Habermas‘s theory of the development of the public 
sphere has encouraged a tendency to measure the value of citizen engagement and 
participation by its degree of autonomy from the state. According to Habermas, we have 
witnessed the ―state-ification of society‖ and ―societalization of the state‖ over the course of 
the twentieth century (1989, p. 142), the result of which has been the reduction of the public 
sphere and erosion of its ability to function as any kind of counter to the state. Consequently, 
as well as bolstering the assumption that state intervention in civil society has an inherently 
negative democratic effect, Habermas‘ idealistic conception of the public sphere also 
presupposes the integrity and democratising effect of autonomous participatory initiatives. In 
fact, this author believes that the ―mythification [of civil society] as a virtuous pole against an 
evil state‖ (Alvarez, Dagnino, & Escobar, 1998, p. 41) is potentially more dangerous than the 
vilification of the role of the state, due to the complacency that it encourages. After all, to 
assume the positive democratic contribution of autonomous participatory initiatives is to 
denigrate the need for proper checks and balances to monitor the actual effects of 
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participation. Blindly encouraging NGO-sponsored participation, which may unwittingly 
serve to entrench existing societal divisions or to provide the illusion of democracy, is 
potentially more damaging than inhibiting state-sponsored participation and any potential 
positive democratic effects thereof.  However, because scholars have made significant 
headway in the past twenty years or so in checking the assumed democratic effects of 
autonomous participatory initiatives and in detailing the possible non-democratic outcomes of 
civil society,
4
 the resonance of Habermas‘ lament of the disintegration of the classical public 
sphere is now more acutely felt in relation to state-sponsored participation, where the 
assumption of inherent negative democratic effects remains rife and academic oversight of the 
benefit of investigating such groups persists.  
Scrutiny of autonomous participatory initiatives has been spearheaded by scholars of 
NGO-led public deliberative and consultative forums in the developing world, which aim to 
include the poor and marginalised in localised decision-making processes.
5
 The common 
thread to arguments as to why it is incorrect to assume that these autonomous participatory 
initiatives necessarily have positive democratic effects rests on the discrepancy between the 
installation of formal democratic procedures and the actual democratic outcomes of 
participation.  Cornwall notes the tendency for the vast majority of the existing ―literature on 
participation in development [to focus] on methodologies or mechanisms and how they are 
supposed to work‖ rather than paying attention to ―what actually happens in practice, and to 
who takes part, on what basis, and with what resources‖ (2002, p. 7).  Similarly, 
distinguishing between the act of ‗spreading‘ and ‗deepening‘ democracy, Gaventa asserts 
that ―the rapid spread of new democratic forms should not be confused with the quality and 
                                                 
4 In particular, see Bayart (1986), Berman (1997), White (1994, p. 380), Schmitter (1997, p. 242), Keane (1998, 
p. 40) Cornwall (2002 & 2004), Gaventa (2004), Cornwall & Coelho (2007), or Alvarez et al (1998).  
5 The Development Research Centre on Citizenship, Participation and Accountability has been at the forefront 
of such work.  Seewww.ids.ac.uk/drc-citizen/ for more information on the Research Centre. 
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nature of their performance‖ (Gaventa in Cornwall & Coelho, 2007, p. xvi). In the given 
context, this discrepancy between design and delivery is attributed to the apparent failure of 
NGOs to acknowledge the impact of entrenched power relations and patterns of domination in 
society upon interactions within the participatory arena, however well intentioned and 
democratically engineered that arena may be. NGOs‘ insufficient understanding and/or scant 
consideration of the influence of the socio-political environment on participatory dynamics 
meant that this issue was not addressed and the potential positive democratic effects of 
participation were all too often curbed or derailed as a result. For example, when attempts to 
set up citizen deliberative forums aimed at promoting inclusion and equality are unable to 
bracket existing societal differences they may inadvertently serve to cement existing 
discriminatory practices, providing the semblance of democracy while, in practice, amplifying 
the most capable voices and excluding the already marginalised. For this reason, strategies to 
tackle any obstructive attitudes within society and to break down existing hierarchies among 
participants have been identified by scholars of NGO-led participatory initiatives as integral 
to realising the potential positive democratic effects of participation.
6
  
However, despite the efforts made to present a more nuanced picture of the democratic 
effects of autonomous participatory initiatives as well as the fact that questions asked of 
NGO-led participation are also applicable to state-sponsored participation, state intervention 
to encourage participation remains cast largely in black and white terms and case-studies of 
state-sponsored participatory initiatives remain systematically excluded from the literature on 
participation and development.  
Deregulation, privatisation, reduction of social services, and curtailments of state 
spending have been the watchwords, rather than participation, greater 
                                                 
6 For example, see Cornwall (2002), Gaventa (2004), or Cornwall & Coelho (2007). 
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responsiveness, and more creative and effective forms of democratic state 
intervention. As the slogan goes, ‗The state is the problem, not the solution‘. 
(Fung & Wright, 2001, p. 6)  
That is not to say that scholars do not recognise the fundamental role of the state in 
―contouring the associational landscape‖ (Schwartz & Pharr, 2003, p. xiv). The fact that the 
modern state cannot be entirely divorced from civil society and, moreover, that the state plays 
a critical role in shaping the environment for the development of civil society and the socio-
political framework for participation has been recognised by political scientists, area studies 
scholars and social movement theorists alike. For example, Skocpol asserts that not only does 
the state play a direct interventionist role, but the influence of the state as a structure with its 
laws and frameworks provides the context in which all societal developments should be 
understood (Evans, Rueschemeyer & Skocpol, 1985, p.27). Similarly Stepan notes that the 
state ―is the continuous administrative, legal, bureaucratic and coercive systems that attempt 
not only to structure relationships between civil society and public authority in a polity, but 
also to structure many crucial relationships within civil society as well‖ (Linz & Stepan, 1978, 
p. xii).
7
  Yet, although the necessity of a ―fully relational approach to states and societies‖ 
(Evans, Rueschemeyer, & Skocpol, 1985, p. 20) has been acknowledged by many scholars, 
analyses of state-sponsored participatory initiatives are all but absent from the literature. ―So 
heavily has the contemporary scholarly literature favoured mobilization from below, one 
might wonder if a state-sponsored social movement is not a definitional contradiction in 
terms‖ (Bowie, 2005, p. 46). In this way, the rigid conception of the negative democratic 
                                                 
7 Also see Schwartz and Pharr (2003), Howard (2003), Evans, Rueschemeyer & Skocpol (1985), Skocpol (1996, 
1997 & 1999), and Levy (1999).  Frolic coins the terms ‘state-led civil society’ in his chapter in the edited 
volume on Civil Society in China (1997). Schmitter further recognises the importance of state intervention in 
order to strengthen civil society (1997). This is similar to the Russian conception of the need for the state to 
take direct action to invigorate civil society, as will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
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effects of state involvement in civil society, derived from the Habermassian notion of the 
ideal classical model of the public sphere, limits the scope and usefulness of the academic 
literature on participation and democratisation. For example, recognising that state actions and 
the political environment affect participation by providing opportunities for or erecting 
barriers to collective action, advocates of a political process approach to collective action 
developed the concept of ‗political-opportunity-structure‘.8 The concept of ‗political-
opportunity-structure‘ (POS) has since become part of an overarching framework, alongside 
‗mobilising structures‘ and ‗framing processes‘ which has been widely accepted by scholars 
as a basis for studying social movements (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996, p. 2). Yet, 
despite the more holistic approach adopted in the ‗POS‘ framework, its proponents do not go 
so far as to consider state-sponsored participation among their extensive work on collective 
action. Thus, although social movement theory has been developed to accommodate the 
perceived need to recognise the influence of the state on the development of civil society and 
the democratic effects of participation, the assumption that state influence on civil society is 
corruptive and inevitably impedes democratic development remains tangible and therefore the 
tendency to disregard state-sponsored participation persists.  
In his influential book Power in Movement, Tarrow defines the term ‗social 
movement‘ as ―those sequences of contentious politics that are based on underlying social 
networks and resonant collective action frames, and which develop the capacity to maintain 
sustained challenges against powerful opponents‖ (1998, p. 2). While the idea of ‗contentious 
politics‘ or ‗challenging opponents‘ need not necessarily preclude the inclusion of loyalist 
organisations who set themselves against opponents other than the authorities, further reading 
of Tarrow‘s work reveals that the notion of contentious politics and social movements is 
                                                 
8 Primarily Tilly (1978) and subsequently taken up by his students/colleagues Tarrow (1998) and McAdam 
(McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996). 
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reserved for challenges against the state, bureaucracy and big businesses and thus state-
sponsored movements are systematically excluded from study. ―Much of the history of 
movement-state interaction‖, Tarrow continues, ―can be read as a duet of strategy and 
counterstrategy between movement activists and power holders‖ and one should not ignore 
―the considerable risks and costs involved in acting collectively against well-armed 
authorities‖ (1998, p. 3; 6). Characteristic of social movement scholars, here Tarrow restricts 
his application of the term ‗social movement‘ and therefore his frame of reference to those 
movements arising from the opposition and calling for broad social change in the face of 
institutional resistance.
9
 Scholars of social movements and democratisation only consider 
state involvement in developing participatory initiatives as far as entry into the state may 
become an eventual possibility for movements having emerged from civil society, as Dryzek 
underlines: 
Democratic life is not just the endless interplay of discourses. There have to be 
moments of decisive collective action, and in contemporary societies it is mainly (but 
not only) the state that has this capacity [....] Yet it is important to maintain a public 
sphere autonomous from the state, for discursive interplay within the public sphere is 
always likely to be less constrained than within the state. It is within the public sphere 
that insurgent discourses and identities can first establish themselves. (2000, p. 79) 
 In these instances the democratic losses and gains of inclusion within the state as opposed to 
action within the public sphere are weighed up.
10
  
                                                 
9 Although ‘consensus movements’ and ‘interest groups’ have been studied by collective action scholars, albeit 
far less than ‘conflict movements’, such groups still emerge from civil society rather than being cultivated by 
the state. 
10 See McCarthy & Wolfson (1992) or Schwartz & Paul (1992) for discussion of the pros and cons of engagement 
with the state for consensus movements.  
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The most notable exceptions to the general trend towards dismissing state-sponsored 
participatory initiatives from academic scrutiny are the works of Katharine Bowie (2005) and 
Akkerman, Hajer & Grin (2004). Bowie investigates the Village Scout Movement in Thailand 
in the early 1970s, which was established in response to the perceived communist threat to the 
incumbent Thai regime in order to manipulate and police the Thai population. Initiated by the 
state in 1971 with royal patronage, by 1976 the right-wing movement faced government 
clampdown. Bowie‘s study explores the dynamics of state-society power relations at play 
during the creation and subsequent rise and fall of the Village Scout Movement. Akkerman, 
Hajer & Grin, on the other hand, use state stimulation of citizen participation in policy-
making in the Netherlands as an example to demonstrate that ―active states should not 
generally be distrusted and that civil society should not generally be regarded as the main 
buttress of democracy‖ (2004, p. 92). In their work, ‗interactive policy-making‘ in the 
Netherlands is portrayed as part of a progressive emergent trend in Western Europe to involve 
citizens in roundtable discussions that feed directly into policy-making with mixed 
democratic effects.  
Nonetheless, there is no such precedent for studying the democratic effects of state-
sponsored participation in Russia. Even accounts of the development of Russian civil society 
that seek to explore the influence of the state and the manner in which various associations 
work alongside the state, such as the volume Russian Civil Society: A Critical Assessment 
(Evans, Henry, & McIntosh Sundstrom (eds.), 2006), devote little consideration to state-
sponsored participatory initiatives among their studies.
11
 Moreover, the limiting effect of the 
                                                 
11 The only state-sponsored participatory initiative referred to in Evans, Henry and McIntosh’s edited volume 
(2006) is the Civic Chamber created by Putin in 2001. This may be because the most obvious precedents of 
state-initiated groups prior to the development of Nashi and the Young Guard in 2005 were political parties, 
who are not strictly defined by the term ‘civil society’.  The volume in question does not necessarily subscribe 
to Habermassian or DeTocquevillian inspired depictions of civil society’s ‘good’ as opposed to the state’s ‘bad’. 
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narrow framework for investigating potential sites of democratisation remains highly visible 
in recent scholarly work on youth organisations in Russia. In keeping with the propensity to 
explore the potential for democratisation exclusively from within the opposition, while state-
sponsored youth organisations are acknowledged in research on Russia, oppositional youth 
organisations have been the sole focus for examination of potential positive democratic 
effects. As the opening lines of Diuk‘s essay on youth in politics attest to, the assumption that 
democratisation can only come from the liberal democratic opposition and not from measures 
taken by or originating from within the regime itself is prevalent among research on Russian 
politics and sets the focus for study squarely on the opposition: 
Since the latest parliamentary and presidential elections in Russia, many 
commentators have been trying to explain why the more liberal parties and 
candidates suffered such a rout, why the period of (at least apparent) ‗transition‘ 
has come to an end, why progress towards democracy has hit a wall, and where 
the path forward may lie. (Diuk, 2004, p. 59) 
Following the role played by youth movements in the ‗coloured revolutions‘ in the Former 
Soviet Union between 2000 and 2005, several studies have sought to provide an overview of 
the main youth organisations in Russia, both pro-regime and opposition, and to reassess the 
potential for youth-led democratisation in light of the post-orange ―political coming of age‖ of 
young Russians (Topalova, 2006, p. 24). However, because the emphasis of recent interest in 
research on Russia‘s political youth has been on assessing progress towards democracy or the 
potential for an ‗electoral revolution‘12 in Russia, and because it remains assumed that 
democratisation originates from autonomous groups within civil society, research since the 
                                                 
12The term ‘electoral revolution’ has emerged among literature on the coloured revolutions in the Former 
Soviet Union and refers to the propensity for elections, or more specifically the announcement of fraudulent 
electoral results, to be the catalyst for a popular revolution against the incumbent regime.  
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‗Orange Revolution‘ to date has continued to be confined to looking to the opposition alone 
for potential positive democratic effects. For example, although Schwirtz‘s overview of 
youth-based political organisations in Russia highlights the polarisation between pro and anti-
regime forces and therefore acknowledges both opposition and loyalist youth organisations, 
the situation is framed in terms of the opposition‘s struggle against the state‘s administrative 
resources (Schwirtz, 2007). Schwirtz denies agency to those Russian youths who support the 
incumbent regime and participate in groups such as Nashi and the Young Guard, portraying 
them as passive instruments of the state‘s efforts to prevent a ‗coloured revolution‘ from 
happening in Russia. The chief objective of Schwirtz‘s study is to assess the ability of 
opposition youth movements to mobilise against the state and thus the conception of 
democratisation and participation is limited to greater oppositional influence to check the 
power of the state. Similarly, while Vinatier sets out a broad conceptual typology of the 
political orientations of the main loyalist and opposition youth movements in Russia, the 
purpose of his research is to explore ―which ideas still have critical potential‖ for the 
opposition and what the ―possibilities of an opening or a fracture of the Putin regime‖ might 
be (Vinatier, 2007, p. 5). With this aim in mind, Vinatier discusses the development of 
ideological strands amongst the opposition and their strengths and weaknesses in isolation 
from any investigation of the ideology or development of Nashi or the Young Guard.  While 
it may well be sensible to look for potential openings for democratic development in Russia 
among opposition groups, whose democratic credentials are far stronger than the pro-Kremlin 
youth organisations‘, consequently Nashi and the Young Guard have been almost entirely 
ignored by academic analysis and the actual significance of state support for these dominant 
groups is unknown.  
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By focusing on Nashi and the Young Guard, this study seeks to rectify the bias that 
the assumption of the inherent negative democratic effects of state-sponsored participation has 
engendered in the literature on youth movements in Russia and on theories of participation 
and development more broadly. However, before proceeding to analyse the impact of state 
support on the democratic effects (both positive and negative) of Nashi and the Young Guard 
in the main part of this study, this introductory chapter first sets out the main flaws in the 
basic assumption of the state‘s corrosive influence on the democratic effects of participation 
in order to pave the way for the subsequent analysis and to justify the value of this research 
beyond merely going through the motions of filling a gap in the literature that might well be 
there for a reason. 
 
All power to the state 
The belief that state-sponsored participatory initiatives have an inherently negative 
democratic effect is in part founded on overblown assessments of the power of the state, 
which increase fear of the ‗active state‘ in civil society. The tendency to endow the state with 
more power than it truly possesses is manifest in two main ways of relevance to this study.
13
 
Firstly, singling out cases of state-sponsored participation as having negative democratic 
effects simply because they have been initiated by the state rather than emerging from civil 
society is based on the misconception that the state is capable of acting in isolation from 
societal pressures and the political environment. In the modern reality, it is usually far more 
difficult to distinguish between the roles of the state and civil society or to discern the primary 
                                                 
13 These two misconceptions have been discussed previously in an article by this author, which focused on the 
sustainability of Nashi following the completion of the 2007-8 electoral cycle (Atwal, 2009). 
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instigator of participatory initiatives than this presumption allows for.
14
 Skocpol asserts that 
states are ‗autonomous actors‘ in the sense that they may ―formulate and pursue their own 
goals which are not simply reflective of the demands or interests of social groups, classes or 
society‖ (Evans, Rueschemeyer, & Skocpol, 1985, p. 9). However, this study contends that, in 
the same way that the notion that NGO participatory initiatives can function in isolation from 
society is misleading, the concept of ‗autonomous state action‘ is not useful for understanding 
the role and capabilities of the active state in civil society. Although it is true that states are 
not passive agents of the public will, far from it, neither the decisions they make nor the 
action they take are ever entirely divorced from consideration of socio-political issues or the 
sway of external actors. Labelling states as ‗autonomous actors‘ encourages oversight of the 
influence of society and the broader political environment on the development and 
implementation of state initiatives and thus exacerbates the tendency to exaggerate the state‘s 
powers. Even in instances when the state seems to act solely in its own immediate interests, 
pursuing a course of repressive measures to impede the expression of societal interests for 
example, it still has to take into account a number of factors in assessing its optimum course 
of action, including societal pressures and the wider political context. In fact, such policy is 
often pursued in direct acknowledgement of the influence of society and in fear of its potential 
power to topple the incumbent regime. It is this understanding that state-sponsored 
participatory initiatives cannot develop in isolation from society that reveals the flawed logic 
of dismissing the potential democratic effects of all such initiatives solely on the grounds that 
they have not emerged from civil society. As Nashi commissar and spokesperson Maria 
                                                 
14 Habermas himself acknowledges the decreasing viability of such a clear demarcation of the roles of the state 
and civil society in the second section of his analysis. However, the Habermassian conception of the classical 
public sphere as being necessarily independent from the state is retained as a liberal-democratic normative 
ideal, which continues to inform contemporary understandings of the state-society dialectic (Hohendahl, 1979 
in Cornwall, 2002, pp.4-5).   
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Drokova notes, state support for Nashi‘s initial development was partly a response to the 
perceived intentions and demands of young Russians: 
When the threat of the ‗Orange Revolution‘ arose, after the events in the Ukraine 
and Georgia [....] the realisation that [young people‘s actions can affect the whole 
country] by both young Russians and the government led to the creation of 
Nashi.
15
  
While the above quotation reflects the way in which the state sought to support the 
development of Nashi in order to contain youth energies inspired by the ‗Orange Revolution‘, 
it also reveals that the attitudes and potential actions of young people themselves were an 
integral component of Nashi‘s origins. Both Nashi and the Young Guard were designed to 
cater for the particular needs of young people in Russia at the time in a way that would be 
non-threatening and even beneficial to the incumbent regime, yet nonetheless responsive to 
young Russians. 
Secondly, the assumption that the state has a corrosive influence on the potential 
democratic effects of participation is based on the further misconception that the state is able 
to direct participation and determine its effects according to its own purposes. In fact, neither 
the state nor any other external actor is able to fully control the outcome or significance of 
voluntary participation. State initiatives are prey to socio-cultural influences in the same way 
that ‗well-meaning‘ NGO attempts to foster participation are affected by the norms, 
prejudices and expectations that participants themselves harbour. Moreover, conceiving of the 
democratic effects of state sponsored participation as immutable and based solely on the 
state‘s intentions is to deny participants‘ own agency. To make such a claim is a severe 
                                                 
15 Author’s interview with Maria Drokova, Lake Seliger, 24 July 2008. 
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indictment of the political environment in any given situation and thus the blanket application 
of this assumption is inappropriate. Taking into account the significance attached to 
participation by participants themselves, the framework that Sarah White uses to assess the 
‗content of participation‘ is useful here (White, 1996). White examines the form and function 
of participatory initiatives in relation to what she terms ‗top-down‘ and ‗bottom-up‘ interests, 
both of which have a bearing on the democratic effects of participation. ‗Top-down‘ interests 
refer to ―the interests that those who design and implement development programs have in the 
participation of others,‖ whether they be the state, NGOs or other actors. ‗Bottom-up‘ 
interests refer to ―how the participants themselves see their participation and what they expect 
to get out of it‖ (White, 1996, p. 7). In this way, White‘s article appreciates that neither the 
interests of those involved in setting up and running participatory initiatives, nor the interests 
of participants themselves can be understood without reference to the other.  
Bowie‘s case study of the right-wing Village Scout Movement in Thailand, referred to 
above, provides an excellent illustration of the undeniable dialectic between the state and 
society (Bowie, 2005). Bowie demonstrates that even under conditions of active state 
interference and political repression, the interaction between state interests and societal 
demands shapes the creation, development, and significance of state-sponsored movements. 
Although the role of the [Thai] state was fundamental [in the creation and spread of 
the Village Scout movement], the movement can be best understood by exploring 
the intersection between the crisis facing the Thai state and the varying hopes and 
fears of its citizenry. (2005, p. 48) 
At the time of the inauguration of the Village Scout Movement, Thailand‘s military 
dictatorship was under threat from Communist insurgency, rising civil discontent and 
1 
 
17 
 
demands for democratic reform. Consequently, the Ministry of the Interior for Thailand 
formed the Village Scout Movement with two primary objectives in mind. Firstly, ―the 
movement sought to inoculate the Thai body politic against communism by injecting its 
citizenry with a dose of nationalism‖ (Bowie, 2005, p. 48). Secondly, the movement aimed to 
repress dissent and generate support for the incumbent regime across society by a process of 
intimidation and encouraging others to inform on traitors to the nationalist cause. Thus it is 
possible to say that although the Village Scout Movement was designed and initiated by the 
state with the preservation of the incumbent regime and the state‘s interests foremost in mind, 
its creation was also a response to the contemporary environment and the perceived threat of 
mass communist revolt. In a similar fashion, the huge success of the Village Scout Movement 
and its rapid expansion between 1972-6 owed as much to public fear of perceived threats to 
the integrity of the nation and the current popularity of the King (patron of the movement), as 
it did to state planning and expenditure on the movement‘s grand initiation ceremonies. 
Finally, in 1976, the authorities attempted to rein in the Village Scout Movement following 
rising conflict between movement activists and local government officials. Again state 
clampdown on the Village Scout Movement demonstrates how societal interests and 
participants‘ own agendas impact on state intervention within civil society. In the time 
preceding the clampdown, the Village Scout Movement had begun to take on a dynamic, 
which the state had not intended. The movement had begun to be used as a ―political base for 
various politicians seeking national-level positions of power in the capital and increasingly 
caused political complications for the state rather than offering solutions‖ (Bowie, 2005, p. 
56). Therefore, although the state played a key role in both establishing and halting the 
activity of the Village Scout Movement, it could not control the direction of the movement‘s 
development.  
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Accordingly, the affirmed interplay between state and societal interests, between the 
creators‘ intentions and the operational reality of participatory initiatives, will be elaborated in 
the course of this study‘s analysis of the democratic effects of state-sponsored participation in 
Russia. While this author is certain that the Kremlin could and would shut down Nashi and 
the Young Guard if they began to challenge the regime, as with the example of the Village 
Scout Movement above, the state cannot fully determine the direction the youth movements 
take, control their behaviour, or direct the significance of participation for activists beyond 
threatening to take action to halt the movements‘ activities.  
  
State interests and resources  
The preconception that state-sponsored participation has negative democratic effects also 
presumes that the state has no interest in pursuing any positive democratic effects of 
participation. Judging by Dryzek‘s assessment below of the historical impetus for 
democratisation such an assumption would not be unfounded: 
An examination of the history of democratisation indicates that pressures for 
greater democracy almost always emanate from insurgency in oppositional civil 
society, rarely or never from the state itself. (Dryzek, 2000, p. 87) 
However, while state-sponsored participation is not without its own agenda and without 
discounting Dryzek‘s above assessment, it may still be the case that the state‘s end goals 
coincide with or necessitate forms of participation that entail some positive democratic effects 
regardless of the questionable democratic credentials of the state‘s motivation in supporting 
such participation.  
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A prime example of the state having a vested interest in pursuing positive democratic 
outcomes of participation is when, in the face of a perceived threat to the incumbent regime, 
the state encourages engagement of a particular group or adopts a more inclusive tactic in 
order to maintain the regime‘s legitimacy and secure its control.  This may be the case when 
certain sections of the population, such as ethnic groups, women, young people (in the case of 
Nashi and the Young Guard) or even the political opposition, threaten civic unrest and the 
state seeks to incorporate them into the existing power structure in order to maintain the 
incumbent regime‘s hold on power. For example, it has been claimed that the Mexican state‘s 
―longevity and stability can be attributed to its brilliantly successful incorporation of 
successive waves of potential troublemakers‖ (Dryzek, 2000, p. 92). Although cooptation of 
democratic opposition forces does not equate to the state pursuing democratic outcomes for 
democracy‘s sake, and indeed the negative democratic effects of forced cooptation are 
obvious, the example of the Mexican regime is used in order to highlight the state‘s 
recognition and accommodation of political alternatives into the formal political arena as part 
of its strategy to prevent political instability: Presumably there are some concessions in terms 
of power and influence made by the state to such groups in order to persuade them to 
relinquish their potential to act as a mobilising force for opposition to the incumbent regime. 
Alternatively, the state may seek to provide genuine opportunities for public involvement in 
local decision-making through the devolvement of decision-making on certain issues to local 
communities, in order to shift some responsibility from themselves and reduce their own 
accountability for any failings.
16
 Similarly, when the state initiates consultation with user 
groups, for example, regarding healthcare practices, the state may strive to ensure that 
feedback arising from consultation informs policy-making so as to secure its legitimacy in the 
                                                 
16 Warren terms this strategy of devolving decisions-making in order to deal with difficult issues with public 
support ‘subsidiarity’ (2001, p.190). 
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eyes of the electorate, irrespective of how successful the implementation of said policy is in 
practice. In each of the above instances it is fair to say that the state intends to encourage 
some positive democratic effects through participation although the motivations for doing so 
are not necessarily commendable. Therefore, it is not safe to automatically assume that state 
involvement in participation equates to all round negative democratic effects even if it is true, 
as Dryzek asserts, that the state itself is rarely or never motivated by a genuine desire for 
greater democracy as an end in itself.  
Furthermore, if and when state interests do coincide with or necessitate positive 
democratic effects of participation, the administrative resources and ‗policy instruments‘ 
available to the state may render these effects more powerful. This eventuality runs contrary 
to the assumption that state-sponsored participation is inherently undemocratic. Consequently, 
by emphasising the singular importance of participatory initiatives‘ autonomy from the state, 
liberal democratic conceptions of the public sphere influenced by the Habermassian tradition 
besmirch any idea of collaboration with the state and thus deny participatory initiatives‘ 
access to potentially massive opportunities that may be available via the state,
17
 as Fraser 
notes: 
The desirability of a sharp separation of civil society and the state […] promotes 
[…] weak publics, publics whose deliberative practice consists exclusively in 
opinion formulation and does not also encompass decision-making […]. (Fraser, 
1993, p. 24) 
                                                 
17 Although McCarthy and Wolfson outline the benefits of state support for ‘consensus movements’ (1992), as 
noted earlier, state support for social movements in general is considered in terms of the weighing up the 
potential gains of having state sponsorship against the perceived inherent detriment to the movements’ 
integrity by having any involvement with the state. 
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Recognising the potential benefit of opportunities available through cooperation with the 
state, some scholars have criticised academic work on Latin American social movements 
during the seventies and eighties, which ―praised movements‘ putative eschewal of 
institutional politics, their defence of absolute autonomy, and their emphasis on direct 
democracy‖, for giving rise to an ―ethos of indiscriminate rejection of the institutional (Doime 
1993; Silova 1994; Coelho 1992; Hellman 1994) that made it difficult for movements to 
effectively articulate their claims in formal political arenas‖ (Alvarez, Dagnino, & Escobar, 
1998, p. 13).  Ironically, while outside interest in youth movements and potential openings for 
democracy in Russia remains almost exclusively focused on the opposition, having state 
support becomes especially significant under a repressive regime such as Russia, where 
resources are centralised and the state has greater power to erect barriers, remove obstacles or 
even to provide incentives for participation.  
This study explores the possibility that the Russian state may have a vested interest in 
promoting certain positive democratic effects of participation in the case of Nashi and the 
Young Guard. It considers whether the Kremlin‘s motivations for sponsoring the youth 
movements have supported any positive democratic effects. Moreover, taking into account the 
state‘s potential to strengthen these effects, this study assesses the Kremlin‘s role in 
reinforcing both negative and positive democratic effects of Nashi and the Young Guard. 
 
Overall, more than the basic desire to rectify the existing bias in the literature, this chapter has 
emphasised the importance of studying the impact of state sponsorship on the democratic 
effects of participation on two counts. Firstly, state involvement in civil society (both in terms 
of shaping the regulatory framework and socio-political environment as well as actively 
intervening to support favoured initiatives) is a reality and therefore worthy of thorough-
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going academic scrutiny. Accepting for a moment, as many do, that state intervention in civil 
society has an inherently negative democratic impact, investigation of the specific impact of 
state support on the democratic effects of participation nonetheless provides an insight into 
the interaction between state and societal interests and informs our understanding of the 
nature of the political system at hand. Secondly, the democratic effects of participation are not 
solely dependent on the democratic credentials of the motives or intentions of those initiating 
participation. Thus, potential positive democratic effects of state-sponsored participation 
should not be dismissed on the grounds that state support for participatory initiatives 
prioritises its own interests above public interests. The fact that the state is the primary agent 
in initiating participation should not automatically override other factors in assessing the 
democratic effects of participation: Attention should also be paid to factors such as the socio-
political environment and the nature of participation itself, as scholars of NGOs have noted. 
Rather than employing Nashi and the Young Guard as an example of the positive democratic 
effects of state-sponsored participation, the validity of this thesis rests only on the democratic 
impact of state support for the youth movements being far more complex than simple negative 
causation. This study will identify specific features of the impact of state support for Nashi 
and the Young Guard on various categories of potential democratic effects (public sphere, 
institutional and developmental – explained below), discerning any differences between the 
two state-sponsored youth movements as well as highlighting the significance of factors other 
than state-sponsorship in determining the democratic effects of participation. Before 
embarking upon this task in the main body of the thesis (chapters 2-7) this study must first set 
out the framework and methodology employed to evaluate the impact of state sponsorship on 
the democratic effects of participation in the case of Nashi and the Young Guard. 
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Conceptualising the democratic effects of Nashi and the Young Guard 
Although analysing the ‗democratic‘ effects of state-sponsored participation is necessarily a 
normative task,
18
 this study refrains as far as possible from becoming bogged down in 
discussion of the relative nature of the concept of democracy. Acknowledging the breadth of 
literature devoted to the concept of democracy in Eastern Europe alone as well as recognising 
the relevance among others of the ideas of ‗electoral democracy‘ or ‗managed democracy‘ for 
evaluating the democratic effects of state-sponsored youth participation in Russia,
19
 this study 
nonetheless chooses to adopt a more clinical approach to assessing the democratic effects of 
Nashi and the Young Guard in the hope that this will bring greater clarity and provide a more 
objective and comprehensive assessment than adopting one or other concept of democracy 
would. This decision is justified on the grounds that issues of contention regarding definitions 
of democracy and what constitutes a ‗consolidated democracy‘ are concerned with 
determining what the end point of the democratisation process is and with providing labels 
that can be used to determine whether a country has achieved a certain level or quality of 
democracy; whereas this study is concerned only with measuring the various positive or 
negative democratic effects of state-sponsored youth participation in the case of Nashi and the 
Young Guard, not what examination of state support for these youth movements reveals about 
the nature or progression of Russian democracy as a whole. Nonetheless, in adopting 
Warren‘s categorisation of the potential democratic effects of association, discussed below, 
                                                 
18 Not only is the concept of democracy in general a normative concept, but the rationale for undertaking this 
research is inevitably imbued with a sense of the bias involved in dismissing state-sponsored participatory 
initiatives from analyses of participation and development based on liberal democratic assumptions made 
about the role of the state in civil society. 
19 The concept of ‘electoral democracy’ is associated with Schumpeter (1976). The term ‘managed democracy’ 
is used frequently to refer to contemporary Russia, for instance see Balzer (2003). 
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this study appropriates the liberal democratic frame of reference for analysing the democratic 
effects of participation contained in Warren‘s work.20  
Developing a framework for discussing the interaction between different democratic 
effects of associations, which he intends to be employed by other researchers in a case-study 
approach, Warren distinguishes between three types of democratic effects – public sphere, 
institutional and developmental (2001, p.13). Categorisation of the potential democratic 
effects of participation in this way is extremely useful for the purposes of this study as it 
enables the researcher to separate areas where the state is assumed to have a particularly 
negative impact (public sphere democratic effects) from areas where it is conceivable that the 
state could potentially have a positive effect (institutional democratic effects) as well as to 
draw out the manner in which ‗trade-offs‘ can and often do occur between different 
democratic effects of participation (Warren, 2001, p.12). As noted above, while state-
sponsored participatory initiatives‘ perceived lack of autonomy and negative impact on the 
development of civil society forms the basis for the common assumption that state-sponsored 
participation has an inherently corrosive influence, at the same time it is recognised that the 
state has the potential to boost the positive democratic effects of participation in other areas 
such as access to decision-making and representation in formal political institutions.  Within 
each broad category of democratic effects as well there are possibilities for trade-offs whereby 
some positive effects naturally come at the expense of others. Thus Warren‘s approach to 
framing the democratic effects of participation so as to take into account the interplay 
between different effects without giving any obvious priority to one particular area of 
democratic effects over another is considered to be an appropriate framework for this study. 
                                                 
20 It is worth noting that this thesis is applying Warren’s criteria for measuring the democratic effects of 
associations in contemporary Russia, which is based on study of associations in America. 
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However, although the framework for this study is heavily based on Warren‘s 
disaggregation of the possible effects of participation, it does not apply Warren‘s 
conceptualisation in a prescriptive fashion. Seeking to uncover the dominant democratic 
effects of Nashi and the Young Guard and explore any tradeoffs between them, this study 
identifies six specific areas from Warren‘s exhaustive breakdown of the potential democratic 
effects of associations on which to focus (two for each of the three categories of democratic 
effects).  The six areas of the potential democratic effects of association, which form the basis 
of this investigation, are set out below under the headings of the three broader categories of 
public sphere, institutional, and development democratic effects.  These six areas correspond 
directly to each of the six chapters that comprise the main body of this thesis. 
 
Public sphere democratic effects  
‗Public sphere democratic effects‘ refers to the ―formation of public opinion and public 
judgment, especially by providing the social infrastructure of public spheres that develop 
agendas, test ideas, embody deliberations, and provide voice‖ (Warren, 2001, p. 61). In other 
words, ‗public sphere democratic effects‘ refers to the impact of participation on the 
development of a functioning civil society.
21
 Warren identifies three areas of potential public 
sphere democratic effects of organisations: ‗public communication and deliberation‘, 
‗representations of difference‘ and ‗representations of commonality‘. Focusing on the areas of 
potential democratic effects that relate directly to Nashi and the Young Guard, this thesis 
considers the relevant aspects of ‗representations of difference‘ and ‗representations of 
                                                 
21 The definition of ‘civil society’ used in this thesis is discussed in the introduction to Part 1 on pages 43 and 44. 
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commonality‘ together in its analysis and the key research questions concerning the public 
sphere democratic effects of Nashi and the Young Guard are thus as follows: 
1. Public communication and deliberation – How has having state sponsorship affected 
Nashi and the Young Guard‘s ability to make ‗public presentation of their cause‘ and 
thus to exert public influence? Are Nashi and the Young Guard sufficiently distanced 
from the state and from ‗sensitivity to power and money‘ to be able to develop a 
public agenda and to formulate public opinion (Warren, 2001, p. 80)? 
2. Commonality and difference – Do Nashi and the Young Guard foster the development 
of bonds of mutual trust and reciprocity between young Russians by building youth 
communities?  Are Nashi and the Young Guard able to challenge the status quo by 
recognising difference of opinion and ‗discursive challenges‘ as opposed to 
representing a ‗mainstream consensus‘ (Warren, 2001, p.81)?   
 
Institutional democratic effects  
 ‗Institutional democratic effects‘ refers to the manner in which associations may ―influence 
the extent to which the institutions of voting and representation work in democratic ways […] 
by providing political representation, enabling pressure and resistance, organizing political 
processes, facilitating cooperation, and serving as alternative venues for governance‖ 
(Warren, 2001, p. 61). Warren identifies 5 areas of potential institutional democratic effects of 
organisations: representation, resistance, subsidiarity,
22
 coordination and cooperation, and 
democratic legitimisation. For the purposes of this thesis democratic legitimisation and 
                                                 
22 This refers to the ways in which organisations can “serve the social infrastructure of subsidiarity” by 
encouraging self-governance in tackling social/moral problems, which have less success when dealt with at the 
state level by issuing sanctions and such like (Warren, 2001, p. 88). 
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representation are identified as the key areas of potential democratic effects of Nashi and the 
Young Guard and the key research questions are as follows:  
3. Democratic legitimisation - In what ways do Nashi and the Young Guard serve to 
―underwrite the legitimacy of the state‖ in terms of encouraging support for state 
policy, democratic processes and institutions (Warren, 2001, p. 91)? 
4. Representation – How has having state sponsorship affected Nashi and the Young 
Guard‘s ability to provide representation for young Russians and communicate their 
interests at state level? 
 
Developmental democratic effects  
Finally, ‗developmental effects‘ refers to the ways in which participation in associations ―may 
contribute to forming, enhancing, and supporting the capacities of democratic citizens […] to 
participate in collective judgment and decision-making and to develop autonomous judgments 
that reflect their considered wants and beliefs‖ (Warren, 2001, p. 61).  Of the five areas of 
potential developmental democratic effects defined by Warren, ‗efficacy‘, ‗political skills‘ 
and ‗critical skills‘ are considered together here and ‗information‘ is disregarded as neither 
Nashi nor the Young Guard aims to provide any kind of information service. The two 
resultant areas of developmental effects investigated in this thesis and the key research 
questions for each are set out below.  
5. Political efficacy and critical skills - How have Nashi and the Young Guard 
contributed to changing perceptions of youth in Russian politics and society and to 
improving young Russians‘ political efficacy? Do Nashi and the Young Guard enable 
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the development of critical and cognitive skills required for participants to be able to 
form autonomous judgements? Is there the opportunity for internal debate and conflict 
to arise and be resolved by deliberative means? 
6. Civic virtues - How do Nashi and the Young Guard promote or hinder the 
development of civic virtues such as tolerance and respect? How has having state-
sponsorship affected this? 
 
The relative influence of state-sponsorship for Nashi and the Young Guard is all-important for 
this study. When measuring the youth movements‘ democratic effects in the above categories, 
this study considers whether it is likely that the same outcome would have been possible 
without state support. It also evaluates to what extent gains made in some areas with the help 
of state support have come at the expense of other areas of potential democratic effects. The 
point of reference for evaluating the democratic effects of Nashi and the Young Guard in this 
study is the corresponding situation in Russia prior to the youth movements‘ development. 
Thus, in terms of representation, for example, this study seeks to assess how representation of 
young people in Russian politics has changed since 2005, to what extent there has been an 
improvement or deterioration, and what of the positive or negative democratic effects here 
can be reasonably attributed to Nashi or the Young Guard and the impact of having state-
sponsorship. Similarly, with regard to the youth movements‘ contribution to the development 
of a functioning civil society, the wider context of political repression in Russia is considered 
only insofar as Nashi and the Young Guard have themselves reinforced or exacerbated this 
problem. This study does not measure the democratic effects of Nashi and the Young Guard 
against the movements‘ own objectives, although examination of the movements‘ objectives 
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is a useful indicator of their potential democratic effects.  Comparison with other countries is 
used for illustrative purposes; however, this study is aware of the importance of continually 
situating its evaluation of the democratic effects of Nashi and the Young Guard in the Russian 
context in order to identify the pre-existing conditions by which to measure the impact of state 
sponsorship for Nashi and the Young Guard. The key question is not so much what the 
democratic effects of state-sponsored participation in the case of Nashi and the Young Guard 
have been, but rather how having state sponsorship has impacted upon these.  
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Methodology 
 
Aims of the thesis 
- To identify the democratic effects, both positive and negative, of Nashi and the Young 
Guard in the three main areas already identified (public sphere, institutional and 
developmental) and explore the trade-offs between these effects. 
- To seek voices unheard in the West and address the gap in the literature on 
participation and development. 
- To illustrate the complexity of state-sponsored participation by demonstrating that the 
state‘s intentions are not the only factor that shapes the democratic effects of Nashi 
and the Young Guard.   
- To demonstrate the value of studying state-sponsored participation as well as 
autonomous participatory initiatives. 
In order to address these aims and meet the demands of assessing each of the different 
categories of democratic effects, it was decided that this research required a multi-vector 
approach. Such an approach would also allow for anticipated likely problems with data 
generation in the field, including but not limited to the researcher‘s status as a Westerner, the 
provocative normative aspect of the research topic relating to processes of democratisation in 
Russia, the difficulties of accessing sensitive documentary material, and the unreliability of 
statistical data on elections. Ultimately the process of data-generation needed to be a reflexive 
process and open to change.
23
 
 
                                                 
23 The term data generation is used purposefully here rather than data collection to acknowledge the 
researcher’s role in producing the data as a result of their engagement with the field.  
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Qualitative research methods 
Semi-structured elite interviews: At the heart of this analysis is the investigation of Nashi and 
the Young Guard‘s relationship with the state and the need to try to gain a better 
understanding of the dynamics involved with state-sponsored participation in this case – what 
does having state sponsorship mean for these youth movements and ultimately how has it 
impacted upon the movements‘ democratic effects?  For this purpose, elite interviews were 
selected as the primary method of data generation. This method is considered to be the most 
reliable way of enabling the researcher to investigate complex attitudes and perceptions 
within the situational context of the social, political and cultural norms of the participant. 
Interviews were held with Nashi and Young Guard leaders in Moscow in July 2008 and, 
rather than simply gaining as many interviews as possible or continuing to interview whoever 
was able until saturation point was reached, emphasis was placed on conducting in-depth 
interviews with key figures identified beforehand. 21 interviews were conducted with Nashi 
and 16 with Young Guard leaders in summer 2008. No opportunity was afforded me to 
communicate with anyone in the Kremlin involved in setting up Nashi or supporting these 
youth movements. Vladislav Surkov, widely accepted to be the instigator of Nashi from 
within the Kremlin, was not available for comment at any point despite several attempts to 
arrange some form of interview or communication with him during my fieldwork. The 
interviews were semi-structured because, although I had an agenda and set items that I wanted 
to discuss, I wanted the content to be determined as much as possible by the interviewee in 
order to allow them room to shape the discussion and thus enable the data generated to 
capture their interests and concerns. All interviews were recorded and anonymity provided at 
the interviewees‘ discretion.  
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 Having anticipated that there might be issues in the field with participants‘ potential 
perception of me as a critical, anti-Kremlin Westerner, I made sure to take care to begin each 
interview by explaining the starting point for my research, my reasons for studying the 
democratic effects of state-sponsored participation in Russia, and most importantly my 
genuine interest in finding out more about these Kremlin-sponsored youth movements. 
However, I still found that I was initially treated with suspicion or at least cynicism by some 
Nashi and the Young Guard elites. The usual suspicion and hostility towards Britons by 
Russian loyalists was not helped by framing this research in terms of the democratic effects of 
state-sponsored participation, because immediately it was likely to be assumed that my 
version of democracy was a Western construct, and thus that I intended to criticise the 
Kremlin and by extension Nashi and the Young Guard. The fact that I was young in this case 
seemed to work in my favour, adding credibility to my interest in the youth movements as 
well as perhaps passing me off as naive and the product of the British government‘s perceived 
aggression towards the Kremlin and ‗hypocritical democratising mission‘ rather than as 
personally critical of the Kremlin. Yet even when I managed to convince them of the integrity 
of my interest in Nashi and the Young Guard, it became apparent that sometimes it was 
assumed that I could not be reasonably expected to understand the nature of Russian 
democracy and the function of state-sponsored organisations such as these. Nonetheless, the 
elite interviews have subsequently provided a rich resource for this study, providing a unique 
insight into the functioning and mindset of Nashi and the Young Guard. Although it must be 
acknowledged that this data necessarily has a partisan bias, this information source has been 
deliberately and specifically sought out in order to provide a platform for voices hitherto 
unheard in the West. 
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Informal talks / internet blogging and social networking sites: This author takes the 
‗interpretivist‘ view that activists‘ own perceptions of the implications of Nashi and the 
Young Guards‘ activity and the significance that they personally attach to their own 
experience within these organisations is key to assessing the democratic effects of 
participation (Mason, 2002, p. 56) – especially the developmental democratic effects, such as  
activists‘ political efficacy, their ability to form autonomous judgments and their attitude 
towards others. In this respect, the methodological strategy adopted in this study represents an 
inductive approach to answering the research question (Flick, 2002, p. 2), because the value 
attributed to elements of participation by interviewees, their framing of their story of personal 
development as well as the emphasis added by them all guide analysis of the developmental 
democratic effects of Nashi and the Young Guard.
24
 In order to obtain this kind of highly 
personalised and sensitive data, informal talks with small groups of activists was initially 
chosen as the most suitable method of getting members of Nashi and the Young Guard to 
share their personal experiences and attitudes. However, it proved to be difficult to gain 
access to activists, particularly Young Guard members and, again, the impact of my own role 
in the process of data generation and as a factor in the research process became all too 
obvious. In this instance, it quickly became apparent that participants‘ perceptions of me as a 
Western outsider researching pro-Kremlin youth movements was shaping the content of the 
discussion such that I believe that participants were refraining from sharing their true opinions 
and thoughts with me and were saying what they thought I wanted to hear and selecting the 
information they chose to share with me. Evidently I needed to be able to interact with 
activists over a period of time in order to first break down the barriers between myself and 
                                                 
24 Whether or not the effects of participation conveyed by the interviewees can be substantiated or somehow 
verified is not the ultimate assessment of the validity of that evidence. The fact that those involved directly in 
participating in Nashi and the Young Guard perceive them to be the effects renders them meaningful for 
analysis.  
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them and to gain their trust and understanding of the purpose and ethics of my research. 
Fortunately, the opportunity presented itself for me to be able to spend two weeks with Nashi 
activists at the movement‘s annual summer camp at Lake Seliger in July 2008. Taking part in 
the camp myself as a full participant (eating, sleeping, studying, relaxing and sharing chores 
with Nashi members at all times) and being of a similar age to many of the young people 
there, I was able to build relationships with groups of them during the course of the camp and 
hold several productive informal group discussions with activists from different regions. No 
such opportunity was afforded me to spend a period of time with Young Guard activists 
engaging with them on their own terms and therefore an alternative strategy of obtaining this 
data was necessary. 
‗Zhivoi Zhurnal‘ (Live Journal) and ‗V Kontakte‘ (In touch) are two web-based 
communication sites. I first became aware of Zhivoi Zhurnal on return from Russia in August 
2008 as this became the means of my ongoing correspondence with several Nashi and Young 
Guard leaders that I had interviewed at length in Moscow. The Young Guard itself also has its 
own account on Zhivoi Zhurnal, which activists use as a forum for discussion and which I 
have been able to observe and also use as a way of contacting Young Guard activists.
25
 Zhivoi 
Zhurnal users can send each other messages and view each other‘s blogs. V Kontakte is 
another popular Russian social networking site.
26
 Again I was introduced to this on return 
from Russia when the group of Nashi activists whose particular camp I shared suggested 
using this as a way of staying in touch with them. Since then I have been able to use this site 
to initiate and maintain contact with other Nashi and Young Guard activists and in this way 
have informal conversations with them via the internet in a way that they feel comfortable 
                                                 
25 http://molgvardia.livejournal.com/  
26 http://vkontakte.ru/  
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with and with more productive results than attempts to organise informal discussion groups in 
the field had brought. 
I decided that it would be a truer reflection of activists‘ genuine impressions of the 
relationship between various influences on agenda formation and practices in Nashi and the 
Young Guard if I were to deliberately refrain from any direct questioning of this topic and 
instead gage this through snatched glimpses within wider conversations about their work with 
Nashi and the Young Guard, the function of the youth movements and simply their reasons 
for joining. 
Reflection and observation: As in any qualitative piece of research, ―instead of excluding it as 
far as possible‖ the researcher‘s inevitable interaction with the field is embraced and becomes 
part of the data (Flick, 2002, p. 6). Keeping a fieldwork diary of my experience of being in the 
field and noting my observations during the course of my stay at Nashi‘s camp at Lake 
Seliger – any difficulties that I encountered, and my impressions of interviews and 
participants‘ reaction to me – proved to be a great asset over my time in the field and during 
analysis. Not only did my diary enable me to reflect on my fieldwork, adjust my strategy and 
adopt new tactics when appropriate, but it was also extremely useful as a complementary data 
source in contextualising interviews and informal talks as well as providing a record of my 
own thoughts and feelings.  
Documentary analysis: Documentary data sources were examined prior to the fieldwork, 
including Nashi and the Young Guard‘s manifestos and press-releases as well as official state 
documents, speeches and policy relating to youth, in order to generate ideas as to the 
democratic goals and intentions of those involved in developing Nashi and the Young Guard. 
As Mason notes, ―effective generation of data‖ during the interview process and during 
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informal talks is ―contingent upon [the researcher‘s] prior analysis‖ of data from documentary 
sources (Mason, 2002, p. 60). However, given the significance of actor‘s perceptions and 
insider perspectives in this study, documentary data were only partial forms of evidence. Only 
alongside the insider perspective of activists and those who have a place within the hierarchy 
of these organisations, gained from narrative analysis of elite interviews and informal 
communications with activists, was documentary analysis able to provide an insight into the 
democratic effects of Nashi and the Young Guard.  Documentary analysis was nonetheless 
useful in tracking changes in the strategies used by the youth movements over time as well as 
for comparing the rhetoric between the two. 
 
Quantitative research methods 
Data compilation and statistical analysis: Quantitative research methods were used alongside 
qualitative methods in the section on institutional democratic effects as appropriate to 
investigate the following: 
- The composition of the State Duma of the Russian Federation over successive 
convocations by age, party and time in office.  
- The age distribution of candidates on United Russia‘s party lists for elections to 
legislative assemblies at all levels between April 2006 and April 2009 compared with 
that of the elected United Russia deputies. 
- The percentage of elections to executive office won by under 35 year olds in the 
period 2003-4 compared to 2007-8. 
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- The number of legislative projects initiated by young United Russia Duma deputies in 
the first six months of the 5
th
 convocation (between 2/12/07 and 2/6/08) and their 
success rate. 
At times this research was hampered by inconsistencies in the availability of data, particularly 
with regard to analyses of the age composition of United Russia‘s party lists and elected 
deputies for elections to legislative assemblies prior to 2007. 
Surveys of specific groups: Surveying targeted groups of United Russia State Duma deputies 
rather than using a qualitative interview approach was considered to be more appropriate in 
this instance, not simply because of the difficulties of arranging personal interviews with busy 
parliamentary deputies, but because there was no need for questions to be tailored specifically 
to each interview. Instead a list of generic questions was compiled for each of the identified 
groups of interest – new, existing and former United Russia State Duma deputies – and these 
were sent electronically to the deputies via United Russia‘s portal for Duma deputies past and 
present.
27
 Again anonymity was provided at the respondents‘ discretion and I believe that this 
method of contacting deputies electronically rather than any personalised or intrusive 
approach encouraged deputies, who would not have otherwise consented to give me an 
interview on the topic at hand, to respond to my questions at their own convenience revealing 
as much or as little information as they felt comfortable with. Rather than using stratified 
purposive sampling usually employed to identify and target key people considered to be 
representative of particular groups, it was decided to contact all United Russia State Duma 
deputies to account for the fact that the response rate was likely to be extremely low. In 
addition, follow-up contact with the deputies was made several months later in order to chase 
up further responses. In the end, responses were received from 35 deputies spanning all the 
                                                 
27 http://www.er-duma.ru/  
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age brackets as well as including new, existing and former United Russia deputies.  These 
responses were then coded thematically in order to allow me to develop a general picture of 
the predominant attitudes and opinions of deputies, but deputies‘ full responses to all 
questions were retained intact and no data was removed from its original context. 
 
 
 
 
Starting point for this research 
Selecting Nashi and the Young Guard as case-studies for exploring the potential democratic 
effects of state-sponsored participation in this study is not to automatically eschew existing 
scholarship on the increasingly authoritarian nature of the contemporary Russian regime and 
naively embark upon what might be called a futile quest for signs of democratisation. This 
study recognises that the primary motivation for the Kremlin in committing its considerable 
resources and influence to supporting the development of Nashi and the Young Guard was to 
prevent the perceived threat of a Russian ‗coloured revolution‘. Yet this study endeavours to 
go beyond the state‘s objectives in supporting Nashi and the Young Guard to reveal the actual 
democratic outcomes of participation and the significance here of factors other than having 
state sponsorship.  As such, this study does not seek to claim that the Kremlin does not have 
its own agenda in supporting the development of Nashi and the Young Guard or that having 
state sponsorship does not have a negative impact overall on the potential democratic effects 
of youth participation in this case (although that remains to be seen). It is argued only that 
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normative criticisms of the active Russian state be eschewed in favour of objective evaluation 
of the democratic effects of state-sponsored youth participation in the same way that 
unreserved praise for NGO-led participatory initiatives has been checked.  Regardless of the 
state‘s intentions, the specificities of the ensuing democratic effects, positive and negative, 
deserve scrutiny.   
Furthermore, it should be emphasised that this study has not been driven by a desire to 
uncover positive democratic effects of state-sponsored participation in the case of Nashi and 
the Young Guard. While this study seeks to question the assumption that state-sponsored 
participation is inherently undemocratic, it does not argue that the state should intervene in 
civil society or that state-sponsored participation necessarily entails some positive democratic 
effects. The objective of this study is not to present the findings of the democratic effects of 
‗Nashi and the ‗Young Guard‘ as an evidence-based contribution to the case for or against 
state-sponsored participation in Russia and beyond. Rather, this study aims only to put 
forward state-sponsored participation as an object of scrutiny. It provides evidence of the 
multitude and complexity of factors that influence the potential democratic effects of 
participation beyond the initiator‘s intentions (in this case the Kremlin‘s) in order to support 
the argument that the democratic effects of state-sponsored participation should not be 
disregarded simply because of the state‘s involvement.   
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PART ONE - PUBLIC SPHERE DEMOCRATIC 
EFFECTS OF NASHI AND THE YOUNG GUARD 
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INTRODUCTION 
As established in Chapter 1, rejection of state-sponsored participation is derived from the 
classical Habermassian conception of the public sphere as necessarily distinct from the state.  
From this fundamental perspective, state involvement in participatory initiatives inherently 
impedes the development of a functioning civil society by encroaching on the necessary 
autonomy of the public sphere and thereby restricting the development of a public agenda and 
suppressing the articulation of non-dominant or alternative discourses. Based on this 
reckoning of the logic behind widespread dismissal of state-sponsored initiatives among the 
literature on participation and development, it is the state‘s apparent disabling impact on the 
democratic effects of participation in the realm of public sphere effects in particular that 
constitutes the core of such an approach.
28
 Thus, by investigating the public sphere effects of 
state-sponsored participation, Part 1 begins the main body of this study by directly 
interrogating the underlying assumptions behind the view that state involvement necessarily 
has a detrimental impact on the democratic effects of participation. Notably, the adoption of 
Nashi and the Young Guard as case-studies in this thesis entails its own normative 
implications as the prevalence of current perceptions of the Kremlin‘s authoritarian tendencies 
reinforces existing assumptions of the negative impact of state involvement here. By selecting 
case studies which are generally considered to be the epitome of the negative democratic 
effects of state-sponsored participation rather than cases which might be readily 
                                                 
28 According to Warren’s categorisation of the democratic effects of association adopted in this study and 
discussed previously in Chapter 1, ‘public sphere’ democratic effects refers to the “formation of public opinion 
and public judgment, especially by providing the social infrastructure of public spheres that develop agendas, 
test ideas, embody deliberations, and provide voice” (2001, p. 61). In other words, the public sphere 
democratic effects of participation in the case of Nashi and the Young Guard refers to the youth movements’ 
impact on the development of a functioning civil society – both in terms of the abilities of Nashi and the Young 
Guard themselves to gain publicity and develop a public agenda as well as their impact on the development of 
civil society more broadly and the articulation of alternative viewpoints. 
 
 
42 
 
acknowledged as an exception to the rule, Part 1 challenges the Habermassian conception of 
the state-society dialectic and the resultant disregard for the potential democratic effects of 
state-sponsored participatory initiatives to its very core.
29
  
On a basic level, Part 1 seeks to verify whether or not the assumption of injury to civil 
society is borne out in the case of state-sponsored youth participation in contemporary Russia. 
While finding that the overall impact of state-sponsorship on the public sphere democratic 
effects of Nashi and the Young Guard is indeed negative would not validate generic dismissal 
of all possible democratic effects of state-sponsored participatory initiatives (including 
institutional and developmental democratic effects as defined in Chapter 1), it would 
nonetheless demonstrate the legitimacy of adopting a critical attitude towards state 
involvement on these grounds. In this way, the conclusions drawn in Part 1 set up the rest of 
the study by determining whether this basis for the common rejection of the potential 
democratic effects of state-sponsored participation holds firm. Further to this rudimentary 
objective of simply checking the assumption that the state has an inherently negative impact 
on the development of a functioning civil society, Part 1 draws out the tensions between voice 
(the opportunity to effectively propagate your message to the public) and integrity (the ability 
to act freely and in accordance with members‘ own interests unencumbered by external 
influence), and the resultant quandary facing associations in contemporary Russia. 
Conceiving of state-sponsorship as potentially being both a blessing and a burden for 
participatory initiatives in general and, moreover, a pre-requisite for survival under the 
present conditions of the Russian regime, Part 1 considers how having state sponsorship may 
have enabled Nashi and the Young Guard to facilitate the development of Russian civil 
                                                 
29 Akkerman, Hajer and Grin’s analysis of state stimulation of citizen participation in policy-making in the 
Netherlands, noted in Chapter 1, might be considered to be a more obvious exception to the rule (Akkerman, 
Hajer & Grin, 2004).  
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society in some ways and caused them to compound existing restrictions on the development 
of civil society in other ways. In doing so, Part One seeks to make some preliminary findings 
as to what factors affect the varying impact of state-sponsorship on the democratic effects of 
participation for further consideration in Parts 2 and 3. 
Before embarking upon this analysis it is first necessary to detail what is meant by a 
‗functioning civil society‘. Although there are valid arguments for adopting a far narrower, 
more distinct focus on civil society, for the purposes of this study the term ‗civil society‘ is 
used in a broad sense to refer to any grouping that is located between the family unit and the 
state (to include social movements, civic associations, trade unions and so on). The adoption 
of so broad an understanding of civil society is justified by the fact that this study is not 
concerned with distinguishing civil society from other elements of society but simply with 
discerning the broad influences of state-sponsored participation for Nashi and the Young 
Guard on the emergence and development of groupings within society. In terms of what the 
measures of a functioning civil society are, this study distinguishes between the vertical and 
horizontal functions of civil society.
30
 Chapter 2 begins by exploring the impact of state 
support for Nashi and the Young Guard on the vertical functions of civil society. 
Conceptualising these democratic effects as communication flows between associations 
(located in the public sphere), the wider public, and the state, Chapter 2 assesses the 
significance of state support for Nashi and the Young Guard‘s ability to make ‗public 
presentation of their cause‘ (downwards communication flow from the public sphere to the 
wider public) and to develop a public agenda (upwards communication flow from the wider 
public to the public sphere). Does state-sponsored participation imply the top-down 
                                                 
30 While not unique to their work on civil society, the distinction between the vertical and horizontal functions 
of civil society adopted in this study was inspired by McFaul and Treyger’s chapter on civil society in the edited 
volume Between Dictatorship and Democracy: Russian Post-Communist Political Reform (McFaul, Petrov, & 
Ryabov, 2004).  
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transmission of a particular message from the state to the public? Focusing more on the 
impact of state-sponsored participation on other groups and on the development of civil 
society as a whole rather than on the capabilities of those receiving state support per se, 
Chapter 3 proceeds to examine Nashi and the Young Guard‘s effects on the horizontal 
workings of civil society. It asks whether Nashi and the Young Guard have been able to 
recognise difference of opinion and ‗discursive challenges‘ as opposed to representing a 
‗mainstream consensus‘ (Warren, 2001, p. 81) as well as to what extent the youth movements 
have contributed to building ‗social capital‘ by developing networks of civic engagement and 
reciprocity between young people across Russia (Putnam, 1993; 1995). The density and 
spread of networks of participants are considered alongside the youth movements‘ interaction 
with other civil-society groups. Has Nashi and the Young Guard‘s dominance come at the 
expense of other groups and the development of civil society in Russia? Is there a basic and 
undeniable good of participation for civil society in general regardless? 
To complicate matters further, although civil society and democracy are interlinked, 
civil society can be used for undemocratic ends and with undemocratic goals in mind. It is 
thus important to stress that this study considers Nashi and the Young Guard‘s contribution to 
the development of civil society as a potential (public sphere) democratic effect only insofar 
as the youth movements serve to support or undermine the development of a functioning civil 
society according to the criteria detailed above. Whether Nashi and the Young Guard are 
pursuing an entirely democratic agenda or whether Russian civil society in general is 
currently directed towards democracy as its end goal is another matter entirely.
31
 This is not 
an attempt to sidestep or to obscure what is a thorny issue and perhaps the main bone of 
contention that scholars interested in the development of Russian civil society and 
                                                 
31 Chapter 7 of this thesis will broach the topic of the democratic credentials of the ethos and methods 
employed by the youth movements. 
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democratisation would have with Kremlin-sponsored groups such as Nashi and the Young 
Guard. Rather, it is an attempt to leave aside the broader, long-examined question of Russia‘s 
political trajectory and future prospects for democratic consolidation in order to clarify what 
precisely the impact of having state sponsorship is on the democratic effects of participation 
(both positive and negative) and why this is the case. 
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CHAPTER 2 – PUBLIC COMMUNICATION AND DELIBERATION  
This chapter considers the impact of state sponsorship on the vertical functions of civil 
society in terms of dominant communication flows between the state, the public sphere and 
the wider public.  For the purposes of analysis these communication flows are broken down 
into two streams, which are considered in turn.  
[1] The way in which participatory initiatives may provide a public platform and 
communicate their ideas downwards to the wider public, encouraging support for 
their cause.  
[2] Conversely, the way that participatory initiatives may serve as an arena for the 
formation of public opinion and thus the upward flow of ideas from societal 
groups, developed in the public sphere, and then articulated at government level. 
Conceptualising the potential public sphere democratic effects of participation in this manner 
highlights the two-way interaction between participatory initiatives and the wider public. This 
becomes significant when it is considered that the implicit critique of state-sponsored 
participation contained within the Habermassian tradition (discussed in Chapter 1) centres on 
the assumption that state intervention in civil society denotes a top-down influence and 
impedes the upward flow of ideas necessary for the development of a public agenda (see 
Figure 1 below). 
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Figure 1 - Dominant communication flows between the state, the public sphere and the wider 
public 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In broad terms, Chapter 2 identifies the extent to which Nashi and the Young Guard fit 
the ‗classical‘ model of dominant communication flows set out in Figure 1 or whether they 
are better characterised as exhibiting ‗reversed flow‘ as a result of having state sponsorship. In 
doing so, this chapter investigates not only precisely what the impact of having state support 
has been for Nashi and the Young Guard, as far as public communication and deliberation are 
concerned, but also how, why and under what conditions state sponsorship has had this effect. 
In terms of the tensions between voice and integrity (noted in the introduction to Part 1), the 
relative strengths of the youth movements‘ allegiances to the state and to their own members 
are interrogated and their implications considered in light of the lack of viable alternative to 
state-sponsorship in contemporary Russia as well as the unique political environment for 
youth politics following the ‗Orange Revolution‘ in Ukraine. Essentially, Chapter 2 questions 
whether it is better, in terms of the development of a functioning civil society in Russia, for 
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pro-regime groups to accept the imposition of external limitations on the scope of dialogue 
and action possible (the debilitating effect of such compromises on ideology and principle 
would be far greater for oppositional groups than for pro-regime groups) than to potentially 
face losing all access to administrative resources and support necessary to be heard not only 
by power-holders but also by the general public. 
The chapter begins by exploring the downward flows of communication from Nashi 
and the Young Guard to the general public. In particular it evaluates the impact of having 
state support on the youth movements‘ ability to gain publicity and thus to exert public 
influence. After delineating the significance of state support for the youth movements‘ 
publicity and the relative democratic effects thereof, the chapter proceeds to consider whether 
this impact is likely to be enduring given the nature of its origins. Next, the upward channels 
of communication, by which Nashi and the Young Guard are able to develop and articulate a 
public agenda, are explored in detail in order to ascertain whether state intervention in this 
case signifies the complete subordination of societal interests to those of the state. Is it 
possible for the state to support the development of a public agenda of any kind and, if so, 
under what conditions and to what effect?  
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The power of publicity  
To the extent that they are directed to this end, the financial and administrative resources of 
any state may provide an organisation with unrivalled publicity by which to exert a public 
influence. In the case of the Russian state, however, the situation is more complex in that the 
Kremlin also reserves the right to deny publicity to those who fail to meet its approval. Thus, 
in the Russian context, state approval is critical for a group‘s ability to make public 
presentation of its cause. As far as Nashi and the Young Guard are concerned, state-
sponsorship has not simply improved the youth movements‘ ability to gain publicity, but has 
been the key to unlocking this positive democratic effect of participation.  
The high degree of control exerted over the Russian media by the Kremlin since 
Putin‘s accession to the presidency has been well documented by numerous studies concerned 
with the concentration of power within the central executive branch to the detriment of all 
other institutions and traditional loci of power.
32
 Essentially, the advantage to be gained from 
having state sponsorship rests on the regime‘s ability to direct media attention and provide 
favourable media coverage to its allies. Lipman refers to this phenomenon as 
‗newsworthiness‘ (2009, p.10) and explains how the Kremlin plays a very hands-on role in 
directing the news agenda for the television schedules on a weekly basis. 
Political TV broadcasting is managed by the joint effort of one or two Kremlin 
aides, including the head of the Kremlin press service and the directors of the 
three major TV channels. This is a cooperative and creative partnership — no 
coercion is involved. Jointly they shape the news agenda in weekly Friday 
                                                 
32 Indeed, in her chapter on the state of the Russian media, Oates strives to go beyond merely updating 
evidence of the state’s monopoly of the media and the impact of this on alternative voices in Russia to begin to 
identify specific particularities of the Russian media and to evaluate the causes and consequences of these 
traits (Oates in Evans, Henry & McIntosh-Sundstrom, 2006, p. 50). 
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meetings inside the Kremlin; then, during the week, the TV managers stay in 
touch with the Kremlin and fine-tune the coverage by phone. This system was 
honed during Putin‘s presidency and remained operative when he handed over the 
presidential office (as well as the head of the press service) to Medvedev. 
(Lipman, 2009, p.11) 
A prominent example and one which Lipman herself refers to is the speed with which Dmitrii 
Medvedev‘s public image and popularity was raised after President Putin anointed him his 
desired successor. According to Lipman, all the major TV channels switched to giving 
Medvedev ‗blanket coverage‘ from this point on and Medvedev‘s activities consistently 
became the key news items (2009, p.10). Whether the Kremlin is involved in detailing the 
news coverage of the main media outlets in such a direct fashion as Lipman states or whether 
the media outlets themselves are simply following the Kremlin‘s lead on the tacit 
understanding that groups or individuals which the Kremlin looks favourably upon and which 
serve the Kremlin‘s interests should be the focus of media attention, the outcome is still the 
same – there is a line of direct causality between Kremlin approval and positive media 
exposure. Certainly, Medvedev‘s popularity ratings (judged by the number of people who said 
they would vote for him as president if an election were to be held on the coming Sunday) 
jumped from 35%, in a survey conducted by the Levada Center immediately prior to Putin‘s 
endorsement of Medvedev as his preferred successor on 10
th
 December 2007, to 79% just two 
weeks later.
33
   
The other side of the coin is the tendency for media outlets in Russia to make 
disparaging comments towards or more often to simply ignore any political opposition or 
                                                 
33 Levada Center, 2007, ‘Prezidentskie reitingi – Vuibori 2008’, available at: 
http://www.levada.ru/vybory2008.html, last accessed 23 January 2010. Surveys conducted on 7-10 December 
and 21-24 December 2007. 
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non-state-approved initiative, which compounds the relative advantage to be gained from 
having state support. Comparison of public recognition of Nashi with long-standing 
opposition groups is indicative of the publicity afforded to Nashi as a result of having 
Kremlin backing. In a 2007 Carnegie Foundation survey of young Russians, just two years 
after Nashi was founded, only 67% of respondents had not heard of Nashi compared to 88% 
who had never heard of the Dvizhenie Protiv Nelegal’nii Immigratsii (Movement Against 
Illegal Immigration, hereafter ‗DPNI‘ – founded in 2002) and 71% who had never heard of 
the Natsional-Bol’shevistskaia Partiia (National Bolshevik Party, hereafter ‗NBP‘ – founded 
in 1992).
34
 A further case in point regarding the multitude of benefits of having state support 
for an organisation‘s ability to gain publicity is the series of rallies organised by the 
opposition in the run up to the 2007-8 electoral cycle and the counter rallies run by Nashi and 
the Young Guard. The ‗Marches of the Discontented‘, which were organised by several 
opposition groups working in collaboration, attracted only several thousand participants, often 
found themselves operating illegally in direct confrontation with the militsiia, and received 
relatively little media attention on the main television channels, all of which was negative.
35
 
In comparison, the ‗March of the Contented‘ and other Nashi and Young Guard rallies, which 
ran counter to the opposition demonstrations, attracted many more supporters and enjoyed the 
sanction and security of the authorities as well as relatively positive and extensive media 
coverage. The mass protests in Kaliningrad in January 2010, which are considered to be the 
                                                 
34 Carnegie Foundation, 2007, ‘Putin’s Generation: Political views of Russia’s youth, presentation by Sara 
Mendelson’, available at: 
http://www.carnegie.ru/ru/pubs/media/105712007%2007%2025%20Presentation%20corr.ppt, last accessed 5 
January 2010. The same survey showed that a significant proportion (41%) of all those who were members of 
or were interested in joining any of the 5 groups listed (Nashi, DPNI, NBP, Memorial and Walking Without 
Putin) expressed a preference for Nashi. The Young Guard was not included in this survey, however, a more 
recent survey conducted by the Forum for Public Opinion in 2010, which includes both Nashi and the Young 
Guard, will be discussed later in this chapter.  
35 In a public opinion survey conducted by the Levada Center in January 2007, when asked whether they 
understood the aims and slogans of the ‘March of the Discontented’, a massive 73% said that they ‘did not 
know anything about this or it was difficult to answer’ (available at www.levada.ru/press/2007011504.html, 
last accessed 4 March 2011). 
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largest opposition rallies of the decade, were not reported as leading stories on either of the 
two main news programmes Vremia or Segondniia as, despite their evident ‗news-
worthiness‘, their significance was potentially threatening to the regime.  
Moreover, not only are groups ill-favoured by the Kremlin shunned by a media that 
works in cahoots with the government, but such groups are further subject to discriminatory 
practices by the authorities facilitated by a raft of legislation introduced in Putin‘s second 
term, which increased state control over the right to assembly and freedom of association in 
Russia. The federal law ‗on fighting extremist activity‘, adopted in July 2002 and amended in 
July 2006, gave the Russian authorities the legal grounding to shut down any organisation that 
it perceives to be guilty of inciting extremist behaviour and effectively enabled them to 
silence any opposition to the incumbent regime by its vague definition and selective 
application of the term ‗extremist‘. In June 2004, tougher regulations on protest meetings and 
demonstrations were introduced, which imposed restrictions on the right to assembly and 
similarly enabled the authorities to prohibit opposition rallies at their own discretion. In 
January 2006, a new law regulating Non-Governmental Organisations was passed which 
meant that all NGOs operating in Russia had to re-register with the Russian government, 
disclose their sources of funding, and undergo expanded state auditing. By hampering the 
ability of Russian NGOs to secure Western funding, this move also contributed to bringing 
opposition to the Russian regime increasingly under state control and vulnerable to Kremlin 
disapproval.
36
 Aside from this specific legislation increasing state oversight of the functioning 
of public sphere organisations, the authorities have simply harassed and illegally detained 
members of the opposition on trumped up charges. For example, in late 2007, Oleg 
                                                 
36 This much criticised 2006 law on Non-Governmental Organisations was amended in July 2009 after members 
of the Obshchestvennaia Palata (Public Chamber) lobbied President Medvedev to simplify the registration 
process for NGOs and thus reduce the scope for abuse of this requirement by the authorities in order to deny 
organisations registration (Evans, 2009, p.9).  
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Kozlovsky, one of the leaders of the youth opposition group ‗Oborona’ (Defence), was 
illegally detained on charges of evading military service and not released until after the 
Presidential elections in March 2008. That is not to mention the numerous arrests and alleged 
use of violence to intimidate peaceful opposition protesters whose rallies were repeatedly 
prohibited by the authorities. Yet, although the Kremlin‘s propensity to abuse its power to 
marginalise alternative views from the public eye might naturally seem to underscore the 
negative democratic impact of state intervention in civil society, this tendency cannot properly 
be considered an effect of state-sponsorship for Nashi and the Young Guard. In fact, as far as 
the impact of state support on the democratic effects of Nashi and the Young Guard in 
isolation are concerned, the undemocratic methods and policy of political repression of the 
Russian state render the relative positive democratic effect of the publicity gained by the 
youth movements all the more significant.
37
 The benefit of having state support for Nashi and 
the Young Guard‘s ability to make public presentation of their cause is multiplied by the fact 
that without state approval, organisations are unable to find alternative means of mass 
publicity.   
 
Having established the critical significance of having state support for Nashi and the Young 
Guard‘s ability to make public presentation of their cause, it is important to note that this 
positive democratic effect is not necessarily enduring, especially as the degree of state support 
has naturally declined with the passing of the immediacy of the perceived threat of youth-led 
political instability in the period 2007-8. While to a certain extent this is true of any situation 
where the benefits are contingent on resources available through sponsorship that might be 
                                                 
37 The wider consequences of the benefits accrued to Nashi and the Young Guard by means of the state’s 
repressive tactics for other groups is given due consideration in Chapter 3 alongside the impact of Nashi and 
the Young Guard on pluralism and contestation and the development of civil society as a whole. 
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withdrawn at any point, this danger is far greater in the repressive political environment that 
exists in Russia, where there is little viable alternative to state support for the purpose of 
gaining media access to the domestic public and where the state is ready to abuse its power in 
order to disable any group that falls foul of its favour. In this way, the very socio-political 
conditions that boost the positive impact of having state support on Nashi and the Young 
Guard‘s publicity also render this benefit less secure.  
As implied at the beginning of this section on the ‗power of publicity‘, the extent of 
the benefit in terms of publicity to be derived from having state support is dependent on the 
extent to which the state‘s resources are directed towards the fulfilment of this objective. 
Although it is extremely difficult to pinpoint any precise information to evidence a decline in 
state funding for Nashi and the Young Guard, it is safe to say that the level of state funding 
made available for the youth movements‘ mass actions, which have been the main focus of 
publicity for the movements, has decreased with the completion of the 2007-8 electoral cycle 
and the emergence of new state priorities. Consequently, with less attention from the Kremlin 
since spring 2008, the extent of the advantage of having state support for Nashi and the 
Young Guard‘s ability to make public presentation of their cause has been reduced. Using the 
Eastview online archive as an indicator of print media coverage,
38
 apart from the ‗Podrabinek‘ 
anomaly between September and November 2009 (which will be discussed below), after 
peaking in 2007 by the end of 2008 the number of central newspaper articles referring to 
Nashi had trailed off to a consistently fairly low level of coverage. The greatest coverage of 
Nashi came in 2005 when the movement was launched and is higher each summer when the 
movement holds its annual youth forum. Coverage of the Young Guard peaked in 
                                                 
38 The Eastview online archive is available at http://online.eastview.com/login_russia/index.jsp. Although 
broadcast media and especially television attracts a far larger audience than print media, newspapers are used 
as the example here because information is more readily available and this study is simply concerned with the 
change in media coverage over a period of time. 
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spring/summer 2007 and decreased fairly steadily over the course of 2008  (see Figure 2 
below).
39
 
 
Figure 2 – Coverage of Nashi and the Young Guard in central Russian newspapers40 
 
 
Similarly, if one considers Nashi‘s annual summer camp held in July each year at Lake 
Seliger, in 2008 there was a noticeable, albeit perhaps predictable, reduction in the degree of 
celebrity and spectacle compared to the 2007 camp, which was held in the immediate run up 
to the parliamentary and presidential elections. In summer 2007, Putin, Medvedev and Sergei 
                                                 
39 While this is symptomatic of a natural and more general decline in the flurry of political activity and 
corresponding media reporting that marks the passing of any electoral campaign period, and does not 
necessarily provide evidence of a decline in state funding for Nashi and the Young Guard, it does indicate a 
decline in state attention and certainly a decline in publicity for the youth movements.  
40 Data derived from author’s own searches for the number of articles referring to ‘Molodezhnoe Dvizhenie 
Nashi’ (Nashi youth movement) or ‘Molodaia Gvardiia Edinoi Rossii’ (the Young Guard of United Russia) per 
month among central Russian newspapers held on the Eastview Online archive. For details on what constitutes 
central Russian newspapers according to the Eastview Online archive see 
http://dlib.eastview.com.ezproxyd.bham.ac.uk/browse/udb/1. 
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Ivanov
41
 made appearances at Nashi‘s camp, whereas in 2008 the official state presence at 
Seliger consisted solely of Igor Shuvalov.
42
  Moreover, despite Nashi‘s claims to the contrary 
and the contradictory information on the number of participants at the camp that can be found 
in the public domain, the reduction in the sheer size and scale of the camp in 2008 and 2009 
compared to 2007 was apparent. Speaking to participants at Seliger 2008, who had also 
attended the previous summer camp, revealed a consistent picture of the changes taking place 
within Nashi, not least in terms of a reduction in money and participants.
43
  
Nonetheless, Nashi and the Young Guard have managed to remain in the Kremlin‘s 
favour and thus the comparative benefit of having state approval for the youth movements‘ 
abilities to gain access to the domestic public remains, albeit a far less potent force. According 
to a nationwide survey conducted by the Fond Obshchestvennoe Mnenie (Public Opinion 
Fund) in February 2010, the percentage of those who had heard of Nashi or the Young Guard 
had only dropped by 3-4 percentage points since May 2009 and were still higher than those 
who had heard of the National Bolshevik Party and considerably higher than those who had 
heard of the DPNI.
44
 Interestingly, while the Young Guard enjoys the relative security of a 
more constant source of support though its affiliation with United Russia than Nashi (who is 
not formally affiliated to any political party), it is Nashi who has managed to continue to 
attract the most media attention (see Figure 2 above). Since the completion of the 2007-8 
electoral cycle, Nashi has begun to adopt various tactics in order to attract media attention 
with some notable success. Nashi‘s publicity, in this respect, has come from the more 
                                                 
41 First Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation from Feb 2007 until May 2008, when he became 
Deputy Prime Minister. 
42 Appointed First Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation in May 2008. 
43 As I have argued elsewhere in detail, this is not necessarily symptomatic of the demise of Nashi, but rather 
simply of the movement’s transformation in order to adjust to the post-electoral environment (Atwal, 2009).   
44 Public Opinion Fund, 2010, ‘Molodezhnie Politicheskii Organizatsii’, available at: 
http://bd.fom.ru/pdf/d06molodezh10.pdf, last accessed 1 June 2010. 
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controversial nature of the movement‘s actions and from the hype artfully generated by the 
youth movement itself.
45
 As will be discussed later in this chapter, the Young Guard‘s post-
2008 emphasis on its status as the youth branch of United Russia represents a significant 
change from the youth movement‘s original 2005 manifesto. While indicating growing 
conformity on the part of the Young Guard (to be discussed further below), this shift might 
also be viewed here as a deliberate strategy by the youth movement to assert its claim to 
support from United Russia in the post-electoral environment. In contrast to the Young 
Guard, it is precisely Nashi‘s lack of formal ties and position outside of the formal political 
sphere that has enabled the youth movement to boost its own publicity. For example, Nashi‘s 
picketing of journalist Aleksandr Podrabinek‘s Moscow home in October 2009 attracted 
international media attention and forced the Kremlin to take notice, provoking comments 
from both Putin and Medvedev.
46
 This explains the sharp rise in media coverage between 
September and November 2009 noted in Figure 2 above. However, the legality of this action 
against Podrabinek by Nashi is questionable, which is partly why the Podrabinek affair 
became so controversial and attracted such interest. For this reason, this is an unconventional 
tactic which is far more difficult for the Young Guard to adopt given its location within the 
formal political arena and the restriction on the scope of activities permissible within the 
framework of being the youth wing of the United Russia party. In different ways, therefore, 
both Nashi and the Young Guard have demonstrated an ability to cope with the challenge of 
                                                 
45 Having state approval in general is critical to Nashi’s ability to drum up a media storm and thus the idea that 
Nashi is attracting media attention itself does not mean to imply that it is doing so without the implicit support 
of the state – Nashi is simply trying to push itself back up the agenda in terms of the Kremlin’s priorities and 
what is newsworthy, because the Kremlin itself is no longer automatically directing media attention towards 
the youth movements as it did in the run up to the 2007-8 electoral cycle. 
46 Aleksandr Podrabinek is the author of a controversial article published online on Ezhednevnii Zhurnal (Daily 
Journal), which criticised what it saw as the Russian authorities’ systematic and enforced glorification of the 
Soviet period. Nashi viewed Podrabinek’s article as offensive to war veterans and the youth movement’s 
ensuing campaign against the journalist was condemned by human rights watchdogs for amounting to 
harassment and physical intimidation. The Podrabinek affair is discussed further in Chapter 7. 
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decreased state attention since the completion of the 2007-8 electoral cycle: The Young Guard 
by drawing on its position as youth branch of United Russia and Nashi by embroiling itself in 
controversy.  As such the positive impact of having state support on the movements‘ ability to 
make public presentation of their cause remains enduring.   
 
In order to place these findings concerning the impact of state sponsorship for Nashi and the 
Young Guard‘s publicity in the context of the research framework and objectives of this 
study, it is necessary to return to Figure 1 (included in the introduction to this chapter), which 
maps the hypothesised dominant communication flows under conditions of state-sponsored 
participation. It is important to note that the ability of a state-sponsored participatory initiative 
to make public presentation of its cause (portrayed by the downward arrow from the public 
sphere to the wider public in Figure 1) is not denied by those who dismiss state-sponsored 
participation on liberal-democratic grounds. Thus, in this respect, the noted benefit of state 
support for Nashi and the Young Guard‘s publicity does not challenge the perceived wisdom 
on state-sponsored participation. However, what is significant from this case study of the 
impact of having state support on Nashi and the Young Guard‘s ability to make public 
presentation of their cause is that it exposes the flawed assumption that autonomous 
participatory initiatives are largely able to gain publicity according to their own merits. In 
fact, the alternative to state sponsorship in contemporary Russia is marginalisation and the 
very real possibility of harassment by the authorities. This discrepancy between the basis for 
comparison between the democratic effects of state-sponsored participation and autonomous 
participatory initiatives according to the theory on the one hand and in the case of 
contemporary Russia on the other has a considerable bearing on the impact of having state 
support. Nashi and the Young Guard‘s abilities to communicate their message to the public 
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have not only benefitted from state support but have been entirely dependent on it. Moreover, 
the repressive actions of the state towards other groups have boosted the relative benefit of 
state sponsorship for Nashi and the Young Guard‘s ability to gain publicity. Though the 
future sustainability of the benefits in terms of publicity accrued to Nashi and the Young 
Guard as a result of having state sponsorship rests on the youth movements‘ abilities to 
maintain Kremlin favour, state approval for them has not been withdrawn and the impact of 
the decline in state interest resulting from shifting Kremlin priorities in the post 2007-8 
electoral period has been tempered by the adoption of alternative strategies and means of 
attracting media attention by the youth movements.   
 
The only significant downside or limiting factor, as far as the benefit of having state 
support for Nashi and the Young Guard‘s ability to make public presentation of their cause is 
concerned, is the simultaneous constraints imposed by the state on the scope of the 
movements‘ dialogue and actions: A state which is able to act as gatekeeper, providing 
selective access to the domestic public via the media, is likely to be a state which is also able 
to impose constraints upon that which is publicised, even by favoured groups. As such, the 
extent of the relative gains in publicity for Nashi and the Young Guard as a result of having 
Kremlin support is inextricably linked to the propensity for the youth movements to be 
subject to state oversight themselves. This chapter proceeds to investigate the dynamic 
between state and societal interests in the development and functioning of Nashi and the 
Young Guard. It considers whether Nashi and the Young Guard are sufficiently distanced 
from the state and from ‗sensitivity to power and money‘ (Warren, 2001, p.80) to be able to 
develop a public agenda in the first place and then proceed to pursue those public interests in 
their bargaining with power-holders. In terms of the hypothesised impact of having state 
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support on the dominant communication flows of participation set out in Figure 1, having 
asserted the magnitude of the benefit of state-sponsorship for a group‘s ability to gain 
publicity in the Russian case, this chapter now seeks to confirm whether state support does 
indeed suppress public influence and extend state control over Nashi and the Young Guard.  
This is conceptualised in Figure 1 above by the replacement of an upward arrow from the 
wider public to the public sphere in diagram A, with a downward arrow from the state to the 
public sphere in diagram B. Moreover, having noted the significance of the socio-political 
environment for the relative impact of having state support on the ability of Nashi and the 
Young Guard to make public presentation of their cause, the chapter explores whether this 
factor is equally important for the youth movements‘ abilities to develop a public agenda. 
 
Public voice in the corridors of power 
The work of social movement scholars on the implications of a movement (having originated 
from civil society) entering into an agreement with the authorities in order to procure 
resources and influence to support their cause highlights the dangers associated with opting to 
take advantage of state-sponsorship for these groups, such as becoming detached from their 
support base or compromising on principles in pursuit of influence.
47
 Nonetheless, according 
to this author‘s reading of the literature, state-sponsorship of autonomous participatory 
initiatives is ultimately conceived of as a reciprocal (though not necessarily equal) exchange 
whereby both parties are obliged to make some concessions in return for gains. From this 
perspective (and thereby ignoring groups whose very conception was influenced or even 
initiated by the state) state support for social movements generally indicates government 
                                                 
47 For example, see McCarthy & Wolfson (1992) or Schwartz & Paul (1992). 
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recognition that a broad popular consensus has formed around the movement‘s goals or else 
that, for some other reason, it is politically expedient for those in power to be seen to support 
such goals at that time and therefore that it might be advantageous for the movement to 
engage with the authorities. There are two main points of interest arising here, which relate to 
the impact of having state support on the development of a public agenda in the case of Nashi 
and the Young Guard and which will be considered in turn. Firstly, there is the implicit notion 
that an initial formative period of development independent of the state is critical for the 
legitimacy of any social movement claiming to represent public interests. Given the Kremlin‘s 
role in initiating Nashi and the Young Guard, it might be expected therefore that these youth 
movements primarily reflect the interests of the state. The impact of Nashi and the Young 
Guard‘s origins and allegiance to the state on the dynamics between state and societal 
interests in the youth movements‘ policy and actions will be investigated here.  Does a certain 
amount of reciprocity still exist when groups have been initiated under the auspices of the 
state?  Secondly, there is the decision as to whether or not to opt for state sponsorship. It is 
assumed that social movements are free to refrain from accepting state support should they so 
wish. The implications of constraints on the degree of choice available regarding state 
sponsorship for the extent of state influence over Nashi and the Young Guard are considered 
in terms of their resultant impact on the development of a public agenda. To what degree does 
the necessity of having state support reduce the youth movements‘ ability to negotiate with 
the state in order to secure gains in the public interest? 
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Origins and allegiances 
At the heart of the understanding that state involvement in the early stages of a movement‘s 
development has a debilitating effect on the movement‘s capacity to represent public interests 
lies the matter of the relative positioning of participatory initiatives in relation to the state. 
Certainly, this author recognises that there are definite implications for a participatory 
initiative of having state-sponsorship from the very beginning compared to attracting state 
support at a later stage. While state sponsorship of social movements in the later stages of 
their development is equally motivated by vested interests and may also be an attempt to 
institutionalise potentially subversive elements, significantly, when state support comes later, 
regardless of the state‘s agenda, it is always reflective of societal interests and pressures that 
have already emerged and established themselves independently of the state. Often state 
support at this later stage comes in recognition of the public mandate that has formed behind 
the views of a particular group or organisation and therefore that group might be expected to 
be better placed to negotiate with the state and procure certain guarantees in the public 
interest. In contrast, when the state intervenes in the formative stages of a movement‘s 
development, whether the intention be to stifle potentially undesirable elements or even to 
prop up favourable initiatives, this is pre-emptive action by the state designed to manipulate 
participation and prevent it from running its natural course governed by societal influences 
alone. Without having had the opportunity to develop independently prior to state sponsorship 
such groups are dependent on the state from the outset and thus more vulnerable to state 
pressures. Moreover, the process of agenda formation for participatory initiatives that have 
state-sponsorship from the beginning is overseen and influenced by the state at every turn. As 
members of the Russian political opposition are quick to point out in the case of Nashi and the 
Young Guard, these ―pro-Kremlin youth movements [...] have not been set up for young 
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people, but rather with political aims in mind to carry out projects in which young people are 
the instrument‖.48  
Nonetheless, Nashi and the Young Guard have made a noticeable effort to appeal to 
young Russians and to develop an explicitly public agenda and this has, at the very least, been 
tolerated if not approved or even promoted by the Kremlin in the interests of thwarting any 
threat of youth-led instability in Russia. As far as Nashi is concerned, the youth movement‘s 
efforts to present a public agenda are best exemplified by its strategy of appropriating much of 
the rhetoric and content of ‗Pora‘- the Ukrainian youth movement set up in 2004 in opposition 
to Kuchma‘s regime and at the forefront of the ‗Orange Revolution‘.  Maintaining national 
sovereignty by resisting foreign attempts to steal the elections, demanding public 
accountability and transparency, as well as promoting the development of a functioning civil 
society are all prioritised by both Nashi and Pora as being necessary for their country‘s future 
progression. By demanding an end to entrenched malpractice and calling for the dismissal of 
self-serving, non-patriotic or simply ineffectual members of the elite, Nashi has sought to 
promote issues of relevance to young Russians inspired by the ‗Orange Revolution‘.49 
Considering that Nashi is a pro-regime youth movement, the parallels between Nashi and 
Pora noted here indicate a deliberate strategy on Nashi‘s part to draw on the inspiration of the 
‗Orange Revolution‘ to mobilise young people while simultaneously undermining any 
‗orange‘ threat to the Kremlin by sapping its anti-regime potency. In this light, state-
sponsorship for Nashi‘s efforts to present an explicitly public agenda might be viewed either 
as a genuine attempt to rally young Russians around a public agenda which has been 
                                                 
48 ‘On the role of the state in youth politics, social programs for youth and the activities of independent political 
youth organisations’, Interview with Oleg Naumov and Anatolii Ermolin for the programme ‘Dialog’on ‘Oren-
TV’, 23 December 2007, available at: http://www.sps.ru/?id=206905&cur_id=224827, last accessed 2 
December 2009. 
49 Nashi, 2005, ‘Manifest’, available at: http://nashi.su/manifest, last accessed 16 June 2010. 
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supported by the state in order to neutralise the potential threat of anti-regime youth activity 
(and in this sense represent the deliberate promotion of some positive democratic effects 
whilst in pursuit of undemocratic ends), or as an insincere programme created in cahoots with 
the incumbent regime in order to mislead young Russians (but which may nevertheless have 
gathered a momentum of its own and thus had some unintended positive democratic effects 
that the state was unable to control). Though the Young Guard made no reference to the 
‗Orange Revolution‘ in its founding manifesto, it too was inspired by the events in Ukraine, 
drawing on the increased attention given to the role of youth in Russian politics that followed. 
Moreover, despite differing from that of Nashi, the stance adopted by the Young Guard in 
2005 may also be described as an attempt by the youth movement to present a public face and 
indeed in this case an anti-hegemonic face. While Nashi reserved its criticism for ‗non-
patriotic elements‘ and the political opposition, the Young Guard‘s original manifesto 
extended its critique of the existing system to all ‗adult‘ politicians, asserting that they were 
shaped by the politics of the Soviet Union and of the nineties which devoted its energy to 
preserving the existing set up rather than changing the world.
50
 Such a bold attack on the 
political elite by the youth wing of the United Russia party (the ‗party of power‘) again speaks 
of powerful ulterior motives for those setting and approving the Young Guard‘s agenda at 
best, and at worst suggests that such challenges to the incumbent elite as set out in the youth 
movement‘s 2005 manifesto were completely disingenuous and designed simply to capture 
the mood among youth at that time. 
Furthermore, although the sincerity of or at least the motivations behind such dramatic 
challenges to the incumbent elite as contained in the hyperbole of Nashi and the Young 
Guard‘s founding manifestos might well be questioned, there are some indications that Nashi 
                                                 
50 The Young Guard, 2005, ‘O gvardii’, no longer available online since the youth movement replaced it with a 
new manifesto in 2008. 
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and the Young Guard have actually pursued a public agenda, coming into conflict with 
power-holders on issues such as corruption and elite rejuvenation.
51
  Former Nashi activist, 
Mikhail Kulikov, pointed to the fact that Nashi activists often meet resistance from civil 
servants and state officials in the regions who seek to resist the movement‘s anti-corruption 
drive.
52
 This claim has been confirmed by Nashi activists, who bemoan the fact that their 
efforts to support the state‘s declared drive for modernisation and greater accountability 
encounter obstacles placed by regional elites and local administrations seeking to preserve the 
status quo. It is worth noting that this is not dissimilar to derogatory remarks made by 
members of the opposition and critics of Nashi and the Young Guard within United Russia, 
who claim that the youth movements are being used by the Kremlin to do its dirty work.
53
 
Yet, while there may well be resentment towards Nashi activists by regional and local elites, 
and especially towards those who have rapidly ascended through the ranks and been awarded 
various posts in regional and local executives owing to their favoured status by the Kremlin, 
this is not necessarily linked to any anti-corruption drive by Nashi. Nonetheless, despite being 
far less high profile than the youth movement‘s mass actions which have more palatable 
objectives, such as honouring Russia‘s war veterans on Victory Day or promoting patriotism 
on Unity Day (by far and away Nashi‘s two biggest events of the year), Nashi has held 
numerous events aimed at raising awareness of the problems caused by corruption in Russia 
and at tackling bribery on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, in testimony to the salience of 
young Russians‘ concerns in determining the youth movement‘s activity at the local and 
                                                 
51 It should be noted that these examples of the youth movements taking action to pursue a public agenda 
reflect antagonism between the youth movements and intermediary regional and local elites and do not 
indicate any tensions with the state in the sense of the federal government or political leadership.  
52 Author’s personal correspondence with Mikhail Kulikov, 13 November 2009.  
53 For example, see Andrew Osborn, The Kremlin’s youthful vanguard, 10 October 2009, available at 
http://andrewosborn.co.uk/article/317/, last accessed 3 March 2010, which describes Nashi as a tool of the 
Kremlin used to do its bidding. Guillory also refers to Nashi as ‘youth mobilized blindly to fulfil the whims of a 
repressive regime’ (Nashi: Is it really the end?, The Exile (22 April 2008) available at 
http://www.exile.ru/articles/detail.php?ARTICLE_ID=18776&IBLOCK_ID=35&PAGE=4, accessed 2 Feb 2011). 
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regional level in particular, Nashi‘s declared commitment to combating corruption and 
supporting the Kremlin‘s anti-corruption drive has tended to manifest itself in actions 
intended to reduce corruption in the education system, which has direct relevance to young 
people. Although Nashi has also conducted publicity stunts, calling for a general public 
rejection of bribery, its greatest efforts have been campaigns targeted at institutes of higher 
education. For example, on 21 March 2007 Nashi held a rally in Kaliningrad to protest against 
the prevalence of corruption across higher education institutes, raising awareness of the 
potential consequences of such corruption for Russian academia and industry. 
With regard to the youth movements‘ efforts at elite rejuvenation, which culminated in 
United Russia‘s adoption of a 20% youth quota for all future party lists, there is a much 
greater sense of conflict between young activists and regional elites. As will be discussed and 
analysed in Part 2 of this thesis, United Russia‘s youth quota was not adhered to in practice 
and did not result in any considerable increase in the proportion of young people in power.
54
 
Yet, what is significant for this chapter is the suggestion that the failure to implement the 
youth quota may be partly attributed to the unassailable influence of regional party elites and 
business interests and thereby indicative of the conflict between Nashi and the Young Guard 
and regional authorities. In a 2008 summary of the Young Guard‘s work thus far, coordinator 
of youth politics for United Russia, Andrei Turchak, claimed that the Young Guard had been 
fully aware of the immense difficulties that its ambitions to get more youth into power were 
                                                 
54 United Russia announced the introduction of its 20% youth quota on 10th April 2006, effective for all of its 
party lists to legislative assemblies at local, regional and federal level. The implementation of this quota has 
subsequently proven to be problematic and as of 2010 there has been little quantitative change in the 
percentage of young United Russia deputies in legislative assemblies. This will be discussed in detail in Part 2 on 
the impact of state-sponsorship on the institutional democratic effects of Nashi and the Young Guard. 
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likely to encounter ―particularly from regional elites.‖55 The proposed influx of young 
candidates represented a significant challenge to existing patterns of patronage practised by 
United Russia and to the influence of business powers and regional elites on the formation of 
the party‘s electoral lists.56  Various reports on the formation of United Russia‘s party list for 
the 2007 State Duma elections draw attention to regional party elites‘ abuse of their position 
for personal gain by unfairly awarding places on the party list on the basis of clientelism. For 
example, Kuinev alleges that people who did not take part in primaries got through to United 
Russia‘s party list, and also that there was widespread manipulation of the results of primaries 
so that people who came in 7
th
 place, for example, in a particular region jumped up to 5
th
 
place by the time of United Russia‘s central pre-electoral congress when the party list was 
formalised.
57
 As a former United Russia State Duma deputy of the 4
th
 convocation explained, 
―nowadays, more and more business people with huge financial resources are becoming 
deputies. These people have a strong influence on the leadership of regional branches of the 
party‖.58 Whether or not such serious problems were indeed anticipated by the youth 
movement and its allies, Turchak‘s statement praising the Young Guard‘s efforts and 
achievements clearly identifies the influence of regional elites as a source of resistance to the 
youth quota and this appears to be backed up by reports of fixing the United Russia party list 
at regional and local level. 
However, there is an important caveat to be noted regarding the above assertion that 
Nashi and the Young Guard have sought to develop and to pursue a public agenda – namely, 
                                                 
55 Turchak, Andrei, 2008, Molodezh kak polnotsennii sub’ekt politiki, Young Guard of United Russia, available at 
http://www.molgvardia.ru/vazhnaya_tema/andrei_turchak_molodezh_kak_polnocennyi_subekt_politiki.html, 
last accessed 14 November 2007. 
56 This is will be discussed further in Chapter 5. 
57 A. Kuinev, 2007 ‘Analiz partiinikh spiskov’, available at http://monitoring.carnegie.ru/2007/11/2007-duma-
elections/analysis-of-kandidate-lists/, last accessed 21 May 2009. 
58 Correspondence with this author, 25 March 2009 
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the ambiguity over what constitutes a public as opposed to a state agenda in this case and the 
consequent difficulty in drawing any definite conclusion as to whether the youth movements 
have been able to develop a public agenda or not.  It almost goes without saying that any 
‗public‘ agenda propagated by Nashi or the Young Guard meets the Kremlin‘s approval. 
There is certainly no evidence of Nashi or the Young Guard pursuing an agenda that has gone 
against the Kremlin‘s wishes. In theory, public interests do not necessarily have to be at odds 
with the state‘s agenda and, indeed, pro-regime groups are likely to reflect state interests to 
some degree anyway. Yet, in practice, it is inherently problematic to judge the sincerity of 
claims to represent a public agenda that is in accordance with the state‘s interests, especially 
when the organisation in question has much to be gained from its allegiance to the state.  If we 
return to the ways described above in which Nashi and the Young Guard have tried to appeal 
to young Russians by developing an explicitly ‗public‘ agenda based on the demands made by 
Pora during the Orange Revolution, then it is possible to note the corresponding function that 
this has served for the Kremlin. By pillorying the liberal-democratic opposition and so-called 
‗non-patriotic elements‘, Nashi ensures that its inflammatory critique of the current polity are 
directed largely at the political opposition and the incumbent regime instead becomes the 
necessary vehicle for initiating an overhaul of the existing system.  
The changes that we aim to make to the format of our country‘s development will 
be revolutionary, but revolutionary in content not in form.  Our task is to achieve 
dynamic change [...] our generation must replace the defeatists currently in power. 
But that does not mean that we should destroy the existing state. On the contrary, 
2 
 
69 
 
political stability is the most important condition for the development of our 
country.
59
 
Ultimately, Nashi contends that regime stability is essential for Russia‘s future progression 
and, moreover, that the means of initiating and implementing the far-reaching socio-political 
transformation that it envisages lies only within the remit and capabilities of the incumbent 
regime. Similarly, although the Young Guard did not explicitly seek to undermine the 
opposition and attack potential ‗orange‘ elements in the way that Nashi did in its manifesto, 
the Young Guard did aim to encourage young people to become involved in politics and by 
implication to provide support and legitimacy for the incumbent regime in the face of a 
potential electoral revolution (to be discussed further in Chapter 4). Thus, both Nashi and the 
Young Guard‘s efforts at developing a public agenda inspired by Pora have broadly suited the 
Kremlin‘s purposes too.   
Moreover, while there may be some degree of convergence between the interests of 
the youth movements and the state, it cannot be denied that the Kremlin‘s role in supporting 
the development of Nashi and the Young Guard is fundamentally exploitative and to the 
extent that it may promote the development of a public youth agenda it does so in order to 
contain the force of public opinion and thus inevitably limits the scope of dialogue and 
actions allowed within the remit of state support. Despite the afore-mentioned difficulties in 
asserting that public interests have superseded state interests or vice versa in the case of Nashi 
and the Young Guard with any conviction, the substantial metamorphosis that the Young 
Guard underwent in the period from 2005 to 2008 would seem to provide the best possible 
indicator of top-down external influence on the youth movement. Although both Nashi and 
the Young Guard underwent significant reformation following the completion of the 2007-8 
                                                 
59 Nashi, 2005, ‘Manifest’, available at: http://nashi.su/manifest, last accessed 16 June 2010. 
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electoral cycle, while Nashi has continued to pursue its patriotic stance against what it sees as 
an ineffectual and self-serving elite in a manner reminiscent of the Ukrainian youth movement 
Pora, the Young Guard has noticeably begun to adopt a more conformist position. At its third 
congress, in summer 2008, the Young Guard passed a new manifesto championing its 
achievements and status as the youth branch of United Russia and dropping all criticism of 
the existing elite and the older generation of politicians in favour of explicit support for 
Putin‘s plan, ‗Strategy 2020‘, and for President Medvedev. In the previous manifesto, which 
was the founding manifesto for the Young Guard when it was rebranded from ‗Youth Unity‘ 
in 2005, no mention of the youth movement‘s relation to United Russia was made at all. The 
Young Guard‘s revised manifesto thus contains explicit recognition of its supportive role as 
the youth branch of United Russia as opposed to the challenging role, critical of all adult 
politicians, set out in the original manifesto.  While a less aggressive tone makes more sense 
after the furore of the presidential and parliamentary elections has subsided, it does appear as 
though the Young Guard has, at the very least, become more closely tied to United Russia and 
the Kremlin and functions as a means of discussing and mobilising support for state policy 
rather than in any initiatory capacity. It is also possible to argue that the shift in the Young 
Guard‘s stance between its 2005 and 2008 manifestos suggests more than a growing 
conformity on the part of the youth movement and in fact reveals the insincerity of the Young 
Guard‘s earlier statements (in apparent defiance of the incumbent political elite) as well as the 
degree of Kremlin oversight over the Young Guard from the very beginning. 
Furthermore, I would suggest that although there may well be little in the way of 
direct top-down dictate of the youth movements‘ policies by the state on any specific basis,60 
                                                 
60In correspondence with this author, Mikhail Kulikov (former Nashi commissar) declared: “direct control over 
the movement didn’t exist – that’s a fact. There was state support for initiatives suggested by the movement 
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those in the upper echelons of Nashi and the Young Guard strive to support the Kremlin‘s 
interests in part out of compulsion. In other words, regardless of Nashi or Young Guard 
leaders‘ manifest sympathy with the regime‘s cause, the severity of the threat of falling foul 
of the Kremlin‘s approval restricts the freedom of dialogue even of those who would look to 
support the regime. In the citation included  below from this author‘s interview with Roman 
Romanov (head of the ideological sector of the Young Guard), Romanov seeks to emphasise 
that there is no top-down dictate of the Young Guard‘s policy by United Russia or by 
implication from the Kremlin: 
Conflicts have been particularly rife between the youth wing and party members 
in the regions when there have been different opinions about what should be done. 
But it is possible to get through this because United Russia should not be seen to 
be a rigid, monolithic structure. The party is also diverse you see, they are all 
patriots but ... there is no longer a strict party line which must be strictly adhered 
to and which cannot be deviated from. It is an entirely different situation these 
days. There is no party line, only a framework, within which discussion and 
political debates can take place and struggles for positions etc. [....] What 
precisely are the limits of this framework? Well, first and foremost it means 
support for the current course – internal security of Russia, economic growth, 
innovation etc. Our support for this course unites us. So you see there‘s no party 
line, but an expanse with certain limits.
 61
 
                                                                                                                                                        
and input from the central authorities, but no such control”. Author’s correspondence with Kulikov, 13 
November 2009. 
61 Author’s interview with Roman Romanov, Federal Staff of the Young Guard of United Russia, Moscow, 10 
July 2008. 
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While this statement of the Young Guard‘s integrity made by one of the movement‘s key 
background figures cannot be taken at face value and certainly the matter of fact assertion that 
the youth movement is able to form its own position independently of the party is highly 
dubious, what is interesting is the admission that there are certain limitations on the scope of 
dialogue possible by the Young Guard and the reference made to conflicts between youth 
activists and party members in the regions. This adds weight to the earlier assertion, presented 
as indicative of the public face of Nashi and the Young Guard, that the youth movements have 
encountered resistance from the authorities at an intermediary level. However, it also 
illustrates the complexity of the relationship between public interests and state interests in the 
case of Nashi and the Young Guard, by alluding to the fundamentality of state-imposed 
constraints on the free development of a public agenda while simultaneously making apparent 
the difficulty of pinpointing the precise nature and degree of state influence on agenda 
formation due to the element of convergence between the interests of the pro-regime youth 
movements and the Kremlin.  
 
The impact of necessity on negotiation 
The closing section of this chapter addresses the question of the impact of the socio-political 
environment on an organisation‘s bargaining power with the state and weighs up the 
aggregate sum of the balance between voice and integrity in the case of state-sponsorship for 
Nashi and the Young Guard, which has been a running theme throughout this chapter. As we 
have already seen, the degree of coercion and political repression that exists in Russia renders 
state support more a necessity than a choice in order for an organisation to be able to function 
effectively. In an environment where there is little choice but to accept the imposition of state 
support in order to avoid marginalisation or persecution, groups are unable to effectively use 
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their decision as to whether or not to opt for state-sponsorship in order to extract concessions 
from the state in return for their loyalty. Thus, that which is considered to be the main benefit 
of state-sponsorship among social-movement scholars (who are nonetheless wary of the 
ultimate cost of the inherent compromise involved in accepting state support), namely the 
courtship of societal influences by the state in return for allegiance, is fundamentally 
undermined by the inability of a group to refuse or to withdraw from state sponsorship. 
Though all state-sponsored organisations must necessarily satisfy certain conditions imposed 
upon them by the state in order to receive state patronage, the lack of viable alternative to 
state support in contemporary Russia further constrains such organisations by denying them 
the leverage required to bargain with the state in order to secure greater gains for themselves. 
This means that the opportunities for voice for Russian state-sponsored organisations are 
limited to that which the Kremlin is prepared to give. The critical question thus becomes what 
has the Kremlin been prepared to give in the case of Nashi and the Young Guard and what is 
this dependent on? The impact of environmental factors, including formal institutional 
structures, informal norms and behaviour and external influences which all condition the 
socio-political arena, are examined alongside a more agent-centred approach, whereby the 
actions of the Kremlin and the youth movements themselves influence the outcome of 
consequent decisions.  
To begin with the environmental factors, the emphasis here is placed on the specific 
circumstances following the ‗Orange Revolution‘ in Ukraine, which shaped the run up to the 
2007-8 Russian federal electoral cycle, rather than on more fundamental and longer-term 
components, such as formal and informal political structures and the rules of the game, which 
govern socio-political activity more generally in Russia. The underlying features of the socio-
political environment in contemporary Russia are considered here only insofar as they may 
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have been temporarily altered by the events surrounding the 2004/5 Ukrainian presidential 
elections and thus may have contributed to opening up new opportunities for the pro-regime 
youth movements. The issue is to what extent, if at all, environmental factors specific to youth 
politics in the period 2005-8 have tempered the additional level of constraints imposed by the 
lack of alternative to having state support for Nashi and the Young Guard.  If one accepts that 
the state supported the development of Nashi and the Young Guard as part of its response to 
the ‗Orange Revolution‘ in Ukraine, as this author does, then this would intimate that the 
Kremlin had a vested interest in being seen to promote youth participation: In other words, 
that both Nashi and Young Guard leaders and the Kremlin had a stake in the youth 
movements‘ success.  In this way, it is possible to argue that, because of the priority placed by 
the Kremlin on securing young Russians‘ allegiance to the incumbent regime in the run-up to 
the 2007-8 electoral cycle, the balance between voice and integrity swung in favour of Nashi 
and the Young Guard, as the constraints in terms of integrity resulting from state-cooption 
remained the same while the potential benefits or opportunities for voice via state-sponsorship 
grew. To put it crudely, there was now a prize on offer for youth allegiance to the regime: 
Whereas previously there had only been penalties for non-conformity, the Kremlin was now 
prepared to devote considerable resources to its youth project. The Kremlin‘s support for 
Nashi and the Young Guard was not confined to passive methods such as allowing access to 
the media and not hindering the movements‘ development, but included active promotion of 
the youth movements with Putin‘s personal involvement.  
However, although pro-Kremlin youth movements were able to command more 
attention from the Russian state following the ‗Orange Revolution‘ in Ukraine, it does not 
automatically follow that the Kremlin‘s strategy of promoting youth politics in the run up to 
the 2007-8 electoral cycle provided Nashi or the Young Guard with any sort of bargaining 
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power in its actions with the state.  The capacity of the Kremlin‘s desire to counter the 
potential threat of youth-led instability to compel the state to make significant concessions to 
the pro-regime youth movements should not be assumed. In fact, it would be a truer 
representation of the dynamic between the state and the youth movements to conceptualise 
their interaction not in terms of demands made and concessions granted but rather in terms of 
the state simply offering rewards for allegiance. Should Nashi or the Young Guard begin to 
place demands upon the regime or to challenge it, then it would be a question of the Kremlin 
weighing up the cost of accepting the youth movement‘s impositions against the cost of 
taking repressive action to neutralise the threat, but it would still be at the state‘s discretion 
and based on the overall balance of state interests. Even Nashi, being by far the largest youth 
movement and most potent force on the streets, would have only been able to take advantage 
of the Kremlin‘s vested interest by taking small calculated risks at most, based on the logic 
that the Kremlin would not wish to take repressive measures against the movement unless it 
was absolutely necessary. Though the Kremlin‘s desire to support the development of Nashi 
as part of an anti-opposition strategy may have given the youth movement some small degree 
of leeway in the run up to the 2007-8 electoral cycle, this is nothing akin to bargaining power 
of any kind. Moreover, the critical importance for Nashi and the Young Guard of maintaining 
state support cannot be underlined enough. The case of the Rodina (Motherland) party 
provides a useful illustration of the fate of state-sponsored groups who forget the imperative 
of remaining loyal to the regime and sets a precedent for state repression of formerly state-
sponsored and even state-initiated participation. Rodina was allegedly set up by the Kremlin 
prior to the 2003 State Duma elections in order to siphon votes from the Communist Party.
62
 
When Rodina subsequently began to attempt to assert its own authority and thus, by 
                                                 
62 Wilson refers to such parties, created by the state in order to divert support away from a genuine opposition 
party, as ‘flies’ (2005, Virtual Politics: Political Technology and the Corruption of Post-Soviet Democracy, 
available at http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/9324-5.cfm, last accessed 11 August 2011). 
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implication, to challenge the regime‘s hegemony in 2006 the Kremlin took action to tame all 
wayward elements associated with the party by forcing Rodina to merge with the Russian 
Party of Life and the Pensioners‘ Party in 2006 to form Spravedlivaia Rossiia (A Just Russia) 
and in the process sidelining the party‘s most controversial members. Thus, the benefit of 
having been set up with the administrative resources and funding derived from state support 
in the initial stages does not assuage the ultimate vulnerability of Nashi and the Young Guard 
to state disapproval and castigatory action.  
Nonetheless, Nashi in particular has demonstrated an extraordinary resilience in the 
face of dwindling state interest since the completion of the 2007-8 electoral cycle. Once 
Putin‘s chosen successor, Dmitrii Medvedev, was successfully installed as President of the 
Russian Federation following a resounding first round electoral victory, Nashi and the Young 
Guard had served their primary purpose for the Kremlin and could no longer reasonably 
expect to receive the inflated gains of state sponsorship available in the period 2005-8. Yet, 
despite rumours of its imminent demise, in early 2008 Nashi remodelled itself, diversifying its 
activities and reorganising its structure. Nashi‘s reorganisation involved the formation of 10 
new projects, including Nasha Innovatsiya (Our Innovation), Nasha Ekonomika (Our 
Economy), Novoe Obrazovanie (New Education) and Nashi Stroitely (Our Builders). 
Although it is fair to say that the development of these projects was to a large extent based on 
activists‘ existing work and thus represents a recognition of activists‘ priorities and efforts in 
a bid to sustain their interest, the decision to create a number of specific projects around 
modernisation, enterprise, the economy and innovation also reflects the attempts of Nashi 
leaders to align the movement with Russia‘s post-election strategic interests. As Nashi‘s 
leader, Nikita Borovikov, explained, ‗like any civic organisation, [Nashi] coordinates its 
activity in line with the needs of the state. The state is now in great need of political and 
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economic innovation. We will occupy this niche and do everything that is required of us‘.63 
Through the diversification of its activities to embrace Russia‘s latest strategic interests, Nashi 
leaders have sought to position the movement so as to continue to be of use for the state as 
well as to prepare the movement to compete effectively and legitimately for funding from 
various sources and from sections of the federal budget that have been earmarked precisely 
for these areas. Such resilience in the post-2008 environment indicates that the specific 
circumstances of the post-‗orange‘ environment in Russia in the run up to the 2007-8 electoral 
cycle are not the only important factor in considering the relationship between the youth 
movements and the state and demonstrates the significance of the role of agency on the part of 
the youth leaders. Without the option of procuring alternative support and security in a 
repressive socio-political environment, organisations must try to favourably influence state 
behaviour towards them by other means and within the framework of remaining loyal to the 
regime. In addition to reconfiguring the youth movement‘s projects so as to realign itself with 
the Kremlin‘s latest priorities, Nashi leaders have taken several further measures to lock-in 
the advantages gained from having state support, including decentralising the organisational 
structure of the youth movement and installing members in formal political institutions. Each 
of these measures, which will be discussed further at various points in this thesis, have 
strengthened the movement‘s position in relation to the state and in doing so have raised the 
costs for the Kremlin should it seek to take repressive action against Nashi. Interesting 
parallels might be drawn here with the work done by Tarrow and other social movement 
scholars working on contentious politics, which identifies raising the costs of repression as 
part of an opposition strategy.
64
  In the case of Nashi and the Young Guard, state sponsorship 
itself initially increased the costs of repression of these groups by helping to provide the 
                                                 
63 Author’s interview with Nikita Borovikov, Lake Seliger, 21 July 2008. 
64 See also Linz & Stepan (1997) for further discussion of the state weighing up the costs of repression and the 
costs of toleration. 
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financial support and infrastructure for the youth movements‘ mass actions, which mobilised 
thousands of young Russians on the streets of Moscow. Since the completion of the 2007-8 
electoral cycle, Nashi has actively sought to further increase the costs of repression whilst also 
currying favour with the Kremlin by diversifying its activities and establishing its presence. In 
contrast, the Young Guard‘s survival strategy has been to become more subservient to United 
Russia and, in this way, reduce the likelihood of the Kremlin wanting to rein the youth 
movement in. 
  
Overall, it has been noted that while state sponsorship under such repressive socio-political 
conditions provides an organisation with vital resources and some degree of protection from 
harassment by the authorities in the form of arbitrary bureaucratic or criminal investigation, it 
also entails a higher degree of oversight and interference from the state. State-sponsorship of 
groups within the public-sphere indeed results in the subordination of societal interests to 
those of the state. Yet, as hypothesised in Chapter 1, the state may have a vested interest in 
promoting an organisation‘s public face and fostering relations between the public sphere and 
the wider public for its own ends. In the case of Nashi and the Young Guard, the Kremlin has 
had a vested interest in supporting the development of a public agenda in order to attract 
young Russians inspired by the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and, as a result, state 
sponsorship has enabled Nashi and the Young Guard to appeal to young Russians‘ interests 
and concerns as well as to begin to challenge regional authorities and the incumbent elite on 
some issues.  However, state support was conducive to the youth movements‘ development of 
a public agenda only insofar as was deemed necessary to secure the Kremlin‘s interests. The 
constraints imposed by having state sponsorship mean that the youth movements are unable to 
defy the regime and the Young Guard in particular has shown increasing signs of conformity 
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since 2008, thus raising questions over whether Nashi and the Young Guard have actually 
been able to purse a public agenda in isolation from the state‘s agenda at all. Consequently, 
although the upward channels of communication from the wider public to organisations in the 
public sphere (such as Nashi and the Young Guard) are not necessarily eradicated as a result 
of having state sponsorship from the outset, they are completely overridden by the downward 
influence of the state on those organisations. The post-‗orange‘ environment in Russia, 
particularly in the run up to the 2007-8 electoral cycle, increased the advantages of having 
state support for youth movements, but did not restore the bargaining power denied to state-
sponsored groups as a result of the ongoing lack of viable alternative to Kremlin support in 
contemporary Russia. While remaining nevertheless vulnerable to the designs of the state, 
Nashi‘s 2008 reorganisation made it viable for the youth movement to retain state support and 
thus rendered the inflated gains of state support in the run up to the 2007-8 electoral cycle 
more durable than may otherwise have been the case. In this way, the interaction between the 
youth movements and the state, and thereby the impact of having state support on the 
democratic effects of Nashi and (to a lesser extent) the Young Guard, have clearly been 
affected by the socio-political environment and by the actions of the agents involved.  
 
Conclusion  
On a basic level, Chapter 2 affirms the implicit criticism of state-sponsored participation 
contained within the Habermassian tradition, which has been identified in Chapter 1 as the 
source of widespread academic rejection of state-sponsored participatory initiatives among 
the literature on participation and development. State sponsorship does denote a dominant 
top-down influence on participation and does ultimately impede the development of a public 
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agenda independent from the state. In this sense the underlying logic behind the 
conceptualisation of reversed dominant communication flows between the state, Nashi and 
the Young Guard, and the wider public in Figure 1 at the beginning of this chapter is sound. 
However, there are significant qualifications to be made on this statement, which speak of the 
importance of the socio-political environment and the agency of youth leaders for the impact 
of having state support on the democratic effects of participation.  
Firstly, while it is true that state sponsorship impedes an organisation‘s ability to 
develop a public agenda and then to pursue that agenda in their interactions with the 
authorities, the scale of the benefit accrued to Nashi and the Young Guard, in terms of the 
publicity gained via state support, is not accounted for in traditional assumptions of the 
detriment of state involvement in civil society, as they fail to recognise the criticality of 
having state approval for access to the mass media in contemporary Russia. In the absence of 
alternative means of access to the media, the logic of rejecting state support on the basis that 
this prevents the expression of public interests is less persuasive. Without state approval, 
autonomous participatory initiatives in Russia struggle to gain the publicity required to attract 
support for their cause or advance their ‗public‘ agenda. Nashi and the Young Guard‘s ability 
to make ‗public presentation of their cause‘ (Warren, 2001, p.80) is the direct result of having 
state sponsorship and its advantage is increased by the inability of those without state 
approval to gain access to the media.  Secondly, the fact that state-sponsorship does indicate a 
dominant top-down influence on participation does not necessarily mean that the youth 
movements are unable to influence state behaviour towards them. Both Nashi and the Young 
Guard took action to secure their position following the completion of the 2007-8 electoral 
cycle, with Nashi diversifying its activities and demanding state and media attention while the 
Young Guard retreated under the wing of the United Russia party for stability and support.  
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Thus, considering the public sphere democratic effects of Nashi and the Young Guard 
relating to the vertical functionings of civil society alone (i.e. not the democratic impact of 
state support for Nashi and the Young Guard on the wider civil society or the potential knock 
on effects on the institutional or developmental democratic effects of participation), in the 
context of the socio-political environment of contemporary Russia it is desirable for pro-
regime youth movements to accept the impositions of state support on the scope of dialogue 
possible in order to gain the publicity necessary to garner support and to be able to promote a 
public agenda to whatever degree. Moreover, the Kremlin‘s reaction to the ‗Orange 
Revolution‘ in Ukraine in 2005 increased the advantages to be gained from having state 
support at that particular time and thus boosted the positive impact of having state support on 
the vertical public sphere democratic effects of Nashi and the Young Guard. Nevertheless, it 
did nothing to assuage the severity of the constraints imposed by the Kremlin on the 
development of a public agenda. 
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CHAPTER 3 – COMMONALITY AND DIFFERENCE 
In the previous chapter it was implied that Nashi and the Young Guard found themselves in a 
situation where there was much to be gained and relatively little to be lost from having state 
support in terms of the vertical channels of communication between the state, Nashi and the 
Young Guard, and the wider public. Yet this refers specifically to Nashi and the Young Guard 
and not to other groups in civil society, namely other youth movements, the opposition and 
even civil society as a whole. This chapter investigates the impact of state-sponsorship for 
Nashi and the Young Guard as far as public sphere democratic effects on a broader level are 
concerned. In doing so, the focus shifts from the vertical channels of communication between 
the state, public sphere and the wider public to consider the impact of state-sponsorship for 
Nashi and the Young Guard on the horizontal linkages within Russian civil society, the key 
elements of which are two-fold: Firstly, the existence of plurality and contestation and, 
secondly, the building of ‗social capital‘ via the development of ‗networks of civic 
engagement‘ (Putnam, 1993, p.173). 
 Chapter 3 begins by considering how state sponsorship for Nashi and the Young 
Guard fits in with the Kremlin‘s conception of the importance of the state‘s role in civil 
society and how this relates to the principles of pluralism and contestation. It explores the 
specificity of civil society in the Russian context and grapples with the perennial debate as to 
whether liberal-democratic norms and understandings of civil society can and should be 
applied to societies in which such concepts are not universally accepted. As an alternative, it 
considers the notion of hegemony being conducive to a nation‘s socio-economic development 
and political progression. Next, chapter 3 grounds such abstract analysis firmly in the 
contemporary reality of Nashi and the Young Guard‘s activities by examining the nature of 
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the pro-regime dominance among youth organisations in Russia. In particular, it identifies the 
extent to which Nashi and the Young Guard have fostered a culture of debate and discussion 
around key policy-issues or whether they have stifled such ‗discursive challenges‘. Finally, 
Chapter 3 explores the structure and nature of participation within Nashi and the Young 
Guard in order to assess their value in terms of the intrinsic ‗social capital‘ of collective 
action. The youth movements‘ contribution to developing networks of reciprocity among 
young people across Russia‘s regions is considered in light of the historical context of societal 
trends in post-Soviet Russia.  
Returning to the tensions between voice and integrity introduced in the previous 
chapter, Chapter 3 investigates whether Nashi and the Young Guard‘s attempts to establish 
their dominance and gain a much sought after public platform and voice for like-minded 
young people have come at the expense of other groups and to the detriment of civil society 
overall. Have the opportunities afforded to Nashi and the Young Guard as a result of having 
state support, identified in Chapter 2, propped open the door for other initiatives to make 
inroads into stimulating civic engagement and debate, or have they, in fact, damaged such 
prospects for the development of civil society by slamming the door definitively in the face of 
aspiring alternative groups? Is it likely that Nashi and the Young Guard were simply adept in 
availing themselves of the otherwise unheard of opportunities for mobilisation afforded via 
state-sponsorship in Russia in the run up to the 2007-8 electoral cycle and, in this way, made 
the most of the potential opening for the development of Russian civil society at the time 
without taking anything away from the prospects of other groups? Has the advantage of 
having state support enabled Nashi and the Young Guard to lay the groundwork for the 
development of social capital in Russia and thereby, in this sense, improved the prospects for 
the development of Russian civil society as a whole?  
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Hegemonic hullaballoo 
Despite its predominance in democratic theory and its status as the staple of most definitions 
of democracy, the principle of pluralism is not universally accepted as necessary or even 
desirable for a functioning civil society. Significantly, the prevalent Russian conception of 
civil society implicitly rejects the importance of this principle on two counts. Firstly, both 
Putin and Medvedev have emphasised that the fate of the state and civil society are interlinked 
and that the state has an essential role to play in developing civil society.
65
  Second and 
connected to the first, there is the notion, expressed clearly by Putin throughout his term in 
office, that civil society has an obligation to unite behind national goals or priorities set by the 
state. The evident discrepancy between the Russian model of civil society and traditional 
Western conceptions of what constitutes a functioning civil society is expressed in Evans‘ 
commentary below: 
The Putin administration speaks of the need for a vigorous civil society but 
interprets civil society as a network of organisations that, while remaining 
technically outside the state, will be co-opted to assist the leadership of the 
political regime in pursuing the objectives that it has chosen for society: The 
compliant social organisations envisioned by Putin would constitute not a genuine 
civil society but a quasi-civil society. (Evans, Henry & McIntosh-Sundstrom, 
2006, p.152) 
                                                 
65 Henry and McIntosh-Sundstrom draw attention to the sharp contrast between Yeltsin and Putin’s policies 
towards civil society: “The benign neglect of civil society during the Yeltsin years [gave] way to a more vigorous 
policy of the Putin administration to engage actors in civil society in a directed way” (2006, p. 3). 
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While it might be easier to dismiss Kremlin declarations of the importance of the state‘s role 
in invigorating civil society as an attempt by the regime to assert its control over that arena 
and negate the potentially, or indeed some would say inherently, challenging nature of civil 
society, the possibility of there being genuine cultural differences in understandings of what 
the functions of civil society are should be seriously considered. Upon further investigation, 
this study finds that the seemingly alien conception of civil society outlined above is not 
confined to Russia and has been documented in analyses of state-civil society relations in 
China and Japan.
66
 Moreover, it finds that there is a solid basis for the tendency for Russian 
society to entrust the state with the power to define the common good and indeed to believe 
that the state alone has the capability to do this.  
 Analyses of state-society relations in China and Japan note a similar trend of state 
involvement in civil society and the all-encompassing state as observed in Russia. Writing on 
civil society in Japan, for example, Pharr notes a clear and valid cultural distinction between 
East and West regarding conceptualisations of the function of civil society and the role of the 
state.  
Although liberalism posits a clear division between [state and society], 
Confucianism does not.... Society is ‗subsumed under the state‘ (Koo, 1993, 
p.328) and entrusted to the care and protection of leaders. State power is itself 
subordinate to a higher moral authority, but rulers, not subjects, are expected to 
define the public good. (Schwartz & Pharr (eds.), 2003, p.333) 
Similarly, Dagnino notes that in Latin America in the mid 70s-80s, the particular environment 
in which Gramsci‘s work was received ―seems to have nurtured a strong emphasis on the 
                                                 
66 See Schwartz & Pharr (eds.) 2003 on Japan and Frolic 1997 on China. 
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progressive or ‗revolutionary‘ possibility of hegemony as a project for the transformation of 
society‖ in contrast to the European application of the term hegemony ―to an analysis of the 
maintenance of the status quo and dominant power relations‖ (Alvarez, Dagnino & Escobar, 
1998, p.39). From this perspective, pluralism is not only not prioritised but is fundamentally 
rejected as the antithesis of what is considered to be most advantageous for progression and 
development in the modern world, namely an imposed consensus or hegemony. It thus 
appears that the Russian regime shares a paternalistic civic legacy with China and Japan in 
terms of what ‗the proper relation between state and society‘ should be and of the need to 
entrust the state with the task of setting out what represents the public interest, as well as a 
philosophical kinship with Gramscian notions of hegemony as applied in Latin America in the 
mid 70s-80s.  Yet, while such reference to analyses of other contexts for the development of 
civil society and particularly for state-civil society relations indicates that the Russian regime 
is not alone in its attitude towards civil society, it does not justify the Kremlin‘s conception of 
civil society beyond a loose sense that there may be a deeper cultural tendency underlying 
this. Indeed, such apparent cultural affinities might simply indicate a common tendency for 
those regimes (Russia, China, Japan and Latin America) to seek to subordinate society and to 
assume the sole responsibility for determining the public good.  
 Nonetheless, there is an argument to be made regarding the relationship between 
Russian political culture and the role of the state in civil society, which further validates the 
Kremlin‘s conception of civil society.  It is possible to argue that the importance of the role of 
the state in invigorating civil society and setting the public agenda is as much a part of mass 
perceptions of the proper relations between the state and civil society in Russia as it is of elite 
design or contrivance. As a former Nashi federal commissar and current analyst at the Central 
Electoral Commission was keen to convey to me, the problem with considering whether state 
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support has a negative influence on the development of civil society in Russia is that Russian 
society itself is ‗oriented towards the state‘:   
In the 1990s, when the state practically disappeared from the social sphere, there 
was a deep internal crisis in Russia – there was a rise in the crime rate and the 
death rate along with a decrease in the birth rate, war raged in Chechnya...  the list 
is endless... but most crucially, there was no consensus in society over even the 
most basic of things – whether we needed democracy, a market economy, 
sovereignty. Now we do have a consensus, thanks in no small part to the state... 
and the state now understands the importance of civil society for the country‘s 
development.
67
  
In addition to the widespread desire for some kind of order and stability following Yeltsin‘s 
presidency, it is also possible to understand why Russian society might be keen for the state to 
play a decisive role in setting the public agenda. Under Yeltsin, the weak state was captured 
by business groups and regional elites, who used the prerogative and institutions of state as a 
tool to further their own interests at the expense of the general public. For this reason, 
excessive influence of society (via unregulated, particularistic interest groups) on the 
decisions of state regarding what constitutes the public good is perceived to jeopardise public 
welfare by derailing the process of agenda formation. In this respect, a desire for a strong state 
empowered to make decisions based on the overall public welfare is understandable in the 
post-Yeltsin period. Alternative portrayals of mass perceptions of the role of the Russian state 
in civil society emphasise that this is a product of Russia‘s historic political legacy such that 
Russian society cannot conceive of the state not being in control of civil society or of society 
not being subordinate to the state.  For example, Evans seeks to place Putin‘s concept of civil 
                                                 
67 Author’s communication with Mikhail Kulikov, 17 November 2009.  
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society ‗in a broader perspective‘ by noting the ‗deep historical roots‘ of the ‗traditional 
conception of the Russian state and society as distinct and separate entities‘ whereby ‗the 
autocratic state is perceived by the people as an alien force, which exerts power with a degree 
of arbitrariness and is always beyond the control of the society‘ (2010a, p.115).  Whether 
Russian society actively entrusts the state with the power to decide what constitutes the 
common good or whether it is more a case of ‗resigned acceptance‘68 and public 
disillusionment with civil society remains debatable. Nonetheless, the likelihood of some 
level of societal support for a prominent role of the state in civil society, for the reasons 
described above, confers some sense of legitimacy on the regime‘s conception of civil society 
and of the state‘s responsibilities and authority in this field. 
However, despite having set out a potential explanation for the Kremlin‘s conception of 
the role of the state in civil society, this author contends that ultimately the ongoing 
legitimacy of the regime‘s approach to civil society can only be derived from a commitment 
to freedom of speech and assembly, which form the cornerstone of democratic pluralism. 
Though the Russian state may or may not have the active support of the public in its 
endeavour to shape civil society and to form a clear consensus on the country‘s future path, to 
the extent that it can be sure of continuing to enjoy any such legitimacy it must allow for 
dissent and debate.  
To be free democratically is not only to be able to participate in various ways in 
accordance with the principles, rules, and procedures of the constitutional system, 
as important as this is, but also, and crucially, always to be able to take one step 
back, dissent, and call into question the principles, rules or procedures by which 
                                                 
68 The term ‘resigned acceptance’ with regard to Russian society, and in particular the Russian electorate’s 
acceptance of the incumbent regime, is associated with the work of Rose, Mishler and Munro (2006). 
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one is governed and to enter into (rule-governed) deliberations over them, or 
usually over a subset of them, with those who govern. (Tully, 2005, p.193) 
In concurrence with Tully, who underscores the fundamental importance of the opportunity 
for dissent and debate in a democracy, this study affirms the importance of the principle of 
contestation as a universal foundation for a functioning civil society, regardless of whether the 
particular conception of civil society that you subscribe to resembles more the Russian 
conception of civil society than the traditional Western one or vice versa. Recognising 
difference is crucial for the success and durability of consensus-building and thus for an 
institution‘s ability to legitimately represent a ‗mainstream consensus‘ (Warren, 2001, p.81) 
rather than imposing a false consensus by silencing dissenting voices.  Similarly, any support 
for hegemony as a progressive, democratic ideal along the lines discussed above must be 
imbued with a sense of the importance of garnering mass support under conditions of free 
debate and thereby obtaining a clear mandate to act legitimately on the people‘s behalf. While 
this author (as perhaps would many scholars of post-Soviet politics) accepts and even 
supports the logic that schisms and splits within a polity can serve to destabilise a system and 
potentially threaten a country‘s development and ability to successfully reform, if democracy 
is our reference point then the emphasis must be laid on consensus-building and not 
consensus-forcing. Consensus may be preferable to conflict, but the opportunity for 
contestation must have first been provided for. In terms of state-sponsorship for Nashi and the 
Young Guard, the resultant pro-regime dominance among youth movements is only a 
negative force on the democratic development of civil society if alternative groups have been 
artificially impeded or sidelined. Thus Nashi and the Young Guard‘s tolerance or rather 
intolerance for alternative opinions becomes all-important for the democratic tenability of the 
Kremlin‘s conception of the role of civil society.  
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Recognising difference  
Having defended the concept of the state‘s role in directing civil society set out by Putin and 
Medvedev in principle and with certain necessary qualifications in place, the democratic 
credentials of the application of the regime‘s policy towards civil society are now examined in 
order to determine what the impact of state-sponsorship under this rubric of state-civil 
relations is in practice based on whether the fundamentality of contestation has been upheld. 
Evans‘ research on the development of the Obshchestvennaia Palata (Public Chamber) since 
its creation in 2005 under Putin is instructive here in so far as he situates the creation of the 
Public Chamber within the wider context of the state‘s policy towards civil society and 
identifies the scope and limitations of state-sponsored participation in the case of the Public 
Chamber.  Although the genesis of the Public Chamber predates the development of Nashi 
and the Young Guard,
69
 the Public Chamber was explicitly linked to the state‘s desire to 
‗provide the impetus for the growth of civil society‘ in the fashion described earlier (Evans, 
2009, p.6) and as such is useful in discerning the sincerity behind the intentions as well as the 
nature of the actual outcomes of state intervention in civil society in Russia.  
On the occasion of the proposal of the creation of the Public Chamber, in September 
2004, Putin declared that the proposed chamber would serve as ―a platform for broad-based 
dialogue, a place where citizen initiatives could be presented and discussed in detail [...] 
where nongovernmental experts analyze key government decisions and especially draft laws, 
[... and a means of] citizen oversight over the work of the machinery of government‖ (Putin 
                                                 
69 Putin first voiced his proposition to create the Public Chamber in September 2004. Thus, discussion of the 
Public Chamber might, at first glance, seem to be a deviation from this investigation into the impact of state-
sponsorship on the public sphere democratic effects of youth movements whose origins lie very much in the 
2005 post-‘orange’ context. 
2 
 
91 
 
2004 cited in Evans, 2009, p.3). In fact, as might be expected, there is little scope for criticism 
of the regime and the Public Chamber is intended to bolster state legitimacy and ultimately 
promote public support for state policy. Yet, Evans‘ research into the development of the 
Public Chamber contends that the chamber has functioned well in its capacity of advising on 
draft legislation and has even successfully initiated legislative amendments in such 
controversial areas as the 2006 law on Non-Governmental Organisations, which reduced the 
scope for the authorities to abuse this legislative requirement to ruin NGOs ill-favoured by the 
regime. According to Evans, since autumn 2006 the Public Chamber has prioritised its ability 
to undertake a rather more understated but relatively influential advisory legislative role.
70
 
While fulfilling the role of ‗serving the Russian state‘ by rallying behind national priorities 
alongside its advisory legislative role, the Public Chamber has been able to ‗intervene on 
behalf of citizens who felt that they were being treated unjustly‘ and to a lesser extent to 
‗investigate the activities of state‘ (Evans, 2010b, p.5).  Thus, the Public Chamber serves as 
an example of how state-sponsorship may allow for public deliberation and contestation 
within certain limits even when state support is bestowed under the terms of the Russian 
regime‘s conception of civil society, in other words under the direct tutelage of the state and 
with the obligation of supporting national priorities. Both those working in the presidential 
administration and members of the Public Chamber themselves recognise that, in 
contemporary Russia, societal initiatives need support from the state in order to organise and 
voice their interests (Evans, 2009, p.6). However, though its members are acutely aware of the 
need to remain within the remit of contesting singular issues and practices rather than 
appearing in direct confrontation with the state and thus posing a challenge to the legitimacy 
of the regime, the Public Chamber has been allowed to challenge policy and legislation with 
                                                 
70 See Evans (2009, p.11-12) for detail of the confrontation that marked the chambers early days. 
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the purpose of improving the state.  In other words the Public Chamber is able to provide 
constructive criticism of the state but its effectiveness comes from working in cooperation not 
confrontation with the state.  
As might be expected, therefore, the situation for anyone not prepared to cooperate with 
the incumbent regime is dire in comparison and the state‘s action to support the development 
of what it considers to be a functioning civil society involves the deliberate and extensive 
repression of political opposition. Though the fact that the state intervenes to support 
initiatives that contribute to its national priorities is not in itself reprehensible, when combined 
with the fact that having state approval is the only guarantee against unfair harassment and is 
the primary means of gaining mass publicity for groups attempting to operate and garner 
support in Russia (as discussed in the previous chapter), the state‘s action to support favoured 
groups serves to impede pluralism and contestation within civil society. The status of 
oppositional political parties is a case in point: The 2003-4 electoral cycle witnessed the utter 
‗collapse of the opposition‘ (Gel‘man, 2005, p.44), and in the 2007 parliamentary elections, 
apart from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), the only parties to cross 
the 7% threshold for entry into the State Duma were state-initiated, approved or co-opted 
parties. Similarly, while it may be natural for groups with opposing political allegiances to 
seek to undermine one another, the privileges of state support enjoyed by Nashi and the 
Young Guard and the dominance of pro-regime forces means that Nashi and the Young 
Guard‘s actions towards oppositional groups have a direct impact on the opportunity for 
contestation in Russian civil society. In this way, the development of Nashi and the Young 
Guard should be considered as part of a wider and pre-existing trend of decreasing pluralism 
and a narrowing margin for contestation imposed intentionally by the state as part of its 
strategy towards civil society. Thus, simply by being a state-sponsored participatory initiative 
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Nashi and the Young Guard are part of a grander design aimed at furthering the dominance of 
pro-regime forces in Russian politics and consequently at marginalising any alternatives. 
Furthermore, beyond the ways in which the state-sponsored youth movements impact 
negatively on pluralism and contestation in Russian civil society by default as a result of the 
broader context of state repression of perceived challenges to the incumbent regime, Nashi 
and the Young Guard themselves also strive vigorously to undermine the opposition in a 
manner that betrays their active collusion with the state in the pursuit of marginalising 
alternatives. Nashi overtly seeks to recruit as many young people as possible, who support the 
current political course and ‗Putin‘s plan‘, and aims to dominate the youth political scene to 
the detriment of the opposition. As Nashi explains in its manifesto, ―it is only by spreading 
the influence of [its] ideas among the younger generation that [it] can prevent young people 
from being drawn in by fascist and liberal extremist organisations.‖71 Thus Nashi‘s explicit 
objective is to rally support for the incumbent regime in order to prevent the opposition from 
using young people to incite a revolution. Nashi expresses its unwavering support for the 
current political course and demands vigilance against those who seek to undermine Russia. It 
should be noted that all political alternatives, or simply actions or ideas that are not in tune 
with the regime‘s perceived stance on Russia‘s national priorities, are considered in this 
category – that is, not only in terms of competition, but in terms of its very existence being 
dangerous and harmful to society. The Young Guard does not declare its political motives in 
such stark terms in its manifesto, preferring to call upon all young people who believe that 
they can make a difference and shape Russia‘s future. In contrast to Nashi, for whom political 
beliefs and ideology have been paramount, in its original manifesto the Young Guard placed 
the emphasis on generational differences, declaring that ―it is not surprising that today 
                                                 
71 Nashi, 2005, ‘Manifest’, available at: http://nashi.su/manifest, last accessed 16 June 2010. 
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politicians are distinguishable only by surname.‖72 The Young Guard thus aimed to attract 
young Russians inspired simply by the power demonstrated by Ukrainian youth in the 
‗Orange Revolution‘ – opting for rejuvenation or youth renewal as opposed to patriotic 
cleansing. As such, lacking any explicit reference to its support for Putin, United Russia or 
indeed for any concrete policy or position, the Young Guard‘s original manifesto makes no 
obvious demands on young people other than that they take responsibility for determining 
their own future and that of their country. Nonetheless, being the youth branch of United 
Russia makes allegiance to the incumbent regime and the politics of the ‗party of power‘ an 
obvious prerequisite for budding members. Moreover, as noted in the previous chapter, the 
movement‘s revised 2008 manifesto makes its support for United Russia explicit and 
highlights its cooperation with the party and the state as being of paramount importance.
73
 In 
an interview with this author, Andrei Tatarinov explained that being a member of the Young 
Guard‘s political council ‗basically means counter-propaganda against the opposition, 
explaining why it is better what United Russia does and so on.‘ Tatarinov also expressed clear 
unwillingness on the part of the Young Guard to engage with other ideas and political 
alternatives: 
We are willing to enter into dialogue with ‗normal‘, reasonable people, whether 
they are members of the opposition or representatives from other youth 
organisations. But, you see, we know what the value of dialogue is. Talking with 
the Union of Right Forces, Yabloko or Kasyanov‘s people is another thing - these 
organisations are not even registered, they do not have a single seat in parliament, 
their ideas are supported by 2% of Russia‘s population at maximum, ours are 
                                                 
72 The Young Guard, 2005, ‘O gvardii’, no longer available online since the youth movement replaced it with a 
new manifesto in 2008. 
73 Young Guard, 2008, ‘Manifest Molodoi Gvardii Edinoi Rossii 2008, available at 
www.molgvardia.ru/convention/manifest, last accessed 13 September 2010. 
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shared by around 90%.... Dialogue has to be meaningful and worth something to 
our organisation you see.
74
 
Interestingly, Nashi and the Young Guard demonstrate an intriguing duality in the 
degree of debate and discussion they encourage, with intolerance towards outsiders tempered 
by fostering some genuine debate within their trusted group. Yet, even in this they undermine 
the principles of plurality and tolerance by constructing a deep ‗us‘ and ‗them‘ divide, which 
ultimately limits the scope of debate.
75
  From participation in Nashi‘s 2008 summer camp and 
discussions with Nashi and Young Guard activists it is clear that both Nashi and the Young 
Guard actively encourage their members to debate and discuss government policy, such as 
‗Strategy 2020‘, and moreover that they are looking for innovative young Russians who are 
able to offer a new perspective and suggest improvements and ways that the national priorities 
could be better achieved.  However, members are required to maintain an unfaltering belief 
that Russia‘s current political course is the way forward and to have faith in the incumbent 
regime to set and pursue national objectives for the common good of the Russian nation. 
While that might seem a fair enough constraint for a pro-regime association to impose, when 
coupled with the desire to undermine alternative groups who do not support the regime or 
whose opinion might be classified as direct criticism of the regime itself along with the 
dominance of pro-regime groups facilitated by Kremlin sponsorship, this amounts to full-
scale exclusion of alternative opinions from political debate altogether. Oates sums up this 
tendency very succinctly when she reflects that ―in the Russian political tradition, there is no 
sense of a loyal opposition or even a Habermassian ‗sphere‘ in which discussion and debate 
can take place. Rather, the political style is one of winners and losers, friends and enemies‖ 
                                                 
74 Author’s interview with Andrei Tatarinov, member of the Political Council of the Young Guard and now 
member of the Public Chamber, Moscow, 10 July 2008. 
75 The limited scope for internal dissent within Nashi and the Young Guard is discussed in full in Chapter 6 
under the category of the developmental democratic effects of participation. 
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(Oates in Evans, Henry and Sundstrom-McIntosh, 2006, p.62). Encouraged by their anti-
orange origins and state support for them on these grounds, both Nashi and the Young Guard 
employ exclusionary rhetoric of the enemy within, referring to Western-sponsored politicians 
and groups in Russia. 
It is worth reiterating that although such a strategy of deliberate marginalisation of all 
political opposition as adopted by the Russian regime and Nashi (the Young Guard to a lesser 
extent) is not something that is recognised as democratic in any shape or form by traditional 
Western liberal understandings of democracy, the idea of the ‗tyranny of the majority‘ and of 
ridding the nation of illegitimate challenges to the regime is considered to be conducive to 
democracy in the Russian context.  In a similar fashion to societal support for a strong, 
dominant state following the chaos and suffering of the Yeltsin years, there appears to be 
some support among the Russian political elite and their supporters (evident bias 
notwithstanding) that the authority of the views held by the mainstream are made stronger by 
ignoring minority views and in this sense cutting out the illegitimate interference of 
particularistic groups, who do not have the common interest at heart.  In Nashi‘s manifesto, 
undermining the opposition was one of the ways that the movement sought to promote the 
development of a functioning civil society. Oppositional efforts to organise and mobilise are 
deemed to be Western-sponsored provocation tantamount to deliberate undermining of 
Russian sovereignty and consequently of Russian democracy.  Parallels may be drawn 
between Nashi‘s manifesto and Surkov‘s 2006 speech on sovereign democracy.  According to 
Surkov, failure to produce an effective leading class means that ‗society will achieve nothing‘ 
and will have ‗no future‘.76 In order for Russia to be a competitive and prosperous nation and 
achieve its rightful position in the global economy, Surkov argues, its leading class must be 
                                                 
76 Surkov, V. (2006) ‘Suverenitet –  eto politicheski sinonim konkurentosposobnosti’, 7 February 2006  – 
available at http://www.er.ru/news.html?id=111148, last accessed 16 August 2007, pages 6 and 10. 
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reformulated so that it is competent and loyal to Russia and implicitly sympathetic to the 
incumbent regime and its ideology.  Nashi‘s manifesto equally abounds with rhetoric of 
cleansing the incumbent elite and getting rid of ‗non-patriotic elements‘ – a term which has 
been used by Nashi to refer to any person, group or action that undermines Russian national 
identity as they perceive it, encourages external influence in Russian affairs, or simply does 
not support Russia‘s current political course or the regime‘s policies. 
 Nonetheless, the extraordinary level of intolerance for those who hold different 
political opinions demonstrated by Nashi in particular represents the sharp end of a wider 
culture of political chauvinism endorsed and even propagated by the state. Nashi‘s rhetoric 
and behaviour contravenes even the most generous understandings of the importance of 
defending the unity of the majority and maintaining the momentum and driving power behind 
modernisation and development. Nashi has employed tactics of outright intimidation and 
aggression, which amount to a rather crude and alarmingly vigilante interpretation of what 
could be perceived as Surkov‘s call to purge the political elite. The constraints on the scope of 
discursive challenges to the regime imposed by the state are not only perpetuated by these 
state-sponsored youth movements, but Nashi further extends the severity and reach of such 
constraints – challenging ‗non-patriotic‘ elements across Russian society as well as 
international groups, who clearly do not fall under the jurisdiction of the Russian regime. In 
contrast to the Young Guard, who go to great lengths to ridicule and undermine the opposition 
but whose actions remain well within the limits of what could be considered acceptable 
behaviour in a political campaign, Nashi adopts a far more aggressive stance by attempting to 
prohibit such opposition from existing by launching cyber attacks on independent media 
sources, seeking to force individuals to quit their posts and creating a climate of fear of being 
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denounced as ‗non-patriotic elements‘ according to Nashi‘s definition and ruthlessly targeted 
by the youth movement.
77
  
 
In sum, it is possible to say that the utter intolerance towards political alternatives practised by 
the Kremlin and the youth movements belies any positive impact of state sponsorship for 
Nashi and the Young Guard on the horizontal functions of civil society in terms of pluralism 
and contestation. This is irrespective of whether one accepts the desirability of state 
involvement in civil society propagated by the Kremlin or whether one believes that 
ultimately consensus building and a directed focus holds greater value for democracy than 
pluralism for pluralism‘s sake. Because political repression is a feature of the Kremlin‘s 
ongoing strategy to support the development of a functioning civil society, state sponsorship 
of Nashi and the Young Guard by default has a negative impact on the movements‘ public 
sphere democratic effects with regard to ‗recognising difference‘. In addition, the 
extraordinary level of intolerance exhibited by Nashi itself towards groups or individuals that 
it deems to be unpatriotic coupled with the movement‘s dominance (enabled by having state 
support) compounds the negative impact of state support on the public sphere democratic 
effects of participation in this way.  
In the previous chapter, great store was set by the fact that the advantages in terms of 
publicity accrued to Nashi and the Young Guard as a result of having state-sponsorship were 
multiplied by the fact that such publicity would have been impossible without state support. 
Along the same line of reasoning, the existing trajectory of Russian civil society must also be 
borne in mind in assessing the relative impact of state support for Nashi and the Young Guard 
                                                 
77The use of coercion and tactics of intimidation by Nashi is something that will be discussed in length in 
Chapter 7 on ‘civic virtues’. 
2 
 
99 
 
on the horizontal linkages between the youth movements and broader civil society in Russia. 
By this reckoning, prospects for pluralism and opposition to the regime were already dismal 
prior to Nashi and the Young Guard‘s creation – a development which merely intensified with 
the dominance of pro-regime forces in the youth sector. However, although the poor prospects 
for the opposition gathering substantial support in the run-up to the 2007-8 electoral cycle and 
inciting a ‗coloured revolution‘ in Russia were predetermined to some extent (not least by the 
repressive political environment created by the state as well as other factors such as the 
opposition‘s own failings and lack of support), it cannot be ruled out that oppositional youth 
groups inspired by the ‗Orange Revolution‘ in Ukraine may have been able to mobilise young 
Russians. Nashi and the Young Guard served to perpetuate the state‘s repressive tactics and, 
by their sheer dominance and tactics of aggression and intimidation, deliberately undermined 
the potential of alternative civil society groups at this potentially critical juncture. Indeed, 
regardless of whether oppositional youth movements would have been able to find support 
and rally around a common cause or whether a ‗coloured revolution‘ was in fact likely in 
Russia, the tactics adopted by Nashi and to a lesser extent the Young Guard served a blow to 
pluralism and contestation within Russian civil society. In practice, state sponsorship of Nashi 
and the Young Guard has exhibited a certain disregard for freedoms of speech and assembly 
and has thus undermined any potential validity or legitimacy for the Kremlin‘s conception of 
civil society noted above. 
 
Building communities 
Having established the resounding negative democratic effect of state support for Nashi and 
the Young Guard on pluralism and contestation in Russian civil society, the final section of 
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this chapter proceeds to consider the ways in which having state sponsorship may have 
boosted Nashi and the Young Guard‘s abilities to contribute to the development of ‗social 
capital‘ by building communities or networks of young Russians.78 In his work on 
understanding the disparity in the effectiveness of democratic institutions in Italy‘s regions, 
Putnam argues that ―networks of civic engagement are an essential form of social capital‖ 
and, moreover, that ―the denser such networks in a community, the more likely that its 
citizens will be able to cooperate for mutual benefit‖ (1993, p.173). The concept of ‗social 
capital‘ was later made famous by Putnam in his influential article ‗Bowling Alone: 
America‘s Declining Social Capital‘ (1995). In this seminal article Putnam defines social 
capital as the ―features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that 
facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit‖ (1995, p.67).  Although Putnam 
uses an aggregate quantifiable measure of social capital in his research, derived from the 
number of social organisations in a given area and other measures of civic engagement 
including voting habits and preferences, this study draws only on what is relevant to aiding 
understanding of the relative democratic effects of state sponsorship for Nashi and the Young 
Guard. With this in mind, this chapter considers the impact of state-sponsorship on the youth 
movements‘ development of networks of young Russians in two main ways: Firstly, in terms 
of the nature and spread of the networks created by Nashi and the Young Guard in relation to 
what was available to young Russians previously. Secondly, in terms of the way in which the 
youth movements may have contributed to building reciprocity between members, enabling 
them to benefit collectively in a manner that would not have been possible alone.  
                                                 
78 It is important to note that the democratic credentials of Nashi and the Young Guard’s objectives have no 
bearing on the democratic value in terms of the social capital of the networks they have established. In his later 
work, Putnam himself qualifies his definition of social capital by asserting that he makes no distinction between 
whether an association’s goals are democratic or not (1999, Social capital: measurement and consequences, 
OECD, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/6/1825848.pdf, last accessed 28 January 2011). 
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Networks of civic engagement 
On a basic level, state support has enabled Nashi and the Young Guard to fund the 
development of vast networks of young Russians in comparison with other youth movements 
such as Oborona (Defence), Da! (Yes) and My (We), which were established around the same 
time as Nashi and the Young Guard but which met with state disapproval for their direct 
opposition to the regime. In early 2008, the Young Guard claimed to have between 120,000 
and 150,000 members and Nashi 300,000, and in both cases the state-sponsored youth 
movements have successfully set up branches across many of Russia‘s regions (see Figure 3 
below). Compare this to Oborona for instance (considered at the time to be Russia‘s answer 
to Pora and arguably the strongest of the opposition youth movements set up in 2005), whose 
membership in early 2008 ran only into the tens and hundreds with little reach outside of 
Moscow and St. Petersburg, and the benefit of having state support in this respect is obvious. 
However, the argument as to the democratic benefit of having state support for the building of 
networks of civic engagement does not end with the simple fact that state-sponsorship has 
enabled Nashi and the Young Guard to develop networks of young people in many of 
Russia‘s regions. As Putnam draws our attention to, the crucial thing in terms of the 
development of social capital is whether an organisation is constructed on vertical lines (such 
as the Catholic Church in Italy) or on more horizontal lines with a less hierarchical structure 
(such as a bowling league), the latter being far more conducive to the development of social 
capital (Putnam 1993).   Nashi‘s reorganisation in 2008, with the result that the movement‘s 
vertical chains of command were replaced with a more horizontal structure, thus takes on a 
rather interesting dimension.  
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As noted in the previous chapter, at the end of January 2008, new leader Nikita 
Borovikov announced Nashi‘s reorganisation. This involved closing down many of the 
movement‘s regional branches and replacing them with nationwide projects developed around 
key priorities, such as the economy, education and modernisation. This reorganisation on the 
eve of the presidential elections has been largely dismissed as a straightforward attempt to 
position the movement so as to continue to be a useful tool for the regime beyond the 
completion of the 2007–2008 electoral cycle and has thus been perceived as indicative of 
Nashi‘s subordination to the state and dependence on state support. However, although 
commentators have focused on the closure of all but five of Nashi‘s fifty regional branches, 
Nashi‘s restructuring actually counter-intuitively represents the movement‘s deeper 
penetration of Russia‘s regions. While previously Nashi represented a tangible, centralised 
force with direct governance over its regional branches, following its reorganisation Nashi 
now has a more amorphous structure with new nationwide projects that enable young people 
anywhere in Russia to become involved and apply for funding to develop initiatives around 
the projects‘ key priorities. Thus, contrary to perceived wisdom, Nashi‘s restructuring 
effectively expands the movement‘s reach. In all of the regions where the youth movement 
formerly had regional branches, activists continue to work under the banner of Nashi but now 
they are organised into distinct and targeted taskforces. Furthermore, enabled by the fact that 
the establishment of a Nashi headquarters is no longer necessary to coordinate Nashi activity 
in a region, the project Malye Goroda (Small towns) has flourished and is striving to 
encourage participation in Nashi‘s activity in the Urals and the Northern Caucasus.79 As a 
result of Nashi‘s reorganisation, much of the movement‘s activity is now conducted at the 
micro-level with limited coordination by federal Nashi staff beyond securing funding and 
                                                 
79 Information obtained from the Malye Goroda section of Nashi’s website, available at: 
http://www.nashi.su/p_small_towns, last accessed 12 January 2009. 
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development support. In contrast, perhaps confined by the limitations of being the young 
wing of the ‗party of power‘, the Young Guard remains a relatively hierarchical structure with 
regional branches looking to the youth movement‘s central headquarters in Moscow for 
guidance. 
Furthermore, if the support networks and communities created for young people by 
Nashi and the Young Guard are considered in light of what the pre-existing situation was for 
young people‘s sense of social cohesion or rather anomie and isolation in Russia, then the 
social capital of these networks of civic engagement is all the more significant. Through its 
annual youth forum held at Lake Seliger each summer since 2005, Nashi has promoted the 
philosophy that young people need to be supported in their development and linked up with 
other young Russians sharing similar interests. As Nashi seeks to underline, this is a 
significant departure from the ‗free for all‘ of the nineties, which left young Russians to fend 
for themselves and make their future either by means of the education and connections that 
their family could provide or, for those from less fortunate backgrounds, by turning to crime.  
A few years ago in Russia, youth politics did not exist in principle, because there 
was simply no inclination for it and also because neo-liberalism was in vogue - 
the idea of 'help yourself‘, ‗make yourself'. Either you managed to make 
something of yourself and were a winner, or else you failed and were branded a 
loser. But not everyone has the same capabilities or equal opportunities, some do 
not have the necessary technology.  Even now, few people understand the concept 
of youth politics. For the first time [...] we are trying to get the message across 
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that young people need to be provided with opportunities, young people need to 
be connected, given the technology etc.
80
 
Consequently, by reaching out to youths who previously found themselves on the margins of 
society and by using the benefits of state support to provide the necessary resources for the 
development of youth projects in its name at local, regional and national level, Nashi has 
made progress towards building social capital among young Russians. Nashi‘s nation-wide 
projects encourage young people to feel part of a community (with all the rights and 
responsibilities that that implies) and supported by a wide network of like-minded people. 
Again Nashi has been much better equipped than the Young Guard here – not being confined 
to politics alone or designed to groom a relatively small elite group.  Nashi has been able to 
diversify its activities and thereby engage more young Russians from a variety of 
backgrounds and with a variety of different interests. 
 
Reciprocity  
The idea of reciprocity is interesting in relation to Nashi and the Young Guard, as it has been 
often assumed that members‘ affiliation to the youth movements is very loose and in actual 
fact constitutes material self interest above all else. Indeed, many of those joining the Young 
Guard no doubt hope that through their loyalty and participation they will be able to advance 
a career in politics of some sort. Moreover, many of those whom I met at Nashi‘s summer 
camp in July 2008 had a very weak sense of identification with the youth movement and had 
come to participate in one of Nashi‘s specific projects that they were interested in and 
possibly to procure funding and resources for their own regional projects. Yet, for the 
                                                 
80 Author’s interview with the head of one of Nashi’s federal projects, Lake Seliger, 21 July 2008 
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purposes of building social capital, the strength of the bonds of membership of a particular 
association or group is important: The degree to which there is a sense of kinship or solidarity 
between members affects the benefits of association in terms of social capital. In his 1995 
article, Putnam implies that there should be a cut off point for recognising the social capital 
rewards of association, whereby membership involves more than ―just writing a check for 
dues or perhaps occasionally reading a newsletter‖: members must be a aware of ―each 
other‘s existence‖ (1995, p.71).  Putnam goes on to use this distinction to categorise 
associations as either secondary or tertiary – Nashi and the Young Guard fall under the 
category of secondary associations as members meet collectively and actively participate 
regularly, whereas an example of a tertiary association would be ‗national environmental 
organizations like the Sierra Club‘ whose members pay dues but rarely interact with each 
other (Putnam,1995, p.70)  Following Putnam‘s logic, therefore, there is a sufficient 
connection between members of Nashi and the Young Guard for the movements‘ impact on 
the development of social capital to be recognised. Moreover, in this sense, Nashi‘s 2008 
reorganisation perhaps facilitates stronger ties between members by encouraging young 
Russians to work on specific projects together with like-minded people in their region and in 
collaboration with people working on the same project in other regions, rather than focusing 
on intra-regional cooperation among a diverse group of people linked only by their basic 
affiliation to Nashi. It is recognised that Nashi is very diverse and that young Russians join 
for a variety of different reasons, which are not necessarily conducive to them developing 
bonds with one another. Whether intentionally or not, Nashi‘s reorganisation has encapsulated 
the essence of encouraging smaller, more closely-knit communities of young Russians, while 
simultaneously enabling the movement to spread more easily to further the development of 
new communities in Russia‘s more remote regions. 
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Furthermore, as Putnam suggests in his earlier book on Making Democracy Work, 
―reciprocity serves to reconcile self-interest and solidarity‖ (1993, p.172), or, expressed more 
bluntly in a later work, ―altruism is not part of the definition of social capital.‖81 In other 
words, self-interest and personal gain are not incompatible with reciprocity and, in fact, are 
the primary drivers for mutual reciprocity and consequently for the building of social 
capital.
82
 
Each individual act in a system of reciprocity is usually characterised by a 
combination of what one might call short-term altruism and long-term self-interest: 
I help you out now in the expectation that you will help me out in the future. 
Reciprocity is made up of a series of acts each of which is short-run altruistic 
(benefitting others at a cost to the altruist) but which together typically make every 
participant better off. (Taylor, 1982, pp.28-29 cited in Putnam, 1993, p.172) 
Thus, whether or not each member of Nashi or the Young Guard ultimately takes part for his 
or her own personal gain, the means of obtaining that perceived reward is through collective 
action alone and on these grounds it can be said that Nashi and the Young Guard cultivate a 
sense of reciprocity for mutual gain among their members. For instance, the realisation of an 
individual‘s aspirations to become a deputy in his regional legislative assembly by means of 
their membership of the Young Guard depends not only on their own abilities but also on the 
collective influence of the Young Guard in changing attitudes towards youth in politics and 
pushing for greater influence of young people in formal political institutions.  
                                                 
81 Putnam, 1999, Social capital: measurement and consequences, OECD, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/6/1825848.pdf, last accessed 28 January 2011, p.7. 
82 It should be noted that Nashi runs a series of volunteer programs involved with caring for the elderly, 
providing free legal advice, taking children out on activities and other charitable causes, which serve the needs 
of the wider community and contribute to a broader sense of community spirit and civic ethos. Thus, to 
underline that self-interest does not undermine mutual reciprocity and thereby the value of social capital is not 
to imply that Nashi and the Young Guard’s activities are necessarily always motivated entirely by self-interest. 
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Overall it is possible to say that, despite the negative impact of state support for the Young 
Guard and particularly for Nashi as far as impeding opportunities for contestation are 
concerned, the horizontal public sphere democratic effects of Nashi and the Young Guard are 
not entirely negative; there are some positive democratic effects with regard to the 
development of social capital. Moreover, in a similar fashion to the negative democratic 
effects discussed in this chapter, the positive democratic effects associated with the 
development of social capital are also magnified by the socio-political context and are also 
greater for Nashi than the Young Guard as a result of Nashi‘s own design. As has been noted 
above, the value of social capital for democracy is dependent neither on the goals or purposes 
of association nor on the motivations for participation of individual members. ―The central 
idea of social capital in [Putnam‘s] view is that networks and the associated norms of 
reciprocity have value.‖83 Thus, simply by establishing networks of young people across 
Russia engaged in collective action, Nashi and the Young Guard have helped to lay the 
groundwork for the development of social capital among Russian youths by building 
networks of civic participation and reciprocity. Moreover, state support to establish and 
promote Nashi and the Young Guard‘s growth has undeniably had a positive impact in this 
respect. In addition, Nashi‘s 2008 reorganisation to structure the movement along more 
horizontal lines rather than vertical, as described above, has greatly enhanced the movement‘s 
positive democratic effects in this field by strengthening the bonds of commonality between 
Nashi members and reducing the hierarchy within the organisation, which could otherwise 
seriously reduce the benefit of the organisation in terms of social capital. Being no part of any 
state design for the youth movement, this positive democratic effect is attributable only to 
                                                 
83 Putnam, 1999, Social capital: measurement and consequences, OECD, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/6/1825848.pdf, last accessed 28 January 2011, p.1 
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agency and, more specifically, the decisions taken by Nashi leaders. In this sense, Nashi‘s 
contribution to the building of social capital among young Russians indicates both the 
potential for state-sponsored participatory initiatives to have unintended positive democratic 
effects as well as the significance of factors other than whether or not an organisation has 
state support in determining the democratic effects of participation. In Chapter 1 it was noted 
that the more recent countervailing trend among scholars to question the analytic dichotomy 
between the state and civil society reflected a desire to recognise the increasingly complex 
relations that exist between the state and civil society in liberal democracies as opposed to the 
previous reference to civil society in opposition to the communist state – the implication 
being that positive state intervention should not be discounted. However, this study has 
demonstrated that even when the state harbours no aspirations towards becoming a liberal 
democracy and undermines pluralism and contestation at every turn, there may still be some 
positive democratic effects – such as the development of ‗social capital‘.  Thus, in addition to 
questioning the more traditional prevalent assumption of the injury afflicted upon civil society 
by the state, this study also challenges the liberal-democratic emphasis of the existing 
countervailing trend of recognising and embracing state-civil society relations.  
 
Conclusion  
In its evaluation of Nashi and the Young Guard‘s impact on the horizontal working of civil 
society, Chapter 3 has demonstrated that the concept of a ‗state-led civil society‘ (Frolic, 
1997) better describes the Russian context than any Western liberal-democratic notion of an 
independent civil society. Consequently, this chapter asserts that assessments of the impact of 
recent state-sponsored initiatives, including Nashi and the Young Guard, on the development 
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of civil society should not get bogged down in their lack of independence from the state, as 
this is a measure of development that is not necessarily universally accepted.  
However, consideration of Nashi and the Young Guard‘s impact on the development 
of the horizontal functions of civil society in practice reveals a rather bleak picture of the 
public sphere democratic effects of state sponsorship for the youth movements in this area. 
Although Nashi and the Young Guard‘s contribution to the development of social capital by 
building networks of civic engagement and reciprocity among young Russians is especially 
significant given the social anomie and deviance that is more typical of youth in Russia, the 
youth movements‘ negative impact on the scope for contestation fundamentally damages the 
legitimacy of the Russian conception of civil society and  does great injury to the 
development of any functioning civil society in Russia. Aside from being party to the 
selective support and repressive will of the state, Nashi has actively extended the state‘s 
policy of marginalisation of political alternatives to include anything that might be construed 
as insufficiently supportive of the regime.  
In terms of the balance between voice and integrity referred to in the introduction to 
this chapter, Chapter 3 finds that Nashi and the Young Guard‘s attempts to establish their 
dominance and gain a much sought after public platform and voice for young people in the 
upper echelons of power have come at the expense of other groups and to the detriment of 
civil society overall. However, this was deliberately sought by Nashi and the Young Guard 
and thus not antagonistic to the youth movements‘ own intentions, as the idea of their facing a 
quandary in negotiating the balance between voice and integrity would imply. The most 
fiercely positive and negative public sphere democratic effects of Nashi in this chapter are 
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associated as much with the youth movement‘s own intentions as with any imposition as a 
result of state-sponsorship. 
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OVERALL EVALUATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE DEMOCRATIC 
EFFECTS OF NASHI AND THE YOUNG GUARD 
Objective scrutiny of the impact of having state support on the public sphere democratic 
effects of Nashi and the Young Guard in Part 1 has identified the particular importance of the 
socio-political environment for the relative democratic effects of state-sponsored 
participation. In the case of Nashi and the Young Guard, the repressive political environment 
that characterised their development has accentuated the impact of state sponsorship on both 
the positive and negative public sphere democratic effects of participation as well as affecting 
the relative value of state-sponsored participation by increasing the costs of not having state 
approval. In addition, at several points during this investigation of the public sphere 
democratic effects of participation, the impact of agency or, more precisely, the impact of 
decisions taken by Nashi and the Young Guard leaders on the democratic effects of 
participation has been noted.  Again, factoring in the significance of agency for the impact of 
state sponsorship on the democratic effects of participation does not necessarily denote a 
positive contribution in the case of Nashi and the Young Guard; decisions taken by the youth 
movements‘ leaders have impacted both positively and negatively on the public-sphere 
democratic effects of state-sponsored participation. 
Significantly, the findings of Part 1 do not refute the main claims behind the implicit 
critique of state-sponsored participation contained in the work of social-movement scholars 
and others. State-sponsorship does indicate a dominant top-down influence and the 
subordination of societal interests to those of the state. However, it is not valid to assume that 
state support has an entirely negative impact on the public sphere democratic effects of 
participation. Such an assumption is undone by the fact that it takes as its reference societies 
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wherein there are viable alternatives to state sponsorship, in which there exists a relatively 
free media and a developed civil society in which a variety of aggregate interests can coalesce 
and present themselves. Drawing on the experience of contemporary state-sponsored youth 
participation in Russia, where there is little viable alternative to state-sponsorship, this study 
finds that the distinction between the implications of having state support and not having it 
becomes all important. Therefore, to allow assumptions based on the conditions that exist in 
Western consolidated liberal-democracies to continue to inform our understanding of the 
democratic effects of state-sponsored participation more generally is to make a serious error. 
In this way, the findings of Part 1 of this thesis vindicate Robert Pekkanen‘s assertion, 
in his chapter tracking the historical development of civil society in Japan, that ―civil society 
is not a dichotomous variable [....] Rather than search for either the suppression or nurturing 
of civil society, we can examine the patterns that the state creates in civil society and the 
patterns of state-civil society relations that emerge‖. Examination of the impact of state-
sponsorship on the public sphere democratic effects of participation in the case of Nashi and 
the Young Guard has revealed the interplay that exists between the various effects of these 
state-sponsored movements on Russian civil society. In Chapter 2 it was noted that state 
support for the development of Nashi and the Young Guard entailed some invaluable positive 
public sphere democratic effects as far as public communication and deliberation are 
concerned, but simultaneously imposed potentially debilitating constraints on the youth 
movements in this same field. Similarly, in Chapter 3 it was discovered that the relative 
democratic gains made by Nashi and the Young Guard on a unitary level translated negatively 
to the development of Russian civil society more broadly in terms of plurality and 
contestation, but that state-sponsorship enabled the youth movements to develop extensive 
‗networks of trust‘ between young people across Russia and thus make a significant 
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contribution to building ‗social capital‘ among what was previously considered to be one of 
the most disaffected and atomised sectors of the population.   
 Looking ahead to Part 2 of this thesis, having begun by examining the public-sphere 
democratic effects of Nashi and the Young Guard where state-sponsorship is presumed to 
have a particularly negative effect, Part 2 explores the impact of state support on the 
institutional democratic effects of participation in the case of Nashi and the Young Guard – 
the area in which state-sponsorship is considered to be most likely to have some positive 
democratic effects. The juxtaposition of Parts 1 and 2 of this thesis will be interesting in the 
final analysis as prevalent accounts of the democratic effects of participation purport that the 
positive institutional democratic effects that might be gained through proximity to the state 
come at the expense of undermining the potential public-sphere democratic effects of 
participation.     
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PART TWO - INSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRATIC 
EFFECTS OF NASHI AND THE YOUNG GUARD  
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INTRODUCTION 
As the Habermassian conception of the public sphere continues to influence academic thought 
and policy development, institutional democratic effects of participation have tended to be 
eschewed in favour of an emphasis on preserving associations‘ autonomy from the state.84 
The underlying logic being that the pursuit of greater representation and influence in formal 
political institutions brings associations closer to the state and in doing so undermines other 
preferred potential democratic effects of participation, namely public sphere effects relating to 
the development of a functioning civil society and the formation of public opinion.
85
  
According to Cornwall (writing on NGO-led participatory initiatives in the developing 
world), ―developing an autonomous public sphere outside the domain of the state is a 
precondition for citizen engagement that does not simply serve to legitimate the existing 
political system‖ (2002, p.4 – emphasis added).  By implication, therefore, the potential 
democratic effects of state-sponsored participation are commonly disregarded on the grounds 
that any positive democratic effects (public sphere, developmental and indeed institutional) 
are necessarily limited by proximity to the state.  
However, acknowledging the potential power of the state to remove obstacles to 
participation and to use its influence to facilitate access to decision-making processes, there is 
a discernible strain within the literature on participation and democratisation that identifies 
                                                 
84  As set out in Chapter 1, the ‘institutional democratic effects’ refers to the manner in which associations may 
“influence the extent to which the institutions of voting and representation work in democratic ways *…+ by 
providing political representation, enabling pressure and resistance, organizing political processes, facilitating 
cooperation, and serving as alternative venues for governance” (Warren, 2001, p. 61). 
85 Noting the contribution that Habermas originally made to the literature on associational life by drawing 
attention to the public sphere effects of associations and in particular the role of associations in forming public 
opinion, Warren expresses concern that “this democratic effect of associational life has become, in some 
philosophical circles, so dominant that it threatens to crowd out the more ‘classical’ *here read institutional+ 
democratic functions of associations” (2001, p.35). 
  
 
116 
 
institutional democratic effects as the field in which state support could have significant 
benefits. For example, contrary to the assumption implicit in Cornwall‘s above assertion that 
state-sponsored participation produces ‗weak publics‘ and inhibits any positive democratic 
effects, Fraser contends that it is precisely the institutional democratic effects of participation, 
enabled via engagement with the state and institutions of governance, that are the key to 
developing ‗strong publics‘. ‗Strong publics‘ are defined by Fraser as ―publics whose 
discourse encompasses both opinion formation and decision making [....] The ‗force‘ of 
public opinion is strengthened [Fraser asserts] when a body representing it is empowered to 
translate such ‗opinion‘ into authoritative decisions‖ (1993, pp.24-5).86 
 Part 2 of this thesis investigates whether the institutional democratic effects of 
participation in the case of Nashi and the Young Guard have been confined to legitimising the 
state, as proponents of the fundamental need for associations to maintain their autonomy from 
the state would profess, or whether state-sponsorship has in fact empowered these youth 
movements by facilitating access to decision-making bodies and thus creating ‗strong publics‘ 
in Fraser's sense of the term. It is divided into two chapters, designed to give proper 
consideration to each of the approaches to the potential institutional democratic effects of 
state-sponsored participation referred to above – on the one hand, that state involvement 
inherently limits all positive democratic effects of participation (including institutional 
effects) and, on the other hand, that state support may in fact boost certain positive 
institutional democratic effects.  Firstly, Chapter 4 on ‗Participation and legitimisation‘ 
examines the ways in which youth political participation via Nashi and the Young Guard has 
served to ‗legitimise the existing political system‘, as Cornwall might expect the democratic 
                                                 
86 Several authors in a 2006 edited volume on Russian civil society contend that “organizations in Russian civil 
society are likely to make more progress in changing state policies and behaviour in their issue areas by forming 
avenues of cooperation with state organizations than by opposing the state directly” (Evans, Henry & McIntosh 
Sundstrom, 2006, p.317). 
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effects of state-sponsored participation to be restricted to. Recognising that providing 
legitimacy for the state can have a positive democratic effect, Chapter 4 asserts that, as well as 
reinforcing the incumbent Russian regime, Nashi and the Young Guard have simultaneously 
contributed to providing democratic legitimacy
87
 for the state in the eyes of participants by 
encouraging support for political processes and institutions as part of their bid to secure youth 
allegiance to the regime at election-time. The motivations for and significance of Kremlin 
support for these youth movements are investigated specifically in order to assess whether or 
not the state has a vested interest in promoting mass youth participation in politics via Nashi 
and the Young Guard beyond securing the incumbent regime. Secondly, allowing for the 
possibility that having state-sponsorship may directly support positive outcomes in the field of 
institutional democratic effects, Chapter 5 on ‗Power to youth‘ explores the potential for the 
state to promote the development of ‗strong publics‘, as Fraser suggests, by facilitating access 
to decision-making processes and representation in the formal political arena. It evaluates 
Nashi and the Young Guard‘s efforts to get young people into political office in order to 
assess the relative influence of these youth movements in the formal political arena and the 
degree to which having state support has facilitated or hindered this.  
 
                                                 
87 Warren describes one of the potential institutional democratic effects of associations as being the ‘capacity 
to provide democratic legitimacy for the state’ (2001, p.91). This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 4 - PARTICIPATION AND LEGITIMISATION 
In the run up to the 2007-8 Russian electoral cycle both Nashi and the Young Guard 
embarked upon an intense campaign to stimulate youth interest in the elections and to get 
young people involved in politics. The pro-Kremlin youth movements each adopted different 
approaches to combating youth apathy towards politics but with the common aim of securing 
the incumbent regime from the perceived potential threat of political instability during the 
elections. On the one hand, Nashi drew on inspirational rhetoric of the power of youth from 
the ‗Orange Revolution‘ and evoked grandiose sentiments of the ‗Great Patriotic War‘ by 
urgently calling for young Russians to defend the motherland against external malevolent 
influences.
88
 On the other hand, in keeping with its more formal political standing as the 
youth branch of United Russia, the Young Guard made the same pleas for young Russians to 
stand up and be counted, but in the rather less vicarious manner of promoting the importance 
of young people taking responsibility for determining the future course of their country.
89
  
Despite the potential positive democratic effects of these rallying calls for young people to 
take part in the elections, unsurprisingly the existing literature on Nashi and the Young Guard 
has tended to discount the movements‘ efforts to encourage youth political participation as 
simply being a means of extending the incumbent regime‘s domination by further 
marginalising the opposition. As we have seen in the previous chapter, similar negative 
assessments of the Young Guard and particularly Nashi‘s impact on the opposition and civil 
society as a whole were not unwarranted. Yet, while securing the regime‘s unchallenged 
authority may well have been the primary intention behind Nashi and the Young Guard‘s 
                                                 
88 Nashi, 2005, ‘Manifest’, available at: http://nashi.su/manifest, last accessed 16 June 2010. 
89 The Young Guard, 2005, ‘O gvardii’, no longer available online since the youth movement replaced it with a 
new manifesto in 2008. 
 4 
 
119 
 
campaign to increase youth participation in politics, this chapter endeavours to explore 
whether the democratic effects of this campaign have been limited to reinforcing the regime 
(and all the negative connotations associated with that in relation to Russia) or whether, in 
fact, some positive democratic effects have ensued, in particular regarding the legitimacy of 
democratic processes and institutions of state.  
The chapter begins by providing the context of Nashi and the Young Guard‘s 
campaign to encourage political participation among young Russians. It asserts that the reason 
behind Kremlin support for this campaign was not a genuine desire to promote mass political 
engagement in its own right, if indeed this was the intention of Nashi or the Young Guard 
themselves.
90
 Instead, the drive to increase youth political participation in the run up to the 
2007-8 electoral cycle was a response to the perceived threat posed to the regime at that time 
by political disengagement among young Russians. As such, state support for youth 
participation via Nashi and the Young Guard reflected an ongoing desire to preserve the 
incumbent regime rather than any shift in attitude towards mass political participation. The 
chapter then establishes what it considers to be the crucial difference between legitimising the 
existing political regime and providing democratic legitimacy for the state, before proceeding 
to assess the extent to which Nashi and the Young Guard have been able to contribute to both 
by examining youth participation in the 2007-8 electoral cycle.  
 
                                                 
90 It is important to distinguish here between young Russians’ engagement in the politics of the everyday, 
which it might be argued the Kremlin seeks to encourage, and the Politics of power, which refers to young 
Russians’ engagement in the formal political arena and which, it is contended, the Kremlin does not genuinely 
desire.  
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Political disengagement and regime support (1999-2004) 
Mass political disengagement has been a ubiquitous feature of post-Soviet politics in Russia. 
Russians‘ widespread estrangement from politicians and institutions of governance and their 
relatively low levels of participation in traditional political activities, such as voting or 
membership of a political organisation, have been well documented by numerous studies 
comparing the post-communist region with Western Europe and America.
91
 Based on data 
gathered prior to the ‗Orange Revolution‘ in Ukraine, these studies note that (alongside 
Ukraine and Belarus) political disengagement in Russia is among the highest in Europe and 
America and has been slowly increasing with the passage of time since the collapse of 
Communism. For example, the ‗Inclusion without Membership‘ surveys conducted in 2004 
show that ―if the average representative adult is a member of 2.4 civil or political 
organisations in Western democracies […] and 0.9 in the post-communist states […] in the 
‗outsider states‘ [Russia, Ukraine and Belarus] it is significantly lower still: 0.26 and 0.27 in 
Russia and Ukraine, respectively, and a slightly higher but still underwhelming 0.50 in 
Belarus‖ (Hutcheson & Korosteleva, 2006, p.35).   
Furthermore, cross-comparison of basic indicators of political engagement in Russia 
with socio-demographic variables highlights that political disengagement has been more 
pronounced among the younger generation. In the 2003/4 federal electoral cycle, voter turnout 
was significantly lower among 18-35 year olds compared to the rest of the population (see 
Figure 3 below).   
  
                                                 
91 For example, see Furusawa 2007, Hutcheson & Korosteleva 2006, Korosteleva 2006. 
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Source: ‗Forum Obshestvennovo Mnenie‘, available at 
http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/cat/societas/policy_interest/attendance/voter_turn_2004/ed041231. 
 
Moreover, according to the 5
th
 wave of the World Values survey conducted in Russia in 2006, 
74.1% of respondents aged between 18 and 30 considered themselves to be not very or not at 
all interested in politics, compared to 61.2% among those aged over 30 (the same is true for 
young Russians‘ propensity to take part in political actions such as attending a political 
demonstration – see Appendix One). A more recent study, conducted in 2006/7 by the Swiss 
Academy for Development in conjunction with the Levada Center, affirmed that young 
Russians were still less likely to be interested in politics than the population in general.
92
 
Yet, despite the validity of these statements it is important to note that, although 
higher than in the United States or France, political disengagement in Russia is no higher than 
in Poland, Latvia, or even Great Britain. Neither is the attenuation of political disengagement 
                                                 
92 Dafflon, 2007, Youth in Russia – A generation in transition, A research report by the Swiss Academy for 
Development, SAD, p.22, available at: http://www.sad.ch/images/stories/Publikationen/sad-youth-in-
russia.pdf, last accessed 3 May 2009. 
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Figure 3 – Voter turnout in the 2003/4 Russian electoral cycle by age 
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among the younger generation new or unique to Russia.
93
 Thus, without seeking to 
problematise the level of political disengagement in Russia, this study notes that relatively 
low and dwindling levels of political participation among young people in particular have 
been a feature of much of the post-Soviet era in Russia: The significance being that, despite 
the longstanding nature of the phenomenon, no clear action was taken by the Kremlin to 
reduce rising levels of youth political disengagement before the development of Nashi and the 
Young Guard in 2005.  
 
In order to understand why the Kremlin did not previously strive to curb rising youth political 
disengagement and ultimately why it then supported Nashi and the Young Guard‘s campaigns 
to encourage youth political participation in 2005, we must look to the relationship between 
political disengagement and regime support in contemporary Russia and begin by identifying 
what the advantages of fostering political disengagement might have been for the Kremlin 
prior to the ‗Orange Revolution‘. This study contends that as well as undermining protest 
against the regime (including support for the opposition), rising political disengagement in 
Putin‘s Russia served to reinforce the regime‘s standing at election time by contributing to the 
reliability and number of votes cast in favour of the incumbent regime.  
Writing shortly after the 2003/4 electoral cycle on the dynamics of regime support in 
the post-Yeltsin period, Rose, Mishler and Munro assert that a significant section of the 
Russian electorate was comprised of what they call ‗floating supporters‘, who can be 
characterised equally by their alternating support for and criticism of the regime as by their 
resigned acceptance of the existing political set up and lack of desire to challenge it (2006, 
                                                 
93 For a comparison of youth political participation indicators from various countries see Appendix One. For 
information on the generation gap in political participation in Britain see Henn, Weinstein & Wring (2002).  
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pp.92-7).  Despite criticising aspects of the regime that impinge on their immediate day-to-
day lives, according to Rose, Mishler and Munro ‗floating supporters‘ can be relied upon to 
vote for the incumbent regime at election-time, because their varying attitude towards the 
regime renders them ―unlikely to invest the time and effort needed [to challenge it]‖ (2006, 
p.93).  This lack of accountability acts as a powerful stabilising force for regime support, 
buffering it and rendering it less susceptible to fluctuations in public satisfaction that might 
have naturally given rise to increased protest against the incumbent regime. With an 
increasingly remote governing polity and Putin‘s personal appeal, any public discontentment 
with regime performance or unpopular policies, such as the monetisation of state benefits for 
pensioners in 2005, is directed first and foremost at the faceless state bureaucracy and 
authorities and does not affect votes for the incumbent regime. Under Putin, regime support 
rose alongside growing political disengagement and with it the proportion of the electorate 
that might be called ‗floating supporters‘. 
Comparison of voting records from the 2003-4 electoral cycle with those from the 
1999-2000 cycle corroborates the assertion that political disengagement and regime support 
enjoyed a positive relationship at this time. Analysis of data from the Central Electoral 
Commission for the Russian Federation for the 2003-4 elections indicates that the regime‘s 
victory did not happen in spite of political disengagement, but was in fact buoyed by it. In 
both the presidential and parliamentary elections, while voter turnout dwindled the absolute 
number of votes for the incumbent regime increased.  In the 2004 presidential elections the 
total number of votes cast was over 5 million less than in the 2000 elections that brought 
Putin into office, yet over the same period the number of votes for Putin increased 
substantially by nearly 10 million. Similarly, while voter turnout decreased by over 6 million 
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between the 1999 and 2003 parliamentary elections the number of votes in the State Duma 
party lists for the party of power (Unity/United Russia) rose by over 7 million (see Figure 4).  
 
  Figure 4 – Voting trends 
 
Source: calculations based on data provided in Appendix Two 
 
Moreover, further exploration of the data available suggests that alongside growing political 
disengagement under Putin a significant number of voters switched their allegiance from the 
opposition to the incumbent regime. Votes for the opposition in the presidential and 
parliamentary elections decreased more sharply than voter turnout and, although it is possible 
that the simultaneous drop in the number of votes for the opposition and gains in support for 
the incumbent regime could be completely unrelated,
94
 the sheer size of the numbers involved 
                                                 
94 The decline in votes for the opposition could be completely unrelated to the rise in votes for the incumbent 
regime if everyone who had voted for the opposition in 1999/2000 but not in the 2003/4 electoral cycle had 
abstained from voting altogether and thus the increase in votes for the incumbent regime came from people 
who had not voted in the previous elections. 
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makes it more than likely that many or at the very least some voters transferred their support 
from the opposition to the incumbent regime over this period. For example, in the elections to 
the State Duma in 2003, votes for opposition parties fell by 16.3 million compared to the 1999 
elections – well over twice as much as the decrease in voter turnout between these elections. 
Putin‘s personal popularity or public satisfaction with his performance in office cannot 
entirely account for this shift in electoral support towards the incumbent regime, as the 
difference between the rise of just under 18% in valid votes cast for Putin in the 2004 
presidential elections compared to the 2000 elections and the increase in Putin‘s approval 
ratings over the same period of just 7% attests to (see Figure 5 below).  
 
Figure 5 - Presidential approval ratings (percentage approval) 
 
Source: Levada center (formerly VCIOM surveys), available at http://www.russiavotes.org/xlfiles/file190.xls  
 
Thus, without attempting to argue that political disengagement alone caused the shift in 
allegiance from the opposition to the incumbent regime during Putin‘s presidency, it is fair to 
say that political disengagement certainly supported the reinforcement of the regime‘s 
electoral standing.  Moreover, the magnitude of the shift in voters‘ allegiance between the 
1999/2000 and 2003/4 electoral cycles, noted above, indicates that regime support was the 
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overwhelmingly predominant outcome of political disengagement at election-time under 
Putin. As such, until 2005 at least, the Kremlin had no motive to encourage mass political 
engagement of any kind. 
 
The ‘orange’ effect (2005-8) 
From the Kremlin‘s perspective, political disengagement took on a new face after the wave of 
youth-sponsored political instability in the Former Soviet Union. Following the ‗Orange 
Revolution‘ in Ukraine, politicians recognised not only the potential threat presented by 
disengaged youth being recruited by opposition groups and mobilised against the regime, but 
also the possibility for young people to be exploited as a powerful political resource.  
Having benefitted from the fruits of political disengagement under Putin described above, the 
events in Ukraine brought the inherent threat that high levels of political disengagement 
contain to the Kremlin‘s attention – that is the capacity for mass ‗perverse politicisation‘.95 
Having embraced mass alienation from politics and settled for the electorate‘s resigned 
acceptance,
96
 the resultant disconnection between politicians and their estranged electorate 
had allowed the incumbent regime a high degree of unaccountability, as noted above. 
However, it also meant that, with high levels of anomie and without the scope to register 
discontentment or become actively involved in mainstream politics, politically disengaged 
Russians were susceptible to recruitment by radical elements seeking to undermine the 
regime. Rather than boosting the regime‘s standing, as evident in the 2003-4 electoral cycle, 
political disengagement was now seen as a possible threat to future regime support if young 
                                                 
95 Blum uses the term ‘perverse politicisation’ to refer to youth engagement in radical groups (2006, p.97). 
96 Rose, Mishler and Munro advocate the idea that the Kremlin consciously “accepted a degree of dissociation 
between governors and governed *…+ and regarded it as sufficient for Russians to show resigned acceptance to 
the regime as a fact of life” (2006, pp.2-3). 
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Russians were to mobilise outside the Kremlin‘s control and engage in subversive political 
activity directed against the regime. Providing incentives for young Russians to ally 
themselves with the regime thus became a priority for the preservation of political stability. 
For this reason, and no other, the Kremlin supported the development of the pro-regime youth 
movements Nashi and the Young Guard and their campaigns to promote youth political 
engagement.   
Presidential aide, Vladislav Surkov‘s address to United Russia‘s Centre of Party 
Training and Cadre Preparation in February 2006 on the concept of ‗sovereign democracy‘ 
(referred to in Chapter 3) provides a unique insight into the Kremlin‘s attitude towards mass 
political disengagement following the ‗Orange Revolution‘.97 In his address, Surkov assumes 
that an elite structure of governance and decision-making is desirable and that the Russian 
masses do not have sufficient understanding to be involved in politics beyond electoral 
participation.
98
 The emphasis placed by Surkov on installing an ‗effective leading class‘ and 
reinforcing the elite structure of political influence already present in Russia supports the 
assertion that Kremlin sponsorship for Nashi and the Young Guard does not represent any 
positive shift in the state‘s attitude towards extending mass participation in politics. 
Moreover, it suggests that, in the post-‗orange‘ environment, the Kremlin‘s intentions have 
been rather to secure existing patterns of elitist participation at the expense of mass political 
engagement. According to Surkov, the masses are required to engage in politics only insofar 
as they are called upon to legitimise the newly-formulated ruling elite (Surkov‘s ‗effective 
leading class‘) and to validate the ideology held by Putin and United Russia as the sole basis 
                                                 
97 Surkov, V. (2006) ‘Suverenitet –  eto politicheski sinonim konkurentosposobnosti’ 7 February 2006  – 
available at http://www.er.ru/news.html?id=111148, last accessed 16 August 2007. 
98 Elite theories of democracy share a similar logic (see Schumpeter 1976, p.269 and Sartori, 1987), but are 
criticised by Bachrach (1967) and Putnam (1995), among other, who argue that democracy must be firmly 
rooted in society and based on continuous engagement and interaction beyond the electoral framework. 
 4 
 
128 
 
for achieving Russia‘s potential and for moving forwards towards a greater democracy. The 
perceived threats posed to Russia‘s sovereignty by globalisation, terrorism, and not least 
‗orange technology‘ are portrayed as further justification of the urgency of the need for the 
public to empower the governing elite to act on their behalf in Russia‘s best interests; the 
implication being that by pledging their allegiance to the incumbent regime at election time 
the public should then refrain from interfering in politics.
99
 
Echoing a similar sentiment, but with specific regard to young people, the ‗Strategy of 
State Youth Policy in the Russian Federation 2006-16‘ outlines measures aimed at creating 
―the conditions for young people‘s successful socialisation and effective self-realisation.‖100 
By encouraging civic engagement, state youth policy seeks to integrate young Russians into 
the existing framework and thus encourage their legitimisation of the incumbent regime and 
reduce the likelihood of them becoming involved in antisocial or politically subversive 
activities without politically engaging them. Although it was drafted well before the ‗Orange 
Revolution‘, the state strategy for youth policy 2006-16 was finally adopted by the Russian 
government on 18
th
 December 2006 and thus the approach set out in the strategy should be 
viewed as indicative of the Kremlin‘s ongoing intentions concerning youth socialisation and 
political activity. If we consider this strategy, like Surkov‘s address, as reflective of the 
Kremlin‘s purpose in supporting the development of Nashi and the Young Guard, then the 
significance is clear and consistent – The Kremlin does not seek to engage the masses in 
politics: Its concern lies in securing support for the incumbent regime, but it aims to do this by 
providing incentives for loyalty to the regime (in this case through supporting ‗socially 
                                                 
99 Surkov, V. (2006) ‘Suverenitet –  eto politicheski sinonim konkurentosposobnosti’ 7 February 2006  – 
available at http://www.er.ru/news.html?id=111148, last accessed 16 August 2007, pages 8 and 10. 
100 Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation, 2006, Strategiia gosudarstvennoi molodezhnoi 
politiki v Rossiiskoi Federatsii, No. 1760, p.4. Available at: http://ed.gov.ru/files/materials/393/strat.doc, last 
accessed 1 September 2008. 
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positive‘  youth initiatives) rather than by promoting mass political participation.101 In this 
light, state-support for Nashi and the Young Guard‘s campaigns to promote youth political 
engagement should be perceived as a disingenuous ploy to attract young Russians, who have 
been inspired by the role played by youth in the ‗Orange Revolution‘, away from oppositional 
youth movements. For the same reason, state-sponsorship should be expected to limit the 
youth movements‘ institutional democratic effects here to legitimising the incumbent regime 
as far as possible. 
 
Defining democratic legitimisation 
There is an important distinction to be made between legitimising the incumbent regime at the 
implied expense of democratic alternatives and the potential ability for associations to 
‗provide democratic legitimacy for the state‘ (to borrow Warren‘s terminology - 2001, p.91). 
Cornwall‘s reproach of state involvement in participatory initiatives for resulting in 
participation that ―serves simply to legitimate the existing political system‖ (2002, p.4) clearly 
relates to the first understanding of an association‘s capacity to provide legitimacy in the 
sense of reinforcing the incumbent regime‘s standing. Moreover, it is this assumed function of 
Nashi and the Young Guard to serve as a bulwark for the regime to the exclusion of the 
opposition that drives widespread criticism and disregard for these state-sponsored youth 
movements.
102
  However, it is the second understanding of an association‘s capacity to 
provide legitimacy by boosting the democratic legitimacy of the state that interests this 
                                                 
101 Blum notes the important and clear distinction made in the Strategy of State Youth Policy between “highly 
desirable politically screened and officially registered ‘socially positive’ youth organisations, and unimportant 
or even undesirable ‘informals’, whose activities are not consistent with the state’s objectives” (2006, p.104). 
102 The Young Guard and particularly Nashi’s impact on the marginalisation of political alternatives has been 
discussed previously in Chapter 3. 
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analysis of the impact of state support on the institutional democratic effects of Nashi and the 
Young Guard most; not only because this potential has been singularly overlooked by the 
existing literature but also because it is possible that, even with the Kremlin‘s lack of genuine 
desire to incite mass political participation, the mere act of encouraging more young people to 
vote in the 2007-8 elections might have had multiple positive democratic effects in this area.  
In Warren‘s conceptualisation of the democratic effects of association, he notes that 
―ideally democratic legitimacy would flow directly from public spheres: institutions are 
[democratically] legitimate if the policies they enact enjoy the support of public opinion‖ 
(2001, p.91). Yet this is only one form of democratic legitimacy that associations can provide 
and, given the established difficulties in discerning whether the youth movements have been 
able to develop a public agenda as opposed to a state agenda and their inherent shortcomings 
in facilitating the ‗formation of public opinion‘ (discussed previously in Part 1), Nashi and the 
Young Guard‘s contribution to this aspect of democratic legitimacy is not the focus of 
analysis. In addition to providing legitimacy for state policies, Warren underlines the 
significance of associational life in supporting the legitimacy of political processes and 
institutions: 
Associations seem to be uniquely important in tying participation to the 
experience of efficacy, which in turn should lead individuals to be more 
supportive of political processes and their outcomes. Associations may in this way 
underwrite the ‗process legitimacy‘ of political institution. (Warren, 2001, p.92)  
Nashi and the Young Guard‘s drive to get young people interested and involved in the 
elections has direct relevance to this aspect of democratic legitimacy, in terms of attaching 
value to the election process for participants as well as promoting faith in the institutions of 
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the State Duma and the presidency and the authority of those elected to office. Consequently, 
investigation of the youth movements‘ contribution to the democratic legitimacy of the state 
in this chapter centres on the manner and extent to which Nashi and the Young Guard have 
been able to encourage youth electoral participation and its corresponding effect on promoting 
the legitimacy of ‗political processes and their outcomes‘ in the eyes of Nashi and Young 
Guard members.  
Nonetheless, while seeking to disentangle an association‘s capacity to provide 
legitimacy for the incumbent regime from its capacity to support the democratic legitimacy of 
the state and, moreover, to draw out the ways in which Nashi and the Young Guard have 
contributed to the latter in particular, it ought to be recognised upfront that the youth 
movements‘ campaign to encourage youth electoral participation encompasses both of these 
functions. Therefore, throughout the analysis, alongside exploration of how the pro-Kremlin 
youth movements may have been able to contribute to the democratic legitimisation of the 
state from participants‘ perspectives by ‗underwriting the process legitimacy of political 
institutions‘, reference is also made to Nashi and the Young Guard‘s often cited, yet 
nonetheless veritable, function to reinforce the incumbent regime‘s standing. Moreover, the 
relationship between these two functions and their resultant outcome in the case of Nashi and 
the Young Guard is extrapolated, i.e. does Nashi and the Young Guard‘s reinforcement of the 
incumbent regime to the detriment of the opposition undermine any ‗process legitimacy‘ for 
political institutions engendered by the youth movements and, if so, to what extent? 
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Nashi and the Young Guard’s contribution to youth electoral participation 
In a basic conceptualisation of the impact of Nashi and the Young Guard‘s efforts to promote 
youth electoral participation on participants‘ perceptions of the legitimacy of the electoral 
process and its outcomes, the higher the level of young Russians‘ participation encouraged by 
the youth movements, the greater the benefit for legitimacy. Conceiving of three levels of 
possible youth participation at election-time, voting is the lowest level of participation and has 
the least but by no means inconsequential influence on the ‗democratic legitimacy of the 
state‘. Beyond voting, campaigning and election monitoring entail a higher degree of 
engagement in the elections and correspondingly the potential impact on providing legitimacy 
is greater. Finally, young Russians may participate fully in the elections by putting themselves 
forward to stand as candidates and this has the most profound effect on legitimacy of the three 
levels of participation set out here. This chapter proceeds to examine the manner and extent to 
which Nashi and the Young Guard have contributed to each of these levels of possible youth 
participation at election-time in order to assess the youth movements‘ impact on the 
democratic legitimacy of the state under the terms set out previously - namely the legitimacy 
of the electoral process and the institutions of the State Duma and presidency as well as the 
authority of those elected to office – all from the perspective of Nashi and the Young Guard 
participants. In light of the state‘s ulterior motives for supporting Nashi and the Young 
Guard‘s campaign to increase youth political engagement noted above, this chapter considers 
whether state-sponsorship has thereby limited the scope of the youth movements‘ potential 
institutional democratic effects to those which primarily serve to secure the regime. 
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1 - Youth voter turnout 
According to Nashi and the Young Guard, the 2007/8 electoral cycle witnessed a dramatic 
improvement in the level of youth voter turnout. In turn, this is portrayed as a success of the 
political awareness/civic duty drive conducted by the state and pro-Kremlin youth 
organisations. Finding similar claims from other internet sources to be equally vague and 
unsubstantiated, the only definite statistic to latch onto regarding youth voter turnout is 
Andrei Turchak‘s assertion, in his summary of the Young Guard‘s achievements, that exit 
polls following the State Duma elections in December 2007 showed that a third of the voters 
were aged between 18 and 34.
103
 To put this into perspective, in the 2003 elections to the 
State Duma, confirmed voter turnout among 18-34 year olds was significantly lower than for 
the 35-54 and over 55 age categories, representing just under 24% of voters.
104
 It should be 
noted, however, that Turchak is the coordinator of youth politics for United Russia and thus is 
highly vested in presenting a positive image of the Young Guard and the success of efforts 
made by pro-Kremlin youth initiatives. In lieu of any suitable means of judging the actual 
democratic outcomes in this area, aside from the unsubstantiated claim that youth voter 
turnout was up in the 2007-8 electoral cycle compared to the 2003-4 cycle, this study must 
satisfy itself with examining the content and function of the youth movements‘ campaigns to 
get young Russians involved in politics. Being thus confined to assessing the likely 
democratic effects of participation in terms of legitimisation, the purposes and motivations 
behind Nashi and the Young Guard‘s campaign (including the Kremlin‘s intentions in 
supporting them) acquire an additional importance in the final analysis. Given the Kremlin‘s 
                                                 
103 Turchak, 2008, Molodezh kak polnotsennyi sub’ekt politiki, The Young Guard of United Russia, available at: 
http://www.molgvardia.ru/vazhnaya_tema/andrei_turchak_molodezh_kak_polnocennyi_subekt_politiki.html, 
last accessed 14 November 2007. 
104 ‘Forum Obshestvennovo Mnenie’, 2004, available at 
http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/cat/societas/policy_interest/attendance/voter_turn_2004/ed041231. 
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afore-mentioned desire to secure youth support for the incumbent regime at election-time, it 
may be assumed that the Kremlin would do everything in its power to ensure the success of 
Nashi and the Young Guard‘s bid to increase youth voter turnout. Moreover, although there is 
no data publicly available on voter turnout in the 2007/8 electoral cycle by age, according to 
the data that is available on the website of the Central Electoral Commission of the Russian 
Federation, voter turnout in general was up in the 2007/8 electoral cycle compared with the 
previous cycle. While voter turnout in the 2004 presidential elections was a respectable 
64.32%, in the 2008 presidential elections this figure had increased to 69.71%. Even more 
impressive, the increase in voter turnout between the 2003 and 2007 elections to the State 
Duma was just over 8% (from 55.67% in 2003 to 63.71% in 2007 – see Appendix 2). The fact 
that these improvements in voter turnout came in the wake of successive cycles of decreasing 
turnout in Russia adds to their triumph (see Figure 4 previously).
105
  
Assuming that youth voter turnout did increase as part of the overall increase in voter 
turnout in the 2007-8 Russian electoral cycle, this might still have had multiple outcomes, 
which may themselves have served to produce different and even counter democratic effects.  
Following Warren‘s general outline of the possible democratic effects of associations, the link 
between the rise in electoral participation (to which Nashi and the Young Guard contributed) 
and strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the state is evident: In essence, simply by 
participating in the elections and voting for a candidate or party the electorate are legitimising 
the election process and also validating the office of institution that they are voting for, be that 
the presidency or the parliament (the option of voting against all was no longer available in 
                                                 
105 For the purposes of comparison, in the 2008 American presidential elections youth voter turnout increased 
by 4-5%, moreover, the trend for youth voter turnout was already upwards in America and had been so since 
the 1996 American presidential elections. For American voter turnout statistics see Circle (Young Voters in the 
2008 Presidential Election, 19 December 2008, available at 
http://www.civicyouth.org/PopUps/FactSheets/FS_08_exit_polls.pdf, last accessed 1 March 2011).  
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the 2007-8 federal elections). At the same time, the efforts of the pro-Kremlin youth 
movements to encourage young people to vote were not only an attempt to get out the youth 
vote but also were overtly targeted at helping the incumbent regime to win the votes of the 
younger generation. Again, in the absence of data on voter allegiance by age, the general 
trend in support for the Kremlin‘s favoured presidential candidate between the 2004 and 2008 
presidential elections is taken as an indicator of the likely pattern of voting habits among 
young people. According to the Central Electoral Commission for the Russian Federation, the 
number of votes for Medvedev in 2008 was 52.53 million compared with 49.56 million votes 
for the incumbent President Putin in 2004, while over the same period the number of votes for 
the party of power, United Russia, practically doubled from 22.78 million to 44.71 million, 
thus increasing the incumbent regime‘s popular mandate (see Appendix Two). The fact that 
higher youth voter turnout was directed in support of the regime is no cause for concern in 
itself from the point of view of the democratic effects of Nashi and the Young Guard.
106
 
However, the youth movements‘ impact on providing democratic legitimisation for state 
processes and institutions needs to be qualified by the methods employed to persuade people 
to vote.  
Campaigns by the pro-Kremlin youth movements to make young people aware of the 
importance of exercising their right to vote and taking an active part in shaping their future 
were continuously backed up by references to the immediacy of the potential threat to Russia 
of an electoral revolution funded by America and its allies among the Russian opposition.
107
 
Cultivating fear of what might happen if young Russians did not come out and register their 
                                                 
106 The net increase in youth voter turnout in the 2008 American presidential elections has been heralded as a 
positive outcome and an implied plus for democracy even though pleas for young Americans to vote were 
directed at winning over the youth vote for a particular candidate.  
107 Details of Nashi and the Young Guard’s campaigns to promote youth engagement in politics and society 
more broadly will be discussed further in Chapter 6. 
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assumed support for the regime at election time, Nashi and the Young Guard thereby 
restricted the perceived options available to young Russians. In practical terms, the 
predominant strategy for getting young Russians to vote in the elections and to support the 
incumbent regime was to threaten and undermine the opposition while providing incentives 
for allegiance to the regime. In the run up to the 2007/8 electoral cycle, the aggregate of Nashi 
Vybori’s efforts (‗Our Elections‘ – a subgroup within the Nashi movement responsible for 
leading the movement‘s campaign to increase electoral participation among youth) can be 
described as promoting youth support for Putin and his chosen successor and maintaining a 
visible presence on the streets ahead of the election in order to physically intimidate the 
opposition and ensure the ‗smooth running‘ of the elections.108 Initially Nashi Vybori was 
called Grazhdanskii kontrol’ (‗Civic control‘) – the original name indicating the group‘s  true 
emphasis on securing order at election-time rather than citizens making a choice or asserting 
their rights. In addition, Dobrovolnaia Molodezhnaia Druzhba (Voluntary Youth Service- a 
division of Nashi accused of recruiting football hooligans to join its ranks) has acted as a 
security service or militia for the movement, policing Nashi rallies and demonstrations as well 
as harassing members of the opposition.
109
  While the Young Guard‘s activities in this respect 
were rather more confined to the rules and decorum of political campaigning (i.e. without the 
physical violence associated with some of Nashi‘s alleged heavy handed actions), the youth 
branch of the United Russia party is not without its own reprehensible tactics to encourage 
young people to vote.  Aside from their educational efforts to raise civic responsibility and 
awareness of the importance of voting among young people, the Young Guard allegedly 
promised cinema tickets to first-time voters. By offering material incentives for young 
                                                 
108 Nashi Vybori was formed in 2005 ahead of the 2008 Russian presidential elections. According to its website, 
its aim was to stop foreign influences from stealing the elections and preventing Russia from regaining its great 
power status (http://nashivybory.ru/).  
109 The role played by Nashi’s Voluntary Youth Service will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7 of this thesis 
alongside Nashi’s tactics of intimidation and aggression. 
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Russians to vote, the Young Guard may have artificially increased youth voter turnout and the 
extent to which this is the case is impossible to determine. Moreover, news of the Young 
Guard‘s strategy to win young people‘s votes might have a hidden counter-productive effect 
of undermining the significance and validity of the electoral process as well as the legitimacy 
of the election outcome in the eyes of young Russians, despite increasing the actual number of 
youth votes for the regime.  
 
2 – Campaigning and electoral monitoring 
Perhaps more significantly then, to support the idea that Nashi and the Young Guard have 
made a positive contribution to youth perceptions of the democratic legitimacy of state 
processes and institutions as well as the incumbent regime‘s standing, both pro-Kremlin youth 
movements have set up projects to work specifically at encouraging youth political 
participation beyond voting alone.  
In the run up to the 2007/8 electoral cycle, the afore-mentioned Nashi Vybori set up an 
election monitoring corps and conducted exit polls with the explicit aim of reinforcing the 
legitimacy of the electoral process and the election results. In fact, these activities appear to 
have been as important to the youth movement as getting young people out to vote in the 
elections. According to Sergei Belokonev (former leader of Nashi Vybori and current State 
Duma deputy) speaking in an interview with Vzgliad, in order to prevent anti-Kremlin forces 
from provoking political instability by creating an atmosphere of distrust in the election 
results and raising doubts over electoral fraud, Nashi Vybori activists were required to 
conduct exit polls and take part in monitoring the elections to ensure that there were no 
irregularities during the 2007-8 electoral cycle.  
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[Nashi Vybori] wants to ensure that the 2007-8 parliamentary and presidential 
elections are carried out in strict accordance with the law, in order to prevent any 
attempt at inciting an ‗orange revolution‘ or any other attempt to destabilise the 
situation should this arise.
110
 
As early as November 2005 Russian newspaper Gazeta reported that Nashi was to receive 
support from the Presidential Administration and the Central Electoral Commission of the 
Russian Federation to ―monitor all major elections in the country, including presidential and 
parliamentary ones.‖111 2,500 Nashi Vybori (then Civic Force) activists were involved in the 
elections to Moscow City Duma on 4
th
 December 2005, acting as observers to monitor the 
elections across Moscow‘s 122 polling stations and surveying 50% of the electorate in their 
exit polls.
112
 While Nashi‘s highly visible presence on polling day may be criticised for 
applying undue pressure on the public to vote for the incumbent regime and for intimidating 
members of the opposition, by launching major projects in 8 regions to get Nashi Vybori 
activists involved in campaigning and election monitoring Nashi has stimulated participants‘ 
engagement in the electoral process and interest in the outcome. The close involvement of 
Nashi Vybori activists in the technicalities of the electoral process legitimises the process and 
its outcome in their eyes and to a lesser extent also in the eyes of all Nashi participants and 
their supporters. Moreover, from a longer-term perspective, Nashi Vybori has sought to 
encourage young people to pursue a political career under its guidance, choosing one of three 
pathways; either aiming to eventually become a political technologist involved in running PR 
                                                 
110 Belokonev, Sergei (2007), interview with Irina Romancheva for Vzgliad, ‘Nashi s budil’nikom’, 12 November 
2007, available at http://www.vz.ru/politics/2007/11/12/124052.html, last accessed 23 August 2009. 
111Gazeta, ‘Pro-Kremlin youth to replace independent observers at elections’, 3 November 2005, available at: 
http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20051103/41981439.html, last accessed 23 April 2008. 
112 Belokonev, Sergei (2007), interview with Irina Romancheva for Vzgliad, ‘Nashi s budil’nikom’, 12 November 
2007, available at http://www.vz.ru/politics/2007/11/12/124052.html, last accessed 23 August 2009. 
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campaigns, a lawyer involved in the work of the electoral committee and electoral staff, or a 
candidate for parliament.
113
  
Similarly, in their own attempt to engage young Russians in politics beyond voting 
alone and to get them involved in the electoral process, in February 2007 the Young Guard 
developed a program called Faktor Gvardii. Working in 6 regions (St. Petersburg, Pskov, 
Stavropol, Samara, Tomsk and Orlov) as well as at a federal level in Moscow, Faktor Gvardii 
conducted its own electoral campaign in the March 2007 regional elections and in the 2007-8 
federal electoral cycle, mirroring that of United Russia but aimed specifically at targeting 
young voters and supporting young candidates. Engaging in agitation and counter-
propaganda, much of the Young Guard‘s efforts were focused on street actions, targeting 
students at Higher Education Institutes and using internet blogs and social networking sites to 
encourage young people to become interested in the elections and to get involved. Though it 
might be noted that Young Guard activists were not given the opportunity to work alongside 
United Russia‘s electoral staff, representatives of the Young Guard have sought to portray 
their electoral staff‘s ‗autonomy‘ from the party as the optimum scenario – an ‗unprecedented 
project‘ allowing young people to participate in the elections ‗on the same level as the main 
party‘ and to ‗work independently‘.114 Again, while getting youth actively involved in the 
electoral process has benefitted the Kremlin by encouraging young Russians to use their vote 
and moreover to vote for the incumbent regime, providing that Young Guard activists have 
not become disillusioned in the electoral process and the value of their input through their 
                                                 
113 http://nashivybory.ru/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=25&Itemid=30&limit=1&limitstart=1, 
last accessed 23 April 2008. 
114 Author’s interview with Andrei Tatarinov, member of the political council of the Young Guard of United  
Russia, Moscow, 10 July 2008 
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experience,
115
 the level of youth engagement noted here boosts the legitimacy of the elections 
and the elected institutions for those involved. Kremlin support for Nashi and the Young 
Guard‘s campaigns to encourage young people to participate in the elections beyond voting 
might be explained by the regime‘s interest in securing the public integrity of the electoral 
process and results in order to prevent any revolution sparked by allegations of electoral 
fraud.   
 
3 - Young candidates 
Finally, both Nashi and the Young Guard have striven to stimulate youth electoral 
participation at the highest level by encouraging and supporting young people to stand as 
candidates for election themselves. Following United Russia‘s announcement in April 2006 
that no less than 20% of all of its future party lists at both regional and federal level should be 
comprised of under 35 year olds,
116
 the Young Guard introduced PolitZavod (‗Political 
Factory‘), a program aimed at recruiting and grooming young people to join United Russia‘s 
ranks. Essentially, PolitZavod encourages young people from all regions of Russia to compete 
to be put forward as potential candidates for United Russia party lists.  The competition for 
the federal project PolitZavod began in April 2007 and involved both Young Guard and Nashi 
activists as well as young people not affiliated to either youth movement.  According to 
Andrei Turchak, coordinator of youth politics for United Russia, each region put forward 2 
candidates, who then went on to a five-day national final, which sorted them into order of 
                                                 
115 At least one prominent Young Guard activist, Alexei Radov, did become disillusioned following his 
experience of the 2007-8 electoral cycle and quit the youth movement. This will be discussed further in Chapter 
6. 
116 Initially the age threshold for United Russia’s youth quota was set at 28 for elections to all levels, but this 
was subsequently raised to 35 for the federal elections.  For the purposes of cross-comparison between 
elections to regional and federal legislative assemblies the proportion of under 35 year olds is used throughout 
this study. 
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rank to be proposed as potential candidates for United Russia‘s party list for the 2007 State 
Duma elections under the region that had originally put them forward.
117
 Given that in 2003 
United Russia won 310 of the 450 seats in the State Duma and had just under 7% of its Duma 
deputies aged under 35, the 20% youth quota on future United Russia party lists represented a 
significant commitment to increasing the number of young people in politics. Moreover, the 
youth quota was perceived as a major boon to Nashi‘s and particularly the Young Guard‘s 
efforts to provide access for young people to formal political institutions and consequently to 
attract youth support: 
In Russia, and possibly in global practice, there is no precedent for the project 
‗PolitZavod‘... The party of power in a country like Russia where 145 million 
people live is pretty big and it has allocated 20% of its party lists to a youth quota. 
This has been promised to young activists in other youth organisations, yet nowhere 
can young Russians realise their potential like they can in our party.
118
  
By encouraging young people to put themselves forward as candidates for elections and 
supporting them in their candidacy, the Young Guard‘s PolitZavod program invests young 
people in the political process – giving them a stake in the outcome and thus a respect for and 
concern in elections, beyond that which might be achieved through efforts to simply 
encourage young people to vote or even to participate in campaigning or election monitoring.
 
Yet, despite the 20% pledged to youth and the benefits of having Kremlin support that 
this seemed to express, in the 2007 State Duma elections only 12.2% of United Russia‘s 
                                                 
117 Turchak, Andrei, 15 May 2007, ‘V Rossii startoval regional’nii tur PolitZavoda 2007’, Smolenskii Novosti, 
available at http://www.smolnews.ru/news/13648, last accessed 18 June 2009.  
118 Author’s interview with Andrei Tatarinov, member of the Young Guard’s Political Council, Moscow, 10 July 
2008 
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official party list was comprised of under 35 year olds (73 people).
119
 Although an 
anonymous member of Nashi‘s leadership claimed that the problems encountered with 
meeting the benchmark set by United Russia for the State Duma elections were confined to 
only a few regions, in fact in 34 of the 83 regions contributing to United Russia‘s party list for 
the State Duma elections no candidates aged under 35 were put forward.  In the regional 
legislative assemblies held at the same time as the elections to the State Duma in December 
2007, fulfilment of the youth quota among United Russia‘s party lists was much better on the 
whole. In 7 of the 9 regional elections held in December 2007 under 35 year olds made up just 
under or even in excess of 20% of United Russia‘s party list (see Figure 6 below). However, 
looking at United Russia‘s party lists for elections to regional legislative assemblies over the 
entire period since the announcement of the introduction of the youth quota in April 2006 
suggests that this is not part of any discernible trend of increased youth representation at the 
regional level (see Figure 7 below). Although the proportion of under 35 year olds included 
on United Russia‘s party list in some regional elections between Autumn 2006 and Autumn 
2010 exceeded 20%, painstaking examination of the data from all of the elections to 
legislative assemblies (both regional and federal) since the announcement of the youth quota 
by United Russia reveals no rhyme or reason to variation in adherence to the quota. For 
example, United Russia‘s party list for elections to the regional legislative assembly in 
Sverdlovsk in Oct 2006 included 25% under 35-year-olds, yet in March 2010 included only 
10%. 
 
                                                 
119 Author’s own calculations based on data available on the website for the Central Electoral Commission, 
available at www.izbirkom.ru/izbirkom.html, last accessed 18 June 2009. For all calculations of ages of Duma 
deputies the age which they turned in election year is used, i.e. for ages of Duma deputies in the 5th 
convocation deputies age is simply 2007 minus their year of birth. Nashi and the Young Guard’s bid to increase 
youth representation in legislative assemblies will be discussed further in Chapter 5. 
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Figure 6 – Evaluating the success of United Russia’s youth quota in the December 2007 elections to legislative assemblies   
           
 Regional level Federal level 
   
Legislative Assembly  
 
Buryatiya  
Republic 
Mordovia 
Republic 
N.Ossetia-
Alania 
Udmurtia 
Republic 
Krasnodar 
Area 
Penza 
region 
Kamchatka 
Area 
Saratov 
region 
Smolensk 
region 
State Duma 
 
           
Convocation 4th conv. 4th conv. 4th conv. 4th conv. 4th conv. 4th conv. 1st conv. 4th conv. 4th conv. 5th conv. 
           
Date of election 
 
2/12/07 2/12/07 2/12/07 2/12/07 2/12/07 2/12/07 2/12/07 2/12/07 2/12/07 2/12/07 
           
           
Count <35yr olds listed on United 
Russia’s party list (UR PL) 120 
 
8 
 
17 
 
9 
 
18 
 
9 
 
6 
 
10 
 
7 
 
10 
 
73 
           
Count all listed on  UR PL 50 120 37 99 36 30 54 33 52 600 
           
% <35 of total listed on UR PL 16 14.2 21.6 18.2 25 20 18.5 21.2 19.2 12.2 
           
Count <35 who won a seat on UR PL 2 1 4 6 3 0 0 2 3 23 
           
Count all who won a seat on UR PL 24 22 25 31 26 10 18 14 15 315 
           
% <35 of all who won a seat on UR PL 8.3 4.6 16 19.4 11.5 0 0 14.3 20 7.3 
           
% of <35 listed who won seat on UR PL  25 5.9 44.4 33.3 33.3 0 0 28.6 30 31.5 
           
% of all listed who won a seat on UR PL 48 18.3 67.6 31.3 72.2 33.3 33.3 42.4 28.9 52.5 
           
Source: Author‘s own calculations based on information available at http://www.izbirkom.ru/izbirkom.html, last accessed 18 June 2009. 
                                                 
120 When a mixed electoral system was used, the calculations here are based only on deputies listed and elected on United Russia’s Party List, not on SMD. 
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Figure 7 - Percentage aged under 35 on United Russia party lists since April 2006 
 
Furthermore, of the 73 young candidates who received a place on United Russia‘s party 
list for the 2007 State Duma elections, only 23 went on to become elected deputies; a much 
lower success rate than older candidates. Whereas 52.5% of all candidates on United Russia‘s 
party list were elected to office, only 31.5% of under 35s listed went on to become deputies in 
the State Duma (see Figure 6 above). This indicates that, even where there was an attempt 
made to adhere to United Russia‘s youth quota in the regional primaries held to select 
candidates for the party‘s list for the State Duma elections, young candidates were never 
really considered for entry into the State Duma and were thus awarded token places on the 
party list, as United Russia Duma deputy Chernishenko‘s account of his experience of the 
primaries in Murmansk bears witness to:  
0 
5 
10 
15 
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Source: author‘s own calculations based on data provided in Appendix 3 
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From the experience of my region, United Russia‘s announcement of the need to 
include a 20%  youth quota in the primaries did not really change the configuration 
of the top three places on the list for Murmansk region as a whole. Young party 
members, who took part in the primaries in my region won 9
th
 and 10
th
 place.
121
 
In practice, this meant that even the overall winner of PolitZavod in Murmansk region, 
Aleksandra Komissarenko, had no real chance of becoming a United Russia Duma deputy, 
despite the party‘s landslide victory in the 2007 parliamentary elections, having been awarded 
5
th
 place on Murmansk‘s contribution to the federal party list when only the top three places 
from Murmansk went through.
122
 What is more, this tendency for young candidates to be 
awarded lower places on United Russia‘s party lists with less chance of being elected than 
older candidates who command the higher positions is not unique to elections at the federal 
level, but is common to regional elections to legislative assemblies across the board since 
April 2006 (see Appendix 3). In all but one of the elections to regional legislative assemblies 
held in December 2007 (Udmurtia Republic), the proportion of under 35 year olds among 
those elected to office was significantly less than the proportion of under 35 year olds among 
those listed as United Russia candidates. 
In terms of the implications of the failure of the Young Guard‘s PolitZavod project to 
effect any significant increase in the proportion of young people elected to the State Duma for 
the movements‘ contribution to the democratic legitimacy of the state, Tamir suggests that 
―the opportunity to seek influence, even if it fails or is only partially effective, can nonetheless 
provide legitimacy for both processes and outcomes‖ (1998, p.224 cited in Warren, 2001, 
                                                 
121 Chernishenko, I. K., United Russia State Duma deputy since 4/12/2000, born1945. Correspondence with this 
author, 20 April 2009. The term ‘primaries’ here refers to the regional competitions held to gain a place on 
United Russia’s party list for the 2007 State Duma elections.   
122 See Loskutova, 2008, pp.135-39 for details of winners of PolitZavod and their subsequent fortunes. 
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p.92). By this logic, regardless of the actual implementation of the youth quota in practice and 
its relative success or otherwise in providing greater youth representation in legislative bodies, 
young Russians inspired by this opportunity will have greater respect for the office of Duma 
deputy and the validity of decisions made by the parliament. Moreover, despite having 
promoted themselves as a gateway to political power, the movements‘ inability to deliver 
United Russia‘s promised youth quota has not noticeably affected their credibility in the eyes 
of young Russians (despite the ‗Radov‘ incident – to be discussed further in Chapter 6). In the 
March 2009 regional elections to legislative assemblies, participation in PolitZavod was 
consistent with the previous elections at this level in March 2006. 
It should also be noted that the failure of United Russia‘s youth quota is not 
necessarily a bad thing for democracy, in the sense that the introduction of a youth quota 
should not automatically be considered to be a positive democratic development. Indeed, the 
democratic credentials of United Russia‘ youth quota are highly contestable. Not least, the 
process of elevating a particular group (whether that be defined by age, gender, ethnicity, 
class or otherwise) and raising their chances beyond their merits alone by virtue of belonging 
to that group fundamentally contradicts the basic democratic notion of equality, regardless of 
whether it was intended to correct an existing bias or prejudice. Allocating places to young 
people on the basis of their age is itself a form of discrimination, albeit positive 
discrimination, and is not altogether dissimilar in method if not intention to the principles of a 
gerontocratic ruling system. Furthermore, the Soviet example indicates how the introduction 
of a youth quota may assist in the consolidation of a non-democratic regime by providing 
undue legitimacy for the regime. 
However, the fact that United Russia‘s youth quota was not implemented gives 
credence to the assertion, made at the beginning of this chapter, that the Kremlin has no 
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genuine desire to instigate mass youth political participation beyond what it deems necessary 
in order to boost support for the incumbent regime and secure it from the perceived potential 
threat of youth-led instability during the 2007-8 electoral cycle. Typifying the attitude towards 
the development of pro-Kremlin youth movements held by the liberal-democratic opposition 
to the Russian regime, Ilya Yashin (then leader of the opposition group Youth Yabloko) 
referred to Nashi as a ―very expensive electoral toy,‖ which would be ―put on ice [after the 
2008 elections] so that it can be reanimated in case of an emergency.‖123  Perhaps more 
significantly and with regard to the youth quota in particular, longstanding United Russia 
Duma deputy, Anatoli Ivanov, appears to share this disparaging opinion of the Kremlin‘s 
intentions towards Nashi and the Young Guard, declaring that ―the introduction of a youth 
quota for the elections to the State Duma was a populist decision aimed at encouraging young 
people to take part in the elections.‖124  In this way, the primary incentive for United Russia‘s 
introduction of a youth quota was to use it, first, as a means of getting young people involved 
in politics in the short-term in order to gain their support and get out the vote in the 2007/8 
electoral cycle and, second, as a way of providing incentives for young, aspiring politicians to 
join United Russia and build up a select cadre reserve to reinforce the party‘s ongoing 
dominance.  
 
                                                 
123 Ekaterina Savina, Yuliya Taratura, and Mikhail Shevchuk, ‘Nashi stali chuzhimi’, Kommersant (29 January 
2008) available at http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=846635, last accessed 20 September 2010.  
Youth Yabloko is the youth branch of the democratic opposition party Yabloko, which has not held any seats in 
the State Duma since the 2003 elections. 
124 Correspondence between this author and Anatoli Ivanov, 17 April 2009.  Born in 1949, A.S.Ivanov has been a 
United Russia State Duma deputy since 19/12/99. 
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Conclusion 
State support for Nashi and the Young Guard‘s campaigns to encourage youth political 
engagement in the run up to the 2007-8 electoral cycle was motivated by the same desire to 
maintain regime support and prevent instability as previous efforts by the Kremlin to cultivate 
political disengagement. Moreover, judging by the position indicated in Surkov‘s speech and 
the State Strategy for Youth Policy 2006-16 as well as the prospective benefits for the 
regime‘s electoral standing accrued through continued mass political disengagement, it is safe 
to say that the Kremlin‘s response to the ‗Orange Revolution‘ in Ukraine was designed to 
limit the potential impact of youth political engagement in Russia rather than to assist its 
development. Critically, the Kremlin‘s actions to support youth political engagement via 
Nashi and the Young Guard have not heralded any change in its attitude towards the 
desirability of mass participation in politics or indeed youth political engagement in its own 
right. As one would expect, therefore, Nashi and the Young Guard have excelled as far as 
participatory youth initiatives that directly reinforce the incumbent regime‘s standing are 
concerned, such as increasing youth voter turnout and staging mass actions campaigning for 
the regime or for a particular young United Russia candidate.  
However, as this chapter has demonstrated, Nashi and the Young Guard‘s campaigns 
to increase youth electoral participation in the run-up to the 2007-8 electoral cycle have 
contributed to both reinforcing the existing political regime and providing democratic 
legitimacy for the state in the eyes of Nashi and the Young Guard participants. Youth voter 
turnout, participation in election monitoring, conducting exit polls and attempts to stand as 
candidate for parliament all encourage participants‘ support for the electoral process and 
respect for political institutions and the authority of those in office. Thus, in seeking to 
reinforce the incumbent regime‘s dominance, state support for the youth movements‘ drive to 
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increase youth electoral participation and political engagement has simultaneously conferred a 
certain degree of legitimacy on the political processes and institutions of state among young 
participants. Being the product of a desire to shut out political alternatives, this positive 
institutional democratic effect of Nashi and the Young Guard therefore represents a case 
where vested state interests of an undemocratic nature have necessitated some positive 
democratic effects (as hypothesised in Chapter 1). 
Nonetheless, although the fact that youth electoral participation via Nashi and the 
Young Guard intentionally served to reinforce the incumbent regime‘s standing does not 
necessarily detract from its positive democratic effect of contributing to legitimising the 
institutions of state, the conflated dominance of pro-regime forces enforced by tactics of 
intimidation and repression challenges that same legitimacy. The tactics of manipulation, 
physical intimidation and bribery employed by Nashi and the Young Guard as part of their 
strategy to increase youth voter turnout in support of the regime undermine what would have 
otherwise represented a significant contribution to the ‗process legitimacy‘ of the state 
(assuming that the youth movements were indeed successful in their bid to increase youth 
voter turnout as they claim). Furthermore, the noted failure to implement United Russia‘s 
20% youth quota in the party‘s list for the 2007 State Duma elections is indicative of the 
restrictive impact of the Kremlin‘s lack of genuine desire to encourage mass youth political 
engagement (beyond that which it perceives to absolutely essential to the preservation of the 
incumbent regime) on the institutional democratic effects of Nashi and the Young Guard.  
Such commentary has clear parallels with Cornwall‘s assertion that failure to develop 
an ―autonomous public sphere outside the domain of the state‖ restricts the effects of 
participation to legitimising the ―existing political system‖ (2002, p. 4), suggesting that any 
attempt by Nashi and the Young Guard to lock in the success of their efforts to get young 
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people involved in politics with any concrete and lasting measure is doomed to fail unless the 
state deems it necessary for regime security. Indeed, although it has been shown that the 
institutional democratic effects of Nashi and the Young Guard here have not been limited to 
legitimising the incumbent regime, instances where the youth movements‘ have contributed 
positively to young people‘s perceptions of the democratic legitimacy of the state have always 
been in tandem with reinforcing the regime‘s standing. It may therefore be concluded that the 
reductionist tendency of existing portrayals of Nashi and the Young Guard‘s relationship with 
the Kremlin notwithstanding, their assessment of the youth movements‘ impact on the 
regime‘s standing is valid: Nashi and the Young Guard have predominantly contributed to 
reinforcing the regime‘s dominance using whatever means possible at their disposal in the run 
up the 2007-8 electoral cycle with scant regard for the democratic effects thereof. 
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CHAPTER 5 - POWER TO YOUTH: REPRESENTATION & RENEWAL 
Despite the traditional prejudice against the democratising potential of state-sponsored 
participation, representation in formal political arenas and decision-making bodies is an area 
of institutional democratic effects where having state sponsorship and support is recognised to 
be potentially beneficial (as noted in the introduction to Part 2). Perhaps unsurprisingly then, 
youth representation in politics has formed an integral part of both Nashi and the Young 
Guard‘s platforms. Already, at the time of their formation in 2005, both youth movements 
pitched rejuvenation of the incumbent political elite as key to initiating their agenda for 
change with the ultimate ambition of modernising Russia and improving the country‘s global 
standing. In other words, both Nashi and the Young Guard identified the elevation of young 
activists to positions of power as being the critical step towards furthering their overall 
objectives:  
 
Having created a cadre reserve for the realisation of our ambition to modernise the 
country, we should provide strong support for getting this new generation of 
leaders into positions of power in the political, economic and administrative elite 
of this country. Our task is to replace ‗en masse‘ the political, economic and 
informational power in this country. We will take every opportunity that we have 
to do this connected with the electoral process, developing recruitment programs, 
existing youth programs, and possibilities for social mobilisation.
125
 
 
                                                 
125 Nashi, 2005, ‘Manifest’, available at: http://nashi.su/manifest, last accessed 16 June 2010. 
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We are fighting two main threats to Russia – oligarchic and communist revanche. 
They both represent a step backwards and we want to move forwards. For this we 
need to bring a new generation to power and for this reason our main slogan is 
‗Power to youth!‘ 126 
 
Having established in Chapter 4 how state-sponsorship has only supported Nashi and the 
Young Guard‘s contribution to providing democratic legitimacy for the state as far as it was 
deemed necessary to secure the incumbent regime, Chapter 5 proceeds to consider the ways in 
which state-sponsorship might have had a more positive impact on the institutional 
democratic effects of Nashi and the Young Guard by enabling representation in the formal 
political arena. It investigates whether state-sponsorship has provided Nashi and the Young 
Guard with access to formal political institutions (beyond the failure to implement United 
Russia‘s youth quota noted in the previous chapter) and, if so, in what manner, to what extent 
and with what democratic implications.  
The chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section begins by assessing 
the youth movements‘ efforts to rejuvenate Russia‘s political elite and analysing the 
significance of their failure to increase youth representation in legislative assemblies. It 
identifies the role of the state in these events and evaluates what this implies for the impact of 
state-sponsorship on the institutional democratic effects of participation as far providing 
representation is concerned. The second section sets out the benefits of state support for Nashi 
and the Young Guard‘s ability to access positions of political authority and to assert their 
influence within the formal political arena. It compares the failed youth quota to the youth 
                                                 
126 The Young Guard, 2005, ‘O gvardii’, no longer available online since the youth movement replaced it with a 
new manifesto in 2008. 
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movements‘ relative success in positioning their most trusted members in positions of 
political power in order to identify the precise nature of the relationship between state support 
and youth political representation in contemporary Russia. Finally, the third section questions 
whether the installation of Nashi and Young Guard leaders into prominent political posts by 
virtue of their loyalty to the Kremlin can really be considered to render the youth movements‘ 
‗strong publics‘ in Fraser‘s sense of the word  (i.e. empowered to be able to ‗translate their 
opinion into authoritative decision-making‘). Has the elevation of Nashi and Young Guard 
leaders to federal political office helped to further the youth movements‘ ultimate objectives 
of asserting the influence of the younger generation on politics or has this been an end in 
itself? 
 
Rejuvenation of Russia’s political elite 
In the previous chapter it was noted that the PolitZavod program, which was the key 
instrument for the pro-Kremlin youth movements to launch young people‘s political careers 
as parliamentary deputies, did not manage to effect any significant increase in the proportion 
of young people standing as United Russia candidates for election to legislative assemblies. 
United Russia‘s declaratory 20% youth quota for its party lists was not implemented and it 
was suggested that this reflected the lack of genuine desire on the part of the Kremlin to 
support mass youth political engagement beyond what it deemed to be essential to securing 
the longevity of the incumbent regime. This chapter moves away from critique of the failure 
to implement United Russia‘s youth quota to evaluate the overall results of Nashi and the 
Young Guard‘s attempts to rejuvenate Russia‘s political elite. The youth movements‘ 
shortcomings as far as their inabilities to increase youth representation in legislative 
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assemblies are concerned are analysed in terms of what they reveal about the impact of state-
sponsorship on the ability of Nashi and the Young Guard to gain access to formal political 
institutions.  
 
Nashi and the Young Guard’s contribution to youth political representation in 
comparative perspective 
Regardless of the shortfall in fulfilling United Russia‘s youth quota, the impact of Nashi and 
the Young Guard‘s efforts to increase youth representation in the State Duma were negligible. 
7.3% of United Russia deputies elected to the State Duma in 2007 were aged under 35, which, 
when compared with the 6.8% of United Russia deputies aged under 35 in the previous 
convocation of the State Duma (4
th
 convocation – elected 2003), is only a slight increase of 
0.5% (see Figure 8 below). Although the proportion of State Duma deputies aged under 35 
increased more among new United Russia deputies (by 6.6% - from 5.6% in 2003 to 12.2% in 
2007), over the same period the average age of United Russia deputies actually increased 
from 48.5 to 50 years. In practice the party retained many of its older deputies, effectively 
swopping the relatively young for the even younger: The proportion of those aged below 35 
and above 55 increased, whereas those aged between 35 and 54 decreased, thus implying that 
the principle of Nashi and the Young Guard‘s campaign for ‗power to youth‘ was not fully 
endorsed by United Russia.
127
 To put this into perspective, if we look at other political parties, 
                                                 
127 Just under 60% of United Russia deputies of the 4th convocation, who did not stay on in the 5th convocation 
were aged between 35 and 54.  At the same time, as one might expect, in the 5th convocation of the State 
Duma, the percentage of new deputies in each age category decreased with age. So while 82.6% of those aged 
under 35 were new, 56.3% aged 35-44, 48.5% aged 45-54, 41.3% aged 55-64 and 28.6% over 65 were new. It is 
worth noting in passing that the Russian State Duma has a relatively high level of turnover of its deputies: 
52.8% of deputies elected in 2007 to the 5th convocation of the Russian State Duma were new, compared to 
32% of deputies in the 13th convocation of the French National Assembly (also elected in 2007) and only 19% of 
MPs elected to the British parliament in 2005 (author’s own calculations based on material available at 
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then in the 2007 State Duma elections the Communist Party of the Russian Federation 
(CPRF) saw a 7% increase in the proportion of its deputies aged under 35 compared to the 
2003 elections and was the only party to see a net decrease in the average age of its deputies 
(although the CPRF still has the oldest deputies on average of all the parties). Furthermore, in 
absolute terms, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) still has far younger deputies 
on average than United Russia (42 compared to 50 years), although it has seen an increase in 
the average age of its deputies since the 4
th
 convocation of the State Duma with just over 14% 
fewer under 35 year olds. 
                                                                                                                                                        
www.duma.gov.ru, www.assemblee-nationale.fr/elections/listes/tour2/eda.htm and 
www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/notes/snsg-01528.pdf. 
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Source: Author‘s own calculations based on data available at: http://www.duma.gov.ru/, last accessed 1/11/08.
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Figure 9 – Age distribution of deputies by party and convocation (percent by row) 
 
State Duma of the Russian Federation 
 
 
Convocation 
 
Age turned in election year ( 1993, ’95.. 2007) 
 
Under 35 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ N 
       
        
 1st (1993-5) 14.5 33.4 34.1 16.3 1.7 461 
 2nd (1995-9) 9.8 29.1 38.7 20 2.4 491 
All deputies 3rd (1999-2003) 10.6 24.5 43.6 18.4 3 436 
 4th (2003-7) 7.2 28.7 35.8 22.9 5.4 428 
 5th (2007-11) 7.8 23.3 32.4 30.9 5.6 450     
        
Party of Power 
(1993 = ‘Choice of Russia’ & ‘Party of Russian Unity 
and Consent’; 1995 = ‘Our Home Russia’; 1999 = 
‘Fatherland-All Russia’ & ‘Unity’; 2003 = ‘United 
Russia’ & ‘Rodina’; 2007 = ‘United Russia’) 
1st  3.3 47.9 29.2 12.5 2.1 48 
2nd  10.7 29.3 38.7 16 5.3 75 
3rd   10.6 29.8 41.7 14.6 3.3 151 
4th  6.8 28.1 37.4 24.2 3.6 310 
5th  7.3 22.5 32.7 33 4.5 315 
        
 1st  27.9 23.5 30.9 14.7 2.9 68 
 2nd  41.5 20.8 30.2 7.5 0 53 
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia 
(Zhirinovsky Bloc) 
3rd   47.1 29.4 17.6 5.9 0 17 
4th  29.0 48.4 12.9 9.7 0 31 
5th  15 55 17.5 12.5 0 40 
        
 1st  -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 2nd  -- -- -- -- -- -- 
A Just Russia 3rd   -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 4th  3.2 37.5 37.5 12.5 9.4 32 
 5th  5.3 21.1 55.3 18.4 0 38 
        
 1st  4 24 42 28 2 50 
 2nd  2 21.1 44.2 29.9 2.7 147 
Communist Party of the Russian Federation 3rd   6.8 10.7 46.6 31.1 4.9 103 
4th  0 2.6 42.1 34.2 21.1 38 
5th  7 7 26.3 40.4 19.3 57 
        
 
The Union of Right Forces (Democratic Choice 
of Russia, Democratic Russia) 
1st  15.5 29.3 25.9 24.1 5.2 58 
2nd  -- -- -- -- -- -- 
3rd   17.9 50 25 3.6 3.6 28 
4th  -- -- -- -- -- -- 
5th  -- -- -- -- -- -- 
        
 1st  17.9 35.7 32.1 14.3 0 28 
 2nd  16.7 47.9 29.2 6.3 0 48 
Yabloko 3rd   0 42.1 52.6 5.3 0 19 
 4th  -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 5th  -- -- -- -- -- -- 
        
 1st  8.3 36.1 41.4 13.6 0.6 169 
Other 
(1995 = ‘Agrarian’, ‘People power’ & ‘Russian 
regions’; 1993 = ‘Agrarian’, ‘New Regional Politics- 
Duma 96’, ‘Russia’, ‘Stability’ & ‘Women of Russia’) 
2nd  2.5 35.6 35.6 23.7 2.5 118 
3rd   -- -- -- -- -- -- 
4th  -- -- -- -- -- -- 
5th  -- -- -- -- -- -- 
        
 
No registered party affiliation 
1st  35 37.5 17.5 10 0 40 
2nd  8 28 48 14 2 50 
3rd   8.5 20.3 50 19.5 1.7 118 
4th  0 47.1 29.4 17.7 5.9 17 
5th  -- -- -- -- -- -- 
        
(Source: author‘s own calculations based on information available at http://www.duma.gov.ru/, correct as of 1/11/08)
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Yet, it should be noted that, even with the failure of Nashi and the Young Guard to instigate 
any significant increase in the proportion of young people among United Russia deputies, on 
average Russian parliamentary deputies are not much older than in Ukraine and are younger 
than MPs in Britain and considerably younger than deputies in the French parliament.  
 
Figure 10 - Comparative table of age distribution of deputies (percent by row) 
 Convocation  Age of deputies at opening of parliament  
< 30 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70 + N 
         
 1st (1993-5) 4.56 24.51 40.35 23.86 6.72 0 461 
 2nd (1996-9) 2.85 18.94 43.38 26.88 7.33 0.61 491 
Russian State Duma 3rd (2000-3) 2.75 19.95 32.57 33.26 10.78 0.69 436 
 4th (2004-7) 2.1 18.69 28.04 41.12 8.64 1.40 428 
 5th (2007-11) 2.44 17.56 25.78 38.89 12.89 2.44 450 
         
French National Assembly 11th (1997-‘02) 0 2.91 15.30 46.63 26.05 9.11 549 
12th (2002-7) 0 1.92 14.34 37.94 37.06 8.74 572 
13th (2007-12) 0 2.78 19.65 39.13 34.61 3.83 575 
         
Polish Sejm 6th (2007-11) 4.35 17.17 34.13 35.22 8.70 0.43 460 
         
Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada 6th (2007-??) 2.89 19.78 32.67 30 13.33 1.33 450 
         
British parliament (1992-1997) 0.15 12.60 39.78 32.41 14.59 0.46 651 
 (1997-2001) 1.52 13.96 38.54 34.45 10.32 1.21 659 
 (2001-2005) 0.15 11.99 35.81 37.48 12.59 1.52 659 
 (2005-2009) 0.46 13.78 29.57 38.54 15.48 2.17 646 
         
 
Source: Author‘s own calculations from material provided on legislative assembly websites correct as of 7/11/08.128  
 
As far as youth rejuvenation in regional legislative assemblies is concerned, the youth 
movements have fared little better. Despite a clear increase in the proportion of under 35 year 
olds elected to office on United Russia‘s list in some regions, there has been no systematic 
                                                 
128 Russia - http://www.duma.gov.ru/; France - http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/qui/; Poland - 
http://www.sejm.gov.pl/poslowie/lista6.htm; Ukraine - http://gska2.rada.gov.ua/pls/site/p_deputat_list; and 
for Britain - http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/notes/snsg-01528.pdf . 
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increase overall (see Figure 11 below) and thus it is difficult to accredit Nashi or the Young 
Guard with achieving any kind of rejuvenation across regional legislative assemblies. The 
average percentage of under 35 year olds among United Russia deputies elected to regional 
legislative assemblies since April 2006 is 7.8%, only slightly better than the 7.3% of young 
United Russia deputies elected to the federal State Duma. 
 
Figure 11 – Comparison of elections held 2008-10 with previous elections to regional legislative 
assemblies prior to introduction of United Russia’s youth quota129 
Source: author‘s own calculations based on data provided in Appendix 3 
 
                                                 
129 Comparing the proportion of United Russia deputies aged under 35 in regional legislative assemblies before 
and after the introduction of the youth quota was limited by the fact that detailed information on candidates 
for elections prior to 2004 was frequently unavailable and elections held before the creation of United Russia in 
2003 were unsuitable for comparative purposes. It is also worth noting that some of the dramatic percentage 
changes shown in Figure 10 are misleading in terms of the magnitude of shift that has occurred given the low 
number (n) involved in some cases. For example, there were 33.3% fewer under 35-year olds elected in 
Nenetsk in 2009 than there were in 2005, but this was only a decrease from 1 young deputy to none, as the 1 
young deputy was 1 of only 3 United Russia deputies elected from party lists in Nenetsk in 2005. 
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Furthermore, when implementation of United Russia‘s youth quota is considered alongside 
the percentage change in regional deputies aged under 35, there are several discrepancies that 
caution against assuming that Nashi and the Young Guard‘s efforts to increase the number of 
young candidates on United Russia‘s party lists have had a positive impact on the proportion 
of young deputies elected to regional legislative assemblies. Despite the fact that over 25% of 
all those listed on United Russia‘s party list for the March 2009 elections to Archangel‘s 
legislative assembly were aged under 35 (i.e. in excess of the 20% youth quota), none of these 
were actually elected to office, which represented a 20% decrease in the proportion of young 
United Russia deputies for Archangel since the previous elections in December 2004. A 
similar disparity between successful implementation of United Russia‘s youth quota and a 
failure to increase the proportion of elected deputies aged under 35 is apparent in the case of 
Yamal-Nenetsk autonomous region and the Republic of Altai (see Figure 11 above). 
 However, getting young people into power is not only about the State Duma and the 
legislative branch. As one of Nashi‘s leaders was keen to point out, their ‗cadre lift‘ also 
operates, and even primarily operates, in the executive branch. 
Legislative power in Russia traditionally holds less weight than the executive 
branch and now more than ever. For this reason, many activists of Nashi and the 
Young Guard prefer to stand for places in the executive branch, whether that is at 
the federal, regional or local level.
130
 
Nevertheless, despite Nashi‘s claims, youth upward mobility in the executive branch appears 
to have been no more successful than attempts to increase the proportion of young United 
Russia deputies in legislative political institutions. Of the 582 elections across the Russian 
                                                 
130 Correspondence between this author and one of Nashi’s leaders, who wished to remain anonymous, 
25/3/09 
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Federation in 2007 and 2008 to positions within the executive branch (at federal, regional and 
local level), only 10 resulted in a person aged under 35 gaining office (1.7%). Whether or not 
1.7% under 35 year olds is actually low for the executive branch in relative terms (in 
comparison with other countries for example) or indeed whether the proportion of under 35 
year olds in the executive branch can be fairly compared at all with the proportion of young 
deputies in the legislative branch in Russia, the true measure of Nashi and the Young Guard‘s 
influence on youth representation in the executive branch is the differential between the 
proportion of under 35 year olds elected to office in the executive branch prior to the 
development of Nashi and the Young Guard and since then. In this respect, the youth 
movements‘ efforts at increasing youth representation in the executive branch have fared 
poorly. The percentage of elections that resulted in a person aged under 35 being appointed to 
executive office in 2007-8 actually appears to have decreased slightly from 2003-4 when 
1.8% of all elections to the executive branch were won by under 35 year-olds.
131
  
Overall, it is possible to say that, despite Nashi and the Young Guard‘s efforts, there 
has been no significant increase in the proportion of United Russia deputies aged under 35 at 
a federal or regional level nor any discernible rejuvenation of the executive branch. Taking 
into account comparison with previous convocations of the State Duma and the age 
distribution of other political parties (in particular judging by the considerable increase in the 
proportion of under 35 year olds among the Communist Party‘s deputies in the State Duma 
over the same period as well as the far larger proportion of under 35 year olds among LDPR 
deputies), it becomes apparent that the youth movements‘ failure to increase youth 
representation in formal political institutions cannot be primarily attributed to any factor 
                                                 
131 Calculation based on collation of data on elections between 1/1/03 - 31/12/04 and 1/1/07 – 31/12/08 
available on the website for the Central Electoral Commission of the Russian Federation - 
http://www.vybory.izbirkom.ru/region/izbirkom. In 2003-4, 895 elections were held to posts within the 
executive branch at all levels, however, for 353 of there was insufficient data for analysis. 
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common to all parliamentary parties in Russia such as the general socio-political environment. 
Whether or not state-sponsorship for Nashi and the Young Guard, not to mention for United 
Russia, has been significant in hindering the youth movements‘ efforts to increase youth 
representation in the formal political arena remains to be seen. 
 
The strictures of state-sponsorship 
Following on from the assertion made in the previous chapter that the Kremlin had no 
genuine desire to cultivate mass youth engagement in politics due to the benefits accrued to 
the incumbent regime from political disengagement, this chapter contends that the Kremlin 
has not been fully behind Nashi and the Young Guard‘s efforts to increase youth 
representation because this too represents a challenge to the foundations of regime support.  It 
argues that state involvement has been the critical factor in determining Nashi and the Young 
Guard‘s inability to increase the proportion of young people elected to office in Russian 
legislative assemblies. Moreover, the youth movements‘ silence in defeat indicates their 
deference to the Kremlin. This is not to suggest that without state-sponsorship Nashi and the 
Young Guard would have been able to more effectively push for increased youth 
representation in politics, but rather that the state‘s own interests have determined the 
outcome of the youth movements‘ bids to rejuvenate the political elite. 
 Since 2003, Russia may be classed as a dominant party regime in Reuter and 
Remington‘s definition of the term referring to a two-sided commitment based on balance of 
powers and division of resources between regime leaders and other political elites, including 
regional governors, big business and prominent politicians (Remington & Reuter, 2009, 
p.503). With the strength of the Kremlin vis-a-vis other political elites gaining, in 2003 Putin 
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backed United Russia in the Duma elections and provided incentives for regional elites to do 
the same. The current situation provides the regime with a constitutional majority in the 
parliament and security in its electoral support, and provides the established political elite 
with guaranteed access to the spoils of state and a means through which to lobby their own 
interests. This situation holds so long as both the regime and the political elite maintain their 
commitment to the party and each remains convinced that they have more to lose from 
reneging on their commitment than could potentially be gained outside of the party. In terms 
of where youth representation fits in to this system of patronage and loyalty,
132
 the systematic 
awarding of a set quota of places on United Russia‘s party list to young people would have 
represented a break with the underlying logic behind the ‗two-sided commitment‘ that 
characterises Russia‘s dominant party regime and thus threatened the fragile bargain that 
holds United Russia together. The proposed pre-allocation of 20% of United Russia‘s party 
lists to young people would have challenged existing patterns of patronage practised by 
United Russia and the informal influence of business powers and regional elites on the 
formation of the party‘s electoral lists.133 For this reason, as well as its lack of genuine 
commitment to promoting mass youth political engagement, it is unlikely that the Kremlin 
would have supported the implementation of United Russia‘s youth quota and, consequently, 
without full state support, Nashi and the Young Guard‘s bid to increase the proportion of 
                                                 
132 Patronage is used here in the traditional understanding of the term simply to refer to ‘particularistic 
exchanges’ whereby the party reinforces its network and garners support by making appointments on the basis 
of loyalty. In keeping with the ‘traditional literature’ on the subject, United Russia’s use of a patronage strategy 
has been ‘demand-driven’ and propagated by local and regional party elites predominantly as a means of 
reward (Kopecký, Scherlis & Spirova, 2007, Party Patronage in New Democracies: Concepts, Measures and the 
Design of Empirical Inquiry, paper presented at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, Chicago, 30 August – 2 September, pp. 1-9,.  Available at 
http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/1/1/4/2/pages211424/p211424-1.php.   
133 According to Shefter, patterns of patronage once established are difficult to break down and are likely to 
entail some costs for the party should it attempt to renounce its patronage strategy: “The way in which a party 
initially acquires a popular base is a character-forming or ‘critical’ experience” (1977, p.414). Having drawn 
heavily on the patronage of regional elites during its formative stage, it would be extremely problematic for 
United Russia to now ‘eschew a patronage strategy’, should it indeed wish to. 
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young people in formal political institutions was destined to flounder. Nashi and the Young 
Guard were ultimately unable to convince United Russia party elites or the Kremlin that 
greater youth representation in formal political institutions was necessary or desirable. 
 Further indicative of the strictures of state-sponsorship, despite pitching youth 
representation in formal political institutions as a central plank of their manifestos (as noted at 
the beginning of this chapter), Nashi and the Young Guard have not criticised the Kremlin or 
United Russia for their lack of commitment to greater youth representation and have not 
publicly acknowledged the failure of the youth quota. The youth quota is increasingly referred 
to as a symbolic commitment by United Russia to promoting greater youth representation and 
participation in the future, rather than as a concrete mechanism to ensure that at least 20% of 
those listed on United Russia party lists are aged under 35. Speaking in July 2008, Andrei 
Tatarinov (member of the Young Guard‘s political council) still praised United Russia‘s 
commitment to youth and even lauded its ability to deliver on its promises to get youth into 
power compared to other political organisations: 
The slogan ‗youth in power‘ is the slogan for United Russia and the slogan for the 
Young Guard and we can really help young people to get into politics proper [....] 
Others have promised to do the same thing, they have promised 10% and so on, 
but nothing‘s come of it.  For example, the liberals, Yabloko, made such a 
promise, but haven‘t got in anywhere. We‘re the only ones who have managed to 
do it and through us young people now hold high political positions all over the 
place – in the regions, in the executive branch, the legislative branch.....134 
                                                 
134 Author’s interview with Andrei Tatarinov, Moscow, 10 July 2008 
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Although such self-congratulatory rhetoric from the Young Guard and United Russia deputies 
may seem like a harmless attempt to save face, in fact this rhetoric may actually be 
detrimental to further efforts to provide the conditions for young people‘s full and genuine 
participation in politics, because by creating a semblance of youth representation it 
undermines the importance of ongoing efforts to this end. The resultant attitude is that, as 
long as young candidates are serious about pursuing a career in politics, it is only a matter of 
time before the youth movements‘ campaigns to get youth into power bear fruit. According to 
the Young Guard, it was a lack of prior regional experience that prevented young people from 
becoming candidates on United Russia‘s party list for the State Duma elections: 
 [The youth organisation‘s] efforts [to rejuvenate the incumbent elite] have only 
just started and you cannot expect such things to happen overnight [....] Many 
young people are now putting themselves forward to become deputies in their 
local administration and from there on going on to become regional deputies. If 
they begin at around 21-22 years of age, as is happening more and more often 
now, then by the time they are 30 they will be well-experienced and will be 
worthy candidates for office at a federal level regardless of the youth quota. For 
this reason, it is possible to say with great confidence that there will be a greater 
proportion of young deputies in the next convocation of the State Duma and it will 
not be long before the 20% youth target is achieved and exceeded.
135
 
Not only is this a blatant denial of the facts of the matter, because there has been no 
discernible trend of greater youth representation in legislative assemblies at a regional level 
either (as noted above), but it also ignores the true and immutable obstacle to realising the 
youth movements‘ goal of rejuvenating the incumbent political elite – lack of state support for 
                                                 
135 Response from the Young Guard’s press office to this author, 20 May 2009  
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this objective and the stifling impact of having state-sponsorship on the youth movements‘ 
abilities to contest this issue. Although Nashi was prepared to admit privately that United 
Russia had let young Russians down in failing to deliver its promised 20% youth quota, it did 
not publicly hold the party to account and did not acknowledge the hindrance of state 
sponsorship to this end.
136
  
 
Infiltration of Russia’s political elite 
While Nashi and the Young Guard have been unable to initiate an increase in the proportion 
of young people holding office in formal political institutions in general, the Kremlin-
sponsored youth movements have proven highly capable of providing unique access to 
political power for their own, most prominent, members. Furthermore, the same logic that 
explained the adverse effect of state sponsorship on Nashi and the Young Guard‘s efforts to 
increase the proportion of young people in formal political institutions, discussed above, also 
accounts for the beneficial impact of having state support on the youth movements‘ ability to 
gain entry for their leaders in decision-making bodies. In this way, it is argued that having 
state support has enabled Nashi and the Young Guard to become ‗strong publics‘ invested 
with the power to translate opinion into authoritative decisions (Fraser, 1993, p.25). 
 
 
                                                 
136 In contrast to the Young Guard, one of Nashi’s leaders (who wished to remain anonymous) admitted that, 
although the quota was more an informal agreement and a declaration of intent than a formal commitment, 
the quota simply was not fulfilled and consequently there has been some degree of discontentment about that 
within Nashi (Personal correspondence between this author and one of Nashi’s leaders, 25 March 2009). 
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Nashi and the Young Guard in the formal political arena  
To begin with the legislative branch, although the proportion of young United Russia deputies 
did not increase, the results of the 2007 State Duma elections demonstrated the relative 
influence of Nashi and the Young Guard on the formation of United Russia‘s party list: Nashi 
and the Young Guard‘s presence among young United Russia Duma deputies is considerable. 
Of the 19 new United Russia deputies elected to the 5
th
 convocation of the State Duma aged 
under 35, 6 were prominent members of pro-regime youth organisations and the others were 
all either celebrated sportsmen and women, were influential in the media, or had previous 
experience of working in the executive or legislative branch. Robert Shlegel (Nashi 
commissar) and Sergei Belokonev (Nashi ideologue and former head of Nashi Vybori – Our 
Elections) were elected as new state Duma deputies for United Russia in December 2007. 
Belokonev then went on to become vice-chair of the Duma‘s State Committee on Youth 
Affairs. From the Young Guard‘s political council, Pavel Zyrianov, Tatiana Voronova and 
Evgenii Samoilov became new State Duma deputies.
137
 Moreover, 5 of the 6 members of pro-
regime youth organisations elected to the State Duma had no previous experience of political 
office and became federal deputies simply by virtue of their loyalty to the Kremlin. In 
comparison, prior to Nashi and the Young Guard‘s existence, pro-Kremlin youth movements 
(including the Young Guard predecessor – Youth Unity) did not enjoy such privileged access 
to State Duma positions and young people who became United Russia deputies previously 
could be said to have done so on the merit of their political experience. None of the young 
United Russia deputies in the 4
th
 convocation of the State Duma were members of a youth 
organisation and, of the 11 new United Russia deputies aged under 35, all had previous 
                                                 
137 The sixth member of a pro-regime youth organisation elected as a United Russia deputy was Maksim 
Mishenko, leader of the youth movement Rossiia Molodaia (Young Russia –commonly referred to as RuMol).  
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experience of working in politics. Thus, clearly, Nashi and the Young Guard represent 
effective channels through which to enter formal politics at a federal level.  
 Similarly, what has been noticeable in terms of Nashi and the Young Guard‘s impact 
on youth representation in the executive branch is the injection of key youth leaders into 
federal level positions. For example, in February 2009, Medvedev‘s replacement of four 
regional governors saw 33 year old Andrei Turchak, coordinator of youth politics for United 
Russia, appointed governor of the Pskov region. Moreover, in an interesting reflection of the 
logic behind appointing prominent youth leaders to political power, which will be discussed 
in detail below, former leader of the opposition youth movement My (We), Maria Gaidar, 
became deputy governor of the Kirov region in February 2009 alongside Medvedev‘s 
appointment of Nikita Belykh (former opposition leader) to the post of governor of the region. 
On 8
th
 October 2007, Vasily Yakemenko (Nashi‘s founder and member of the movement‘s 
Federal Soviet) was declared head of the State Committee for Youth Affairs,
138
 which secured 
Nashi a significant role in budgetary control over youth projects.  
Having successfully established footholds in federal political institutions with state 
support, Nashi and the Young Guard are well placed to increase their future influence in the 
formal political arena and are actively seeking to do so. According to Nashi‘s manifesto, 
―acting as a network of mutual support [the youth movement will] make the most of the 
capabilities of its members, who have gained access to positions of power in order to promote 
new members.‖139  Speaking to a group of Nashi activists at the movement‘s summer camp in 
July 2008, newly elected Duma deputy and Nashi ideologue Sergei Belokonev urged his 
audience to be on the alert for any elections in their regions so that the movement and 
                                                 
138 The State Committee for Youth Affairs later became the Federal Agency for Youth Affairs under President 
Medvedev and is now more commonly referred to as RosMolodezh. 
139 Nashi, 2005, ‘Manifest’, available at: http://nashi.su/manifest, last accessed 16 June 2010. 
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RosMolodezh (the Federal Agency for Youth Affairs) could assist them in their endeavours to 
be elected to positions of authority in political institutions in their regions.
140
 The youth 
movements‘ ability to provide access to political institutions and decision-making bodies for 
its most prominent members is a considerable positive democratic effect and one which has 
been reliant on having state support. The logic behind Kremlin promotion of Nashi and 
Young Guard leaders to formal political office is the subject of further discussion below. 
 
The fruits of state sponsorship 
Contrary to the Kremlin‘s indisposition towards encouraging mass youth engagement in 
politics or increasing youth representation across federal and regional political institutions, the 
privilege by which Nashi and the Young Guard are able to provide access to political power 
for their leaders and most loyal members is in keeping with the Kremlin‘s preferred political 
strategy of client-patron relations. Thus, rather than being a hindrance, state-sponsorship has 
had a positive effect on the pro-regime youth movements‘ efforts to establish their exclusive 
influence in the formal political arena.  
 If we return to the earlier discussion on Russia being a dominant party regime and the 
impact of this on the strategies supported by the Kremlin regarding youth political 
participation, then it is possible to set out precisely why the Kremlin has boosted Nashi and 
the Young Guard‘s abilities to gain access to political authority for its own elite while 
simultaneously undermining their attempts to increase youth representation en masse. From 
the Kremlin‘s perspective, Nashi and the Young Guard‘s purpose here was to underwrite the 
                                                 
140 Author’s own observation of a meeting between Sergei Belokonev and leaders of the following projects 
Nasha Ekonomika (Our Economy), Novoe Obrazovanie (New Education’), Start-Ap (Start-Up), Kadry dlia 
Modernizatsiia Stranii (Cadres for the Modernisation of the Country) and Nashi Stroiteli (Our Builders) which 
took place on 22 July 2008, Lake Seliger, Moscow. 
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informal rules of play that govern the current dominant party regime that exists in Russia by 
making it clear to young Russians that influence on politics and society can be gained only 
through allegiance to the incumbent regime – in this way extending a similar deal to youth 
leaders as had been imposed upon regional elites and prominent business men previously. 
Rather than challenging the existing political set-up, rewarding individual pro-Kremlin youth 
leaders for their loyalty with positions of authority represents an extension of the regime‘s 
particularistic methods and is symptomatic of the United Russia party‘s persistent use of a 
patronage strategy. In contrast, Nashi and the Young Guard‘s unsuccessful efforts to increase 
the proportion of young people in politics (by means of United Russia‘s youth quota in the 
case of the legislative branch) would have represented a reduction in the prize of political 
power available to regional and business elites upon whose support United Russia depends 
and upon which commitment the dominant party regime‘s stability is based. 
Ultimately, despite Nashi‘s desire to attract as many young people as possible to its 
ranks in order to dominate the youth political scene and despite the openness of the Young 
Guard‘s PolitZavod program, in practice, the youth movements‘ interpretation  of ‗power to 
youth‘ is highly exclusive. The process of filtering through aspiring youngsters to select an 
elite group, a handpicked, trained and tested, loyal few, who will then go on to receive the 
fruits of representation that the youth movements are capable of providing with Kremlin-
backing, should perhaps have been expected given the commonalities between Nashi‘s 
ideology and that of the Kremlin. Evoking the spirit of elitist theories of democracy espoused 
in Surkov‘s speech on sovereign democracy (discussed in Chapter 3), only the chosen few of 
Nashi and the Young Guard‘s members gained positions in the executive or legislative branch 
of government. As suggested in Chapter 4, the introduction of United Russia‘s youth quota 
was just another means of attracting young people‘s attention and was never intended by the 
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Kremlin or the party to create systematic channels of influence for young people in formal 
political arenas. Instead, with state support, the youth movements perpetuate a more 
particularistic distribution of power to youth – extending the existing system of patronage in 
operation in Russian politics, but nonetheless with considerable positive democratic effects 
for Nashi and the Young Guard in terms of their access to political institutions and decision-
making bodies and thus their credentials as ‗strong publics‘ (Fraser, 1993).  
 
Empowerment or institutionalisation? 
The final qualification required on the institutional democratic effects of Nashi and the Young 
Guard‘s attempts to get young people into power is to emphasise that institutional access does 
not necessarily translate into empowerment. As Cornwall notes, ―having a voice clearly 
depends on more than getting a seat at the table (2004, p.84). Including disadvantaged groups 
in the deliberation process is not enough to enable them to participate effectively and have 
equal influence (Young, 2002; Kohn, 2000, p.474). Indeed, it is argued that, when 
accompanied by continued discrimination against them during the process of deliberation, 
formally allowing entry to previously excluded groups may exacerbate the problem of their 
subordination by creating the illusion of democratisation and inclusion.
141
 The youth quota 
that existed in the Soviet era ensured that the formal representation of young people was 
relatively high on paper. Yet, although the importance of youth engagement was bandied 
around during the Soviet period and despite the pervasiveness of the Komsomol, the Soviet 
                                                 
141 In studies of participation and development in Less Economically Developed Countries cases have been 
recorded where the authorities have used the creation of new participatory spaces in order to co-opt the 
opposition – enjoying the legitimacy created by being able to attach the names of respected members of the 
opposition or leaders of particular interest groups, race or class identification, without actually affording these 
groups any real influence or alternative public platform (White, 1996, p.6). Parallels may be drawn here with 
attempts by the Kremlin under Putin to co-opt the political opposition. 
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Union was remarkable for its increasing rule by gerontocracy, which lingered on into the post-
Soviet era.  Writing in 1995, Sharonov remarks: ―Behind the slogan ‗Young people are free to 
do anything‘, there is often nothing more than demagogy and political time-serving‖ (1995, 
p.67). In this way, even those young candidates that were successful in being elected to the 
State Duma on United Russia‘s party list in 2007 may not necessarily have found themselves 
empowered to participate fully and freely in the legislative process.  
Analysing the creation of participatory spaces in the developing world, Cornwall and 
Gaventa have repeatedly sought to emphasise that gaining an understanding of the ―power 
relations that surround and fill new spaces for democratic engagement is critical for an 
assessment of their transformative potential‖ (Gaventa, 2004, p.39).142 Thus, in many ways 
the issue of whether participation in formal political arenas is genuinely empowering for 
Nashi and Young Guard members relates back to the discussion in the previous chapter on 
participation and legitimisation, because the core questions really are on what grounds have 
these young people been invited to participate in these political forums and what is the 
purpose or function of their participation for the party and for the regime in general? 
Following the conclusions drawn in Chapter 4 that there has been no change in the Kremlin‘s 
attitude towards the desirability of mass political engagement along with the conclusions 
drawn so far in this chapter that the Kremlin has perpetuated its existing patronage strategy by 
rewarding key individuals with political office rather than facilitating the youth movements‘ 
bid for increased youth representation in general, it appears that the underlying purpose of 
Kremlin support for Nashi and the Young Guard has been to maintain the status-quo. It is 
therefore likely that, having rapidly gained access to formal political institutions, Nashi and 
Young Guard members will find it difficult to make any significant difference to Russian 
                                                 
142 Also see Cornwall 2002 and 2004. 
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politics. If young people are being assimilated into existing power structures specifically in 
order to preserve the status quo, then the ability of Nashi or Young Guard members that have 
gained seats in legislative assemblies or have been awarded positions in the executive branch 
to champion the interests of young Russians from inside is likely to be curtailed, unless of 
course those interests coincide with the Kremlin‘s wishes. Furthermore, if youth action is 
perceived as a potential threat to the stability of the incumbent regime, then it should be 
expected that the reality of any policy of youth representation by the Kremlin would translate 
into a subordinated form of participation for young people despite United Russia‘s claims to 
the contrary.
143
  
As it stands, the monopoly on political power in Russia, held by the Putin 
administration and United Russia, ensures that youth in the opposition remain in the 
political shadows, forced to engage in contentious political actions such as protests, 
conferences, and the occasional building occupation. Youths who choose to join the 
authorities through groups such as Nashi can only hope to become bureaucratic tools 
in a politically uncompetitive, corporatist nomenklatura. In neither case will the 
political culture of Russia‘s youth mature. (Schwirtz, 2007, p.82) 
In an effort to assist young people to participate effectively in formal political institutions 
over the long-term the Young Guard has created several projects. In February 2007, the 
Young Guard created the Molodezhnoe Federal’noe Sobranie’ (Youth Federal Assembly) in 
order to provide a support network for young deputies in local and regional legislative 
assemblies across Russia. Essentially the Youth Federal Assembly comprises young deputies 
                                                 
143 Gryzlov speaking on the occasion of the announcement of the youth quota – “We hope that there will be 
representatives from the Young Guard in the next convocation of the State Duma, who will promote the 
interests of young people during the discussion and passage of legislation” (United Russia, 2006, Vlast’ 
molodeet, available at http://www.edinros.ru/news.html?id=112262, last accessed 16 January 2008). 
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from across Russia and simulates the State Duma by meeting several times a year and 
discussing new legislative initiatives, albeit only in the framework of an advisory body. In 
addition, the Youth Federal Assembly has an online portal which enables young deputies 
across Russia to communicate with other young deputies, share advice, and plan and develop 
legislative initiatives together.
144
 According to the United Russia Duma deputies that took 
part in this author‘s survey into attitudes towards the adoption of the youth quota and towards 
the party‘s new young deputies,145 while it is true that it is tough for these young deputies, this 
is due to the difficulties encountered by all deputies when they first enter the State Duma and 
are trying to find their feet and is not necessarily related to their age.  
Overall, this author agrees with Schwirtz‘ above statement to the extent that the 
repressive political environment that exists in Russia does impose constraints upon those who 
are able to gain entry to the formal political arena as well as those who are forced to the 
margins. For this reason we should expect young Nashi and Young Guard members gaining 
positions of political authority to be subject to the same impositions or limitations as any 
other politician holding office in contemporary Russian. However, any implication that pro-
Kremlin youth leaders, who have been rewarded with political positions by the Kremlin are 
being held at arm‘s length and are not privy to the same rights as older colleagues (or that all 
politicians in office in Russia are mere bureaucratic tools subject to the whims of the Kremlin) 
are unsubstantiated.  
 
 
 
                                                 
144 The website for the Young Guard’s ‘Youth Federal Assembly’ is available at www.1mfs.ru. 
145 Further findings of this survey will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
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Conclusion 
The dominant party regime that exists in Russia today has a significant bearing on the 
Kremlin‘s strategy for supporting youth political participation via Nashi and the Young Guard 
and thus on the ensuing democratic effects of state-sponsored participation in this case. State-
sponsored youth participation in the case of Nashi and the Young Guard extends the existing 
patronage strategy employed by the regime and eschews the introduction of any systematic 
form of representation for young people in politics. There has been no general increase in 
youth representation in the formal political arena in either the legislative or executive branch 
despite the priority given to rejuvenating the political elite among the youth movements‘ 
goals. Moreover, the failure to implement United Russia‘s youth quota indicates the extent of 
Kremlin control over the degree and kind of youth political representation that Nashi and the 
Young Guard may provide as well as the weakness of their position in relation to the state.  
However, the inflow of Nashi and Young Guard leaders into positions of political 
office across the board, including at a federal level, has been impressive. Though this is 
indicative of the Kremlin seeking to reward the youth movements‘ loyalty to the regime rather 
than of any political sway on the part of the youth movements, it nonetheless results in the 
considerable representation of Nashi and Young Guard personnel in formal political 
institutions and by Fraser‘s definition thus renders the youth movements ‗strong publics‘ 
capable of accessing political decision-making bodies.  In the previous chapter the youth 
movements‘ positive contribution to providing democratic legitimacy for the processes and 
institutions of state was the secondary outcome of the Kremlin‘s strategy to defeat any 
potential opposition in the run-up to the 2007-8 electoral cycle. Significantly, this chapter has 
found that Kremlin support for Nashi and the Young Guard has directly and deliberately 
resulted in their unique access to formal political institutions and decision-making bodies. 
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OVERALL EVALUATION OF THE INSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRATIC 
EFFECTS OF NASHI AND THE YOUNG GUARD 
Having approached this study‘s analysis of the institutional democratic effects of state-
sponsored participation from the perspective that this was an area in which having state 
support might reasonably be expected to be beneficial for Nashi and the Young Guard, 
overall, it must be acknowledged that on this score the results are mixed. As was the case with 
regard to the public sphere democratic effects of Nashi and the Young Guard, state-
sponsorship has had both a positive and negative impact on the youth movements‘ 
institutional democratic effects. Moreover, as well as secondary democratic effects (which 
were a necessary part of the Kremlin‘s plans for the youth movements although not the 
primary aim or motivation for the Kremlin), again the Kremlin has directly and deliberately 
supported some positive institutional democratic effects of Nashi and the Young Guard, albeit 
in pursuit of its own vested interests. Thus this study‘s analysis so far of the public sphere and 
institutional democratic effects of state-sponsored participation in the case of Nashi and the 
Young Guard supports the conclusions that, firstly, the impact of state support on the 
democratic effects of participation is more complex than simply being cast in Manichean 
terms of good or bad and, secondly, the state may even be the direct source of some of the 
positive democratic effects of participation. 
 In addition, Part 2 of this thesis has served to corroborate the importance of the socio-
political environment as a factor in shaping the impact of state support on the democratic 
effects of participation in the case of Nashi and the Young Guard. More specifically, analysis 
of Nashi and the Young Guard‘s institutional democratic effects has identified mass political 
disengagement and the dominant party regime that exists in Russia as key determinants for 
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the Kremlin‘s motivations in supporting the youth movements‘ efforts to increase youth 
political participation and consequently for the impact of having Kremlin support on the 
youth movement‘s democratic effects in this regard. In Chapter 4 it was noted that the 
benefits of mass political disengagement for regime support made the Kremlin loathe to 
promote youth political engagement beyond what it deemed necessary in order to prevent 
youths‘ perverse politicisation and the potential threat of instability at election-time. 
Similarly, in Chapter 5, we found that the two-sided commitment of patronage and loyalty 
that characterises Russia‘s dominant party regime dictated the nature of political 
representation that Nashi and the Young Guard were able to provide with state support. 
Interestingly, the importance of agency as a factor in shaping the impact of state sponsorship 
on the public sphere democratic effects of participation in the case of Nashi and the Young 
Guard, noted in Part 1, was not mirrored with regard to the institutional democratic effects of 
participation in Part 2. Despite their noted ability in Part 1 to secure the benefits of having 
state-sponsorship for the movement‘s ability to gain publicity and funding beyond the 
completion of the 2007-8 electoral cycle, neither Nashi nor the Young Guard have been able 
to compel the Kremlin to support their campaigns to increase youth representation in the 
formal political arena via the implementation of United Russia‘s youth quota.  
Putting aside the complexities of state-sponsored participation for a moment in order 
to address the issue of whether the positive institutional democratic effects of Nashi and the 
Young Guard have come at the expense of the youth movements‘ public sphere democratic 
effects, it is possible to conclude that these two areas of possible democratic effects of 
participation are not necessarily antagonistic. Having state-sponsorship has had a negative and 
positive impact on both the institutional and public sphere democratic effects of Nashi and the 
Young Guard.  Thus, it is misleading to suggest that the proximity to the state necessary for 
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certain institutional democratic effects precludes all positive public sphere democratic effects 
of associations. The socio-political environment that exists in contemporary Russia renders 
Nashi and the Young Guard as dependent on Kremlin approval and support for public-sphere 
democratic effects such as access to the media as they are for institutional effects such as 
representation in decision-making bodies. Furthermore, it is feasible that the very institutional 
democratic effects, which were enabled by state support, may themselves provide 
opportunities for and facilitate other positive democratic effects, including in the realm of 
public-sphere democratic effects. For example, regardless of their contribution to perpetuating 
the existing system of patronage practised by the regime and United Russia, those Nashi and 
Young Guard activists who have been awarded positions of power within the legislative and 
executive branch are able to make public presentation of their cause owing to the public 
platform that simply being in the State Duma or governor of a region provides.  
 Part 3 of this thesis will move away from the debate concerning the impact of state-
sponsorship on the relative institutional and public-sphere democratic effects of participation 
to consider the final area of potential democratic effects of Nashi and the Young Guard 
according to Warren‘s conceptualisation – the developmental democratic effects. It hopes to 
corroborate the above conclusions derived from Parts 1 and 2 while also highlighting the 
significance of agency for the developmental democratic effects of participation. Following 
on from the discussion at the end of Chapter 5 concerning whether or not young activists have 
been empowered by entry into the formal political arena, Chapters 6 and 7 examine the 
impact of participation in Nashi and the Young Guard on individual members. What does 
participation in these state-sponsored youth movements mean for them and what are the 
developmental democratic effects of this in terms of youth engagement in Russian politics and 
society as well as the civic virtues promoted by the youth movements?    
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INTRODUCTION 
 Part 3 of this thesis investigates the impact of state support on the developmental democratic 
effects of Nashi and the Young Guard. As set out in Chapter 1, the developmental democratic 
effects of participation refers to the ways in which associations may have a formative 
influence on participants‘ skills and abilities as well as their behaviour and beliefs. The 
developmental democratic effects of Nashi and the Young Guard considered in this study are 
the youth movements‘ contribution to participants‘ political efficacy and critical skills as well 
as to their tolerance and respect for law and order. Unlike the earlier discussion of the public 
sphere and institutional democratic effects of Nashi and the Young Guard, which engaged 
directly with existing debates regarding the democratic trade-offs of participation and the 
perils of state-sponsorship, the sphere of developmental effects has not been the focus of 
arguments concerning the democratic effects of state-sponsored participation. This is 
interesting for two reasons: Firstly, it is interesting because there are therefore no prevalent 
assumptions regarding the impact of state support on the developmental democratic effects of 
state-sponsored participation, which must form the starting point for this study, other than the 
general notion that state-sponsorship impedes all democratic effects of participation. Secondly 
and more importantly, it is interesting because it is possible that the developmental 
democratic effects of Nashi and the Young Guard may be less affected by having state 
support than the other categories of democratic effects, which have been held up as a case in 
point of the negative or positive impact of state-sponsorship. In other words, it is suggested 
that the developmental democratic effects of state-sponsored participation are not the centre 
of controversy for scholars precisely because the impact of state support may be less 
important in this field than other factors, such as the decisions and actions taken by the youth 
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movements and activists themselves. According to Bellin, ―an association might be subject to 
state control and hence incapable of hedging state power yet be sufficiently mobilizational to 
school citizens in public spirit and political participation‖ (1995, p.125).  
 Part 3 is divided into two chapters. Chapter 6 examines Nashi and the Young Guard‘s 
contribution to youth engagement in politics and society in Russia. Whereas Chapter 4 
discussed youth political engagement in terms of electoral participation in quantifiable terms, 
Chapter 6 considers youth engagement more broadly and in qualitative terms of the value 
attached to participation by young people themselves as well as how others perceive the role 
of young people in politics and society. In addition to setting out the ways in which the youth 
movements‘ campaigns and the opportunities provided as a result of having state support 
affect participants‘ political efficacy and critical awareness, Chapter 6 also explores the 
propensity for participants‘ own personal agendas to influence outcomes. Having concluded 
in Part 2 that the Kremlin had no genuine desire to promote mass political engagement 
beyond what it deemed necessary to ensure regime security and having noted the 
consequences of this in terms of imposing constraints upon the institutional democratic 
effects of Nashi and the Young Guard, Chapter 6 investigates the limits of the impact of state 
support in the field of the developmental democratic effects of participation. Chapter 7 then 
proceeds to investigate the youth movements‘ capacity to promote or hinder the development 
of civic virtues such as tolerance and respect for law and order. It assesses the democratic 
credentials of the ethos of Nashi and the Young Guard as projected in the youth movements‘ 
strategies and actions.  Any changes in the methods employed by each of the youth 
movements as well as variation between the two movements are isolated and analysed in 
order to identify the primary factors influencing Nashi and the Young Guard‘s contribution to 
civic virtues and to evaluate the relative significance of having state support.  
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CHAPTER 6 – ENGAGED CITIZENRY: RIGHTS & RESPONSIBILITIES 
Chapter 6 considers the impact of state-sponsorship for Nashi and the Young Guard on the 
developmental democratic effects of participation in terms of youth engagement in politics 
and society. The Kremlin‘s drive for greater youth engagement, begun under Putin in 2005, 
cannot be understood without reference to participants‘ own agendas or to the broader socio-
political context. In Chapter 1 it was noted that assumptions of the detrimental impact of state 
support on the democratic effects of participation imagined the state to have more power than 
it actually possesses. In a similar fashion, it is unrealistic to imagine that simply the state's 
resources and its desire to assist in the stimulation of pro-regime youth organisations are 
enough to sustain youth participation and mobilisation; youth motivations and societal and 
cultural drivers must also be considered. Logically then, these other factors must also be taken 
into account when considering the democratic effects of participation. As Cornwall notes: 
Spaces created with one purpose in mind may be used by those who engage in 
them for something quite different. Efforts to control outcomes can only be 
partial, and the impotence of initiating agencies to direct or close down emergent 
processes is part of their inherent dynamism. Factoring in the agency of those who 
are invited to take up, or come to inhabit, spaces suggests that nothing can be 
prejudged. (2004, p.81) 
Thus, regardless of the Kremlin‘s designs to simultaneously promote and limit youth political 
participation via Nashi and the Young Guard (discussed in Part 2), the extent to which young 
participants become politically engaged and take to heart the youth movements‘ campaigns 
and ultimately the significance of their experience for participants themselves could never be 
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controlled by the state. Undoubtedly, the impact of state-sponsorship and the socio-political 
environment on the outcomes of Nashi and the Young Guard‘s campaigns to promote youth 
electoral participation, noted in Part 2, indirectly affect the value of participation for members 
and thereby the youth movements‘ contributions to developing youth political efficacy. Yet, 
unlike gaining publicity or being awarded positions in political institutions, which were well 
within the Kremlin‘s power to grant or deny, the developmental democratic effects of Nashi 
and the Young Guard here may be only partially attributed to and even less so determined by 
state-sponsorship.  
 In order to demonstrate the lesser significance of state support for the developmental 
democratic effects of participation here, this chapter refrains from simply setting out the ways 
in which Nashi and the Young Guard have influenced the development of political efficacy 
among participants in favour of emphasising the relative independence of these democratic 
effects from state-sponsorship. It begins by examining the youth movements‘ campaigns to 
encourage youth engagement, noting the residual good of their efforts to integrate young 
people into politics and society regardless of the motives behind their leaders‘ adoption of this 
strategy or Kremlin support for it. The chapter then considers the shortcomings of Nashi and 
the Young Guard‘s efforts to improve perceptions of young people in Russia and whether 
they may be attributed to the impact of having state support. Finally, the chapter finishes by 
highlighting what might be termed the unintended or even unexpected contribution of Nashi 
and the Young Guard to increasing youth political engagement beyond the direct control of 
the state or the youth movements‘ leaders.  
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Redefining the youth of today 
Concerns in Russia over the existence of a moral vacuum particularly affecting the nation‘s 
youth have been raised throughout the post-communist period. Problems of drugs, drinking, 
crime and HIV infection were prevalent among the younger generation in the late Yeltsin – 
early Putin period. The term poterannoe pokolenie (‗lost generation‘) has long been used to 
refer to the younger generation that were the product of the culmination of the nineties, of the 
mercenary, atomised society that followed the end of communism and the hardship of ‗shock 
therapy‘ and crash privatisation under Yeltsin. While to a certain extent the terminology used 
is indicative of the negative perception of young people in Russia at this time, it should also 
be recognised as representing acknowledgement that greater attention to young people was 
required. Youth socialisation programs and the development of a coherent youth policy were 
deemed necessary during Putin‘s first term, but progress was slow going pre-2004, perhaps in 
part because youth disengagement did not threaten the incumbent regime in the short-term 
and in fact mass political disengagement helped to maintain the status quo and even boost 
support for the incumbent regime (as discussed in Chapter 4).   
 Following the wave of ‗coloured revolutions‘ in the Former Soviet Union and in 
particular the ‗Orange Revolution‘ in Ukraine in Winter 2004/5, addressing the issue of youth 
social and political anomie was pushed up the agenda. Young people on the fringes of society 
were perceived to be most susceptible to persuasion by ‗radical‘ groups seeking to overthrow 
the incumbent regime. Moreover, with the upcoming presidential elections of 2008, in which 
Putin was unable to stand as a candidate himself, the immediacy of the threat posed by the 
potential for the ‗perverse politicisation‘ of young Russians became apparent.146  Partly in 
                                                 
146 The term ‘perverse politicisation’ has been referred to and discussed previously in Chapter 4. The term 
originates from Blum’s article where he uses it to refer to youth engagement in radical groups (2006, p.97). 
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response to this push from above for youth socialisation programs, the ‗Strategy of State 
Youth Policy in the Russian Federation‘ was finally adopted in December 2006, representing 
Russia‘s first post-Soviet policy relating specifically to young people at a federal level.147 
Without directly referring to the role of youth in the ‗Orange Revolution‘, it makes reference 
to the importance for young people to be ‗ready to resist political manipulation and extremist 
calls‘.148 Although the 2006 Strategy for State Youth Policy does not suggest that young 
Russians should be encouraged to be politically engaged (as noted in Chapter 4), it does detail 
a programme for supporting young people‘s reintegration into society and providing 
opportunities for them to realise their potential.  
 This section on ‗redefining the youth of today‘ sets out the ways in which Nashi and 
the Young Guard have not only been able to translate state youth policy into action via their 
youth socialisation initiatives, but have also attempted to enact such change as to leave a 
lasting legacy that would be unaffected by the prospect of declining state interest in this area 
following the completion of the 2007-8 electoral cycle. It begins by examining Nashi and the 
Young Guard‘s contribution to improving attitudes towards youth in Russia, as far as their 
social status and the idea that young people need to be nurtured and provided with 
opportunities for their self-realisation are concerned. It then proceeds to investigate the ways 
in which the youth movements have sought to change young people’s perception of 
themselves in terms of their responsibilities both socially and politically.  
 
  
                                                 
147 The State Youth Policy, discussed previously in Chapter 4, had been long in the pipeline prior to the ‘Orange 
Revolution’ in Ukraine, but was not adopted until December 2006.  
148 Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation, 2006, Strategiia gosudarstvennoi molodezhnoi 
politiki v Rossiiskoi Federatsii, No. 1760, p.4. Available at: http://ed.gov.ru/files/materials/393/strat.doc, last 
accessed 1 September 2008. 
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Rehabilitating Russia’s youth  
The Young Guard and Nashi in particular have done much to support the state‘s policy to 
reintegrate disaffected youths into society and to encourage a more inclusive and supportive 
attitude towards young people in Russia.
149
 Indeed, such youth initiatives are the primary 
means of putting state youth policy into action and are key to its effective implementation by 
engaging young people in the process. One of the youth movements‘ major successes has 
been to convey the message to young people that there are opportunities available to them 
regardless of their background. In an interview with this author, one of Nashi‘s leaders 
explained the purpose of the movement‘s annual summer camp to be to equip all those 
interested with the necessary tools to participate effectively and to realise their potential, in 
contrast to the free-for-all that existed in the nineties when young people whose families 
could not support their advancement were left to fend for themselves:  
A few years ago in Russia youth policy did not exist in principle, because there 
was simply no inclination for it and also because the idea of ‗neo-liberalism‘ was 
in vogue – the idea of ‗help yourself‘, ‗make yourself‘. Either you managed to 
make something of yourself and you were a winner, or else you failed and were 
branded a loser. But not everyone has the same capabilities or equal opportunities, 
some do not have the necessary information. Even now, few people understand 
the concept of a youth policy at all. Here we are trying to get the message across 
that young people need to be provided with opportunities, they need to be brought 
together, given the technology and so on.
150
 
                                                 
149 Due to its purely political focus, the Young Guard has been unable to adopt the more inclusive approach 
embodied in Nashi’s wide-ranging societal initiatives. 
150 Author’s interview with an anonymous Nashi leader, Lake Seliger, 21 July 2008. 
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Both Nashi and the Young Guard have attracted young people from a variety of backgrounds 
to their leadership and the resounding achievement of Nashi‘s 2008 summer camp was its 
notable ability to provide all participants with equal opportunities for their self-realisation – 
for example, enabling young people outside of Russia‘s central regions to raise funds to start 
their own business or social initiative. In an embodiment of Nashi‘s efforts to provide 
opportunities for young people from across Russia, as well as the youth movement‘s spread 
and expansion in the post-electoral environment (noted in Chapter 3), since 2008 Nashi has 
held an annual youth forum called SeliSakh in the Far-Eastern Sakhalin region of Russia in 
addition to its forum at Lake Seliger (midway between Moscow and St. Petersburg). The 
importance of such opportunities and the wider inspiration that they provide for young 
people‘s efficacy and self-realisation amidst the disparity that exists in Russia cannot be 
underlined enough.   
 Furthermore, by increasingly focusing on the message that young people need to be 
nurtured and supported by the state in order to realise their potential, alongside the idea that 
the younger generation has a duty to protect and secure Russia (to be discussed below), Nashi 
has translated the Kremlin‘s more supportive approach towards youth in the run-up to the 
2007-8 electoral cycle into a more enduring phenomenon. While the need for young people to 
take action in order to defend Russia or to validate its institutions may be tied to a particular 
point in time and thus may be expected to logically decline after this period (in this case the 
need for young Russians to rally in the defence of the motherland was strongly associated 
with the 2008 presidential elections and the perceived threat of ‗malevolent‘ efforts to 
overthrow the incumbent regime), the notion of greater support for young people is more 
generic and conducive to a lasting shift in state policy and societal attitudes towards youth. In 
this way, Nashi has sought to consolidate the improved status of youth in Russia by raising 
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young people‘s expectations of the state and increasing their sense of entitlement to certain 
rights, such as the right to education and training, which would be less easy for the state to 
subsequently deny once the perceived immediacy of the need for the Kremlin to engage 
young Russians passed. Moreover, Nashi has further endeavoured to ensure that the new 
status of young people in Russia becomes a lasting legacy by claiming an ongoing 
justification for continued state interest and support for youth work. By pitching youth as a 
key resource for modernisation and innovation, Nashi has attempted to place the cultivation of 
young Russians‘ self-realisation at the forefront of securing Russia‘s future prosperity and 
global standing.  The establishment of the State Agency for Youth Affairs (successor of the 
State Committee for Youth) is perhaps the greatest example of the movement‘s bid to 
consolidate the change in perceptions of young Russians among politicians and society that it 
has encouraged. In testimony to Nashi‘s particular influence here, the movement‘s founder, 
Vasily Yakemenko, was made head of the agency (as noted previously in Chapter 5) with 
several other Nashi commissars receiving positions within the agency. Two years on since the 
completion of the 2007-8 federal electoral cycle and the obligation of the state towards youth 
in Russia has not ended. 2009 was dedicated the year of youth in Russia.  
 
Citizen – y 
In line with the Kremlin‘s bid to get young people on board for the 2007-8 federal electoral 
cycle and to maximise youth voter turnout in favour of the incumbent regime, Nashi and the 
Young Guard have both encouraged young Russians to become socially and politically 
responsible: To cast their vote at election-time in order to prevent ‗western-sponsored radical‘ 
influences from asserting their influence over Russia, but also to play a part in improving 
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conditions for themselves and those around them by becoming actively involved in their 
communities. As far as political engagement in particular is concerned, the Kremlin‘s lack of 
genuine support for mass youth political engagement has been discussed at length in Part 2 
and the extent to which young people have become politically engaged regardless of this will 
be discussed later in this chapter. However, it is the immutable good of the youth movements‘ 
efforts to instil young people with an understanding of what it means to be a responsible 
citizen, irrespective of the state‘s motivation in supporting this, which interests the analysis 
here.  Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar refer to this field of activity as ‗cultural politics‘ and 
seek to highlight its importance in the democratisation process: 
Social movements not only have sometimes succeeded in translating their agendas 
into public policies and in expanding the boundaries of institutional politics but 
also, significantly, have struggled to resignify the very meanings of received 
notions of citizenship, political representation and participation, and, as a 
consequence, democracy itself. (Alvarez et.al. 1998, p.2) 
A common thread to Nashi and the Young Guard‘s message is the repeated assertion 
that the younger generation‘s time has come: that Russia‘s youth of today has a unique 
opportunity to make a difference and to be masters of their own destiny, but also that they are 
obliged to stand up and be counted because they are being relied upon. Slogans such as 
VremIa Prishlo (My time has come) reinforce Nashi‘s message (epitomised in the grandiose 
rhetoric of its manifesto below) that Russia‘s future depends on the actions of young people 
today and that every single young person has a patriotic duty or responsibility to take an 
active part in determining their own future:  
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We live in difficult times. Freedom, justice, cooperation – that is how we envisage 
Russia in the future. But we live in a country where world history has been written 
and will continue to be written over the next ten years. We can make Russia as we 
would like it to be and in doing so we can make the whole world a better place. 
Not everyone has the chance to do that in their lifetime.
151
 
To a certain degree this can be seen as a ploy simply to get young people to vote for the 
incumbent regime and to reject the opposition by giving adherents an artificially inflated 
sense of importance. For example, in the run up to the elections, the Young Guard developed 
slogans that portrayed voting for the regime as a vote for young people themselves – Vremia 
vibirat’ vremIa (It is time to choose my time) and Preemnik – eto Ia (I am [Putin‘s] 
successor). In a similar fashion, Nashi has hi-jacked the celebration of Victory Day, handing 
over the torch from Russia‘s esteemed veterans of the Great Patriotic War to Nashi activists in 
a symbolic gesture intended to associate pro-regime youth political participation with 
patriotism and national duty. Nashi‘s first Victory Day parade in May 2005 attracted around 
50,000 participants and has continued to be one of the youth movement‘s main events, 
involving 65,000 young people in honour of the occasion‘s 65th anniversary in 2010. 
Electoral slogans aside, however, and the wider significance of the youth movements‘ 
campaigns to engage young people in politics and society must be acknowledged. Whether or 
not the opportunity is genuinely there for young people en masse to influence politics and 
determine Russia‘s future, the lasting impact of work to engage young people in community 
projects at a local and regional level by Nashi in particular is evident. 
                                                 
151 Nashi, 2005, ‘Manifest’, available at: http://nashi.su/manifest, last accessed 16 June 2010. 
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Before I joined Nashi there wasn‘t much for me to do back home [….] Now, I am 
able to help to improve young people‘s school experience […] and work out my 
own ideas to help our local community.
152
 
In the above statement this 20 year-old Nashi member from Voronezh demonstrates both the 
relevance of Nashi‘s activities to himself and also the degree to which he feels that he is able 
to input into Nashi‘s objectives in his region. This statement was typical of Nashi activists 
that this author encountered, including those who were disillusioned with the pomp and 
spectacle of Nashi‘s mass actions but still viewed the youth movement as a means by which 
they could have an impact in improving their future and the future of Russia. This is the 
longer-term reality of the youth movements‘ efforts to invest young people in their future – a 
change in the mindset of participants, redefining what it means to be a young citizen in Russia 
and what their roles and responsibilities are.  
 
 Sticking points 
Despite the noted positive developmental democratic effects of Nashi and the Young Guard‘s 
efforts to improve perceptions of young people in Russian politics and society and to increase 
youth activism in the community, there are some areas where it is possible to identify 
significant shortcomings; shortcomings that go some way towards undermining the positive 
impact noted above. Having set out areas in which Nashi and the Young Guard were able to 
make more of a lasting improvement in the status of young people than might otherwise have 
been the case given the short-term nature of the Kremlin‘s interest in supporting this 
                                                 
152 Author’s communication with Nashi activist, 2 February 2009. 
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endeavour (i.e. positive democratic effects attributable to the agency of the youth movements 
themselves and distinguished from the impact of having state-sponsorship per se), this section 
considers whether the shortcomings identified here should be attributed to the impact of 
having state support or not. It focuses on two main areas where the youth movements have 
not had a positive impact on the development of participants‘ political efficacy and critical 
skills: Firstly, lingering negative stereotypes of young people among United Russia 
politicians, which reflect the Kremlin‘s own lack of genuine support for youth political 
engagement beyond voting and electioneering. Secondly, the manner in which internal dissent 
and members‘ ability to engage in meaningful debate with the opposition is stifled by the 
youth movements themselves.  
 
Entrenched stereotypes 
The impact of state-sponsorship on the developmental democratic effects of Nashi and the 
Young Guard may be felt in the limits of the youth movements‘ abilities to overcome 
negative stereotypes of youth held by United Russia State Duma deputies, as apparent in their 
negative attitudes towards young candidates for elections to the 5
th
 convocation of the State 
Duma. The overwhelming majority of United Russia Duma deputies surveyed (and indeed 
Young Guard representatives themselves) placed the blame for the lack of any significant 
increase in youth representation in legislative assemblies on young people themselves: This 
was despite the party‘s trumpeted commitment to helping to prepare young candidates for 
political duties at all levels and to working with the Young Guard to get ―young people ready 
so that they [could] realistically participate in all the organs of electoral power in [the] 
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country.‖153 The most common reason cited by United Russia State Duma deputies for why 
young candidates did not fare better in the 2007 elections to the State Duma was young 
people‘s own deficiencies, namely their apparent inexperience and lack of commitment. 
Typically, United Russia deputies contended that there was not a sufficient calibre of young 
people able to undertake parliamentary duties to allow the party to bestow 20% of its list to 
under 35 year-olds. Most young people at present, it was argued, simply ―are not ready for 
political duties at a federal level‖ having not yet built up the necessary political experience ―at 
the local and regional level.‖154 Furthermore, it was implied that the majority of young people 
who aspire to become parliamentary deputies are not suitably committed to the level of work 
required of a State Duma deputy, being ―insincere‖ and incapable of ―understanding that the 
work of a deputy is not about self-promotion, but is a daily struggle with lots of hard 
work‖.155  
 Although it might be somewhat unfair to blame state-sponsorship of Nashi and the 
Young Guard for these negative perceptions of aspiring young politicians, it is reasonable to 
suggest that the Kremlin‘s lack of support for the youth movements‘ bid to increase the 
proportion of young people in legislative assemblies (noted in Chapter 4) has given United 
Russia members carte blanche to reject the efforts of young people to get into politics 
(whether this be based on genuine prejudice towards young people or simply a desire to 
prevent an influx of new people into United Russia who might threaten the benefits of 
patronage for existing members). Some United Russia deputies spoke of the implicit 
understanding that the Kremlin was only paying lip-service to the importance of youth 
                                                 
153 Gryzlov, United Russia (2006) Vlast molodeet, available at http://www.edinros.ru/news.html?id=112262, 
last accessed 16 January 2008 
154 Correspondence between this author and Anatoli Ivanov (United Russia State Duma deputy since 19/12/99, 
born 1949), 17 April 2009.  
155 Correspondence between this author and A. Semenov on behalf of Vyacheslav Kushchev (new United Russia 
State Duma deputy of the 5th convocation, born 1948), 24 March 2009. 
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politics in the run up to the 2007-8 electoral cycle and that there was little real substance 
behind its support of Nashi and the Young Guard‘s efforts to get more young people into 
politics.  This has a knock-on effect on the commitment of United Russia‘s leaders to 
supporting aspiring young politicians (the party‘s empty promises of implementing a 20% 
youth quota were discussed in Part 2 of this thesis). According to one former United Russia 
deputy, who wished to remain anonymous: 
Today the politics of United Russia is defined by politicians of the older 
generation. These politicians do not really want to let young people into the real 
world of politics and that is why only 12.2% of the party‘s list [for the 2007 
elections to the State Duma] was comprised of under 35 year olds.
156
 
From this quotation it is possible to see the manner in which perceptions of a reluctance to 
change the status quo from higher up within United Russia and the Kremlin leadership have 
encouraged widespread disregard for the implementation of United Russia‘s declared youth 
quota. Moreover, following the Kremlin‘s lead, United Russia deputies at all levels have little 
incentive to embrace the role of youth in politics and to question their own attitudes towards 
young people. 
Indeed, as noted in Chapter 4, even the Young Guard itself displayed such resigned 
acceptance of United Russia‘s failure to implement its declared youth quota and of the 
difficulties faced by aspiring young politicians as to indicate the perceived inevitability of 
these things and the futility of appealing to the Kremlin for support on this. In response to 
questions from this author, the Young Guard asserted that the youth quota should be viewed 
as a platform to allow competent young candidates to compete fairly with older candidates. 
                                                 
156 Correspondence with the author, 25 March 2009. 
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―Who needs politicians who have gained power without any competition, without a struggle 
and without experience?‖ the Young Guard asks.157  Thus, from this perspective it is only 
right that those young candidates, who the Young Guard supported and prepared to take up 
United Russia‘s 20% youth quota on its party list for elections to the State Duma, should have 
found it difficult to get a place on the list and even that most of them should not succeed on 
this occasion. According to the Young Guard, the quota is a tool to assist younger candidates 
in addition to other resources and candidates‘ own skills and abilities. It is not a means in 
itself of getting young people into power. The emphasis here is again placed on young 
people‘s own ‗deficiencies‘ to realistically expect to gain a place on United Russia‘s party list 
even with the introduction of the youth quota. And again there is the same tendency, even 
among youth representatives, to push the blame away from United Russia and onto young 
people. In this respect, some of the blame for these shortcomings must lie with the youth 
movements themselves for failing to attempt to push for further youth representation and for 
accepting instead the reward of a few key political positions for its leaders (noted in Chapter 
5).   
 
Critical thinking 
The second significant shortcoming, as far as the youth movements‘ contribution to 
participants‘ political efficacy and critical skills is concerned, is the lack of scope for internal 
debate provided by Nashi and the Young Guard. Despite encouraging young people to take an 
active part in politics and society as well as seeking to provide them with equal opportunities 
for their self-realisation, Nashi and the Young Guard both restrict the scope for internal debate 
                                                 
157 Response from the Young Guard’s press office to this author, 20 May 2009 
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within the youth movements. This is a throwback to the discussion of Nashi and the Young 
Guard‘s contribution to pluralistic politics in Chapter 3 where the youth movements‘ impact 
on the marginalisation of opposition groups was considered. Similarly, though the lack of 
scope for internal debate is exacerbated by the youth movements‘ dominance and the degree 
of legitimacy gained from having state support, it must also be attributed to the ethos of the 
youth movements themselves and their own desire to eliminate alternatives and ingratiate 
themselves with the incumbent regime.   
The severity of Nashi‘s attack on opposition groups alone (discussed previously in 
Chapter 3) is enough to deter internal dissent within the youth movement and thus to stifle 
democratic debate and the expression of individual beliefs. Yet, in addition, Nashi‘s portrayal 
of the immediate threat of Russia being taken over by imperialists should young people not 
support the incumbent regime and stave off the Western-sponsored opposition at election-time 
attaches grave danger to the prospect of young people‘s failing political support.158 
Furthermore, Nashi‘s repeated conflation of the expression of alternative political viewpoints 
with being unpatriotic reinforces participants‘ implicit understanding that there is no room for 
questioning the youth movement‘s political stance on any level. Although Nashi leaders 
sought to emphasise their encouragement of genuine debate and discussion among 
participants at Seliger in an interview with this author, personal experience of Seliger 2008 
can attest to the doctrinaire nature in which the youth movement requires acceptance of its 
political beliefs among participants. While there was much debate and scope for independent 
thinking and initiative as far as business, innovation and modernisation were concerned, 
questions of politics or the incumbent regime‘s performance were sacrosanct. Such 
                                                 
158 Wilson uses the term ‘green gates stratagem’ to refer to “the artificial polarisation of choice, usually 
involving the threat of après moi, le deluge, and/or ‘greater evil’ myths of democracy in danger or scarecrow 
nationalists taking power” (2005, Virtual Politics: Political Technology and the Corruption of Post-Soviet 
Democracy, available at http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/9324-5.cfm, last accessed 11 August 2011).  
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dogmatism and its negative impact on the developmental democratic effects of Nashi, as far 
as promoting members‘ capacity for critical thinking is concerned, is as much the result of the 
youth movement‘s own strictures and intolerance (although these may themselves represent 
an attempt to ingratiate itself with the regime) as it is of having state-sponsorship and the 
Kremlin‘s general strategy of marginalising the opposition. 
 While the Young Guard has adopted a far less aggressive attitude towards the 
opposition than Nashi, it nevertheless requires a similar level of unquestioning loyalty from 
its members. In fact, being a smaller, more hierarchical group, under the direct watch of 
United Russia and with an exclusive focus on politics, it would be fairer to say that the Young 
Guard places greater demands on the behaviour and beliefs of its members. When asked how 
the Young Guard deals with internal conflicts or differences of opinion within the youth 
movement, Andrei Tatarinov (member of the Young Guard‘s political council) declared there 
to be ―no internal conflicts at all‖ in the Young Guard:  
We share a common task, common aims, so we don‘t have any serious conflict, 
not like Yabloko thank God and I hope there won‘t be any in the future.159 
Tatarinov‘s statement makes an interesting allusion to the trade-off between greater freedom 
of opinion and group unity by comparing Yabloko and the Young Guard – the suggestion 
being that expecting members to adhere to a certain set of political beliefs and to always 
support the movement‘s stance makes the group more unified and therefore stronger in 
pursuing its ambitions and seeing off the opposition. However, the artificiality of such 
complete unity and commonality becomes apparent when the ‗Radov incident‘ (referred to 
previously in Chapter 5) is considered. Former member of the Young Guard‘s Central Staff 
                                                 
159 Author’s interview with Andrei Tatarinov, Moscow, 10 July 2008 
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and Political Council, Alexei Radov, quit the movement in December 2007 after becoming 
disillusioned with United Russia‘s broken promises and rhetoric of greater power to youth.160  
Unwilling to admit that United Russia had let the youth movement down, the Young Guard 
condemned Radov‘s actions and, via a series of interviews and articles published on the 
movement‘s website, prominent Young Guard leaders and activists attacked Radov for his 
criticism of United Russia.
161
 In the case of the Young Guard, the youth movement‘s 
dependence on the United Russia party compounds its intolerance of alternative opinions or 
unsanctioned behaviour among its members. Radov‘s criticism of United Russia not only 
aggravated tensions between the party and the Young Guard by displeasing United Russia, 
but also potentially undermined the Young Guard‘s position in terms of its support from 
United Russia and its stature in the eyes of young Russians. It is worth noting, however, that 
such restrictions on internal debate imposed by Nashi and the Young Guard are not confined 
to state-sponsored associations. For instance, the liberal democratic opposition party Yabloko 
also requires strict loyalty from its members. In December 2009 Ilya Yashin (leader of 
Molodezhnoe Yabloko – Youth Yabloko) was compelled to leave the party over his 
involvement with ‗Solidarity‘ (a coalition opposition group) when there were no such public 
accusations or criticisms as Radov had made of United Russia.
162
 
Overall, it is possible to say that the ability of Nashi and the Young Guard to change 
perceptions of young people in Russian politics and society has been determined primarily by 
the state. Although the youth movements have played a significant role in framing perceptions 
                                                 
160  Kommersant, No.2 (3819), 15 January 2008, ‘U liudei net shansov stat’ dazhe pomoshchnikami deputatov’, 
available at www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=842206&print=true, last accessed 4 September 2010. 
161 For example, see 
www.molgvardia.ru/ideologicheskiy_otdel/nadezhda_orlova_hrustno_kogda_nastoyaszii_buntar_prevraszaets
ya_v_pogremushku.html or www.molgvardia.ru/peredovaya_gazeta/_detskii_sad_pryamo_i_nalevo_.html  
162 For details of Yabloko’s decision to ban its members from participating in certain political groups, see 
http://www.theotherrussia.org/2009/12/21/yabloko-bans-members-from-other-political-groups/, last 
accessed 28 February 2011.  
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of youth since 2005, realistically, any shift in perceptions of the role of young Russians noted 
in this chapter is attributable first and foremost to heightened Kremlin interest in youth 
following the ‗Orange Revolution‘ in Ukraine and the desire of political groups to tap in to 
youth as a potential source of support. Moreover, in the face of a lack of genuine Kremlin 
support for any systematic increase in youth political representation, the youth movements 
were unable to alter negative perceptions of aspiring young politicians among State Duma 
deputies belonging to the United Russia party (their supposed ally in their campaign to give 
‗power to youth!‘).  Finally, although both Nashi and the Young Guard have imposed tight 
constraints on the scope for internal debate within the youth movements beyond that which is 
strictly necessary to retain state approval and have done so on their own initiative, this is 
clearly in accordance with the Kremlin‘s wishes and is influenced by precedents of the state‘s 
castigatory action towards wayward political groups as well as the desire to ingratiate the 
youth movements with the Kremlin and United Russia. 
 
Out of control 
The final section of this chapter asserts that the developmental democratic effects of Nashi 
and the Young Guard on individual participants are as much dependent on young people 
themselves as they are on the youth movements‘ strategies, the socio-political environment or 
on having state sponsorship. This argument is advanced by three key points, which will be 
discussed in turn below. Firstly, that despite expectations of their demise in the post-electoral 
environment, the youth movements have remained active in the face of dwindling Kremlin 
interest. Secondly, that the propensity for activists to become politically engaged regardless of 
the state‘s intentions or the will of Nashi and Young Guard leaders must be considered. 
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Finally, in the case of Nashi, that increasingly the members themselves have gained some 
degree of control over the movement‘s development and have thus reduced the scope for 
either the Kremlin or the youth movement‘s leaders to determine its future.   
 
 
Post-election sustainability 
With the completion of the 2007-8 electoral cycle and the elimination of the immediate threat 
of a Russian ‗coloured revolution‘, rumours began to circulate of the Kremlin‘s fading interest 
in supporting the youth movements‘ development and consequently of the movements‘, and 
in particular Nashi‘s, imminent demise.163 These rumours were fuelled when Yakemenko 
stepped down as Nashi‘s leader in December 2007 in order to take up a position as head of the 
newly created State Committee for Youth Affairs and, at the end of January 2008, new leader 
Nikita Borovikov announced the movement‘s reorganisation (referred to previously in this 
thesis), which involved closing down all but five of Nashi‘s fifty regional branches. At 
Nashi‘s annual camp at Lake Seliger in July 2008 the total number of participants was less 
than five thousand, half as many as at the previous camp in 2007. Taken together with the 
conspicuous absence of high-profile Kremlin figures in comparison to previous years, the 
depleted number of participants added weight to earlier suppositions of Nashi‘s post-electoral 
                                                 
163 For example, see Heller (2008), Savina, Taratuta & Shevchuk (2008) Nashi stali chuzhimi, Kommersant, 29 
January, Halpin, T. (2008) ‘Vladimir Putin’s youth army Nashi loses purpose’, The Times, 22 July; and Sean 
Guillory, ‘Nashi: Is it really the end?’, The Exile (22 April 2008) available at 
http://www.exile.ru/articles/detail.php?ARTICLE_ID=18776&IBLOCK_ID=35&PAGE=4, last accessed 2 Feb 2011. 
Predictions of the Young Guard’s imminent demise were less forthcoming, probably owing to the less 
controversial and lesser publicised status of the Young Guard in comparison to Nashi as well as the fact that, 
being youth branch of United Russia, the Young Guard is far more likely to continue to exist in one form or 
another even when state sponsorship dries up for pro-regime youth movements. Consequently, this section 
focuses on Nashi and not the Young Guard. 
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downfall and led to comments that Nashi was outdated, without purpose and struggling to 
attract participants or state recognition. However, two years on and Nashi has survived the 
post-election period and has even expanded its reach into Russia‘s regions. In light of the 
ostensible decline in Nashi‘s favour with the regime and with the benefit of hindsight, this 
study contends that expectations of the movement‘s post-electoral demise have not come to 
pass because they failed to take into account the agency of Nashi leaders and activists 
themselves in influencing the Kremlin‘s decisions and actions towards the youth movement. 
Expectations of the demise of Nashi were based on the flawed assumption that members of 
these state-sponsored pro-regime youth movements are passive agents of the Kremlin‘s will 
and therefore incapable of sustaining the movement in the longer term should state support 
wane. This assumption is prevalent in existing narratives on Nashi and is common to both 
dominant discourses regarding the youth movement identified by this author – the ‗creeping 
authoritarianism‘ discourse, held by opposition to the incumbent Russian regime, which 
views Nashi as an attempt by the Russian state to undermine the development of independent 
youth political movements; and the ‗defending Russia‘ discourse, which portrays Nashi as a 
legitimate response to external threats to the sovereignty of the Russian nation and is favoured 
by the Kremlin and those who support the incumbent Russian regime.
164
   
According to the ‗creeping authoritarianism‘ discourse, the development of Nashi is 
considered to be symptomatic of the Russian regime‘s ongoing strategy to crush internal 
dissent and reinforce its own dominance.  From this perspective, Nashi is perceived to be part 
of an internal political quest to disarm any potential rivals and to stamp out dissent.
165
 As 
such, the movement‘s development is not seen as a legitimate response to external threats to 
                                                 
164 These dominant discourses were first identified and elaborated in a previous publication by this author 
(Atwal, 2009, p.744). 
165 Examples of Western academic work that may be described as belonging to the ‘creeping authoritarianism’ 
discourse on Nashi include Vinatier (2007) and particularly Schwirtz (2007).  
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Russia‘s sovereignty, as it claims to be. Instead, it is believed that the movement was initiated 
by the increasingly authoritarian regime in order to capitalise on Russian youth energies 
inspired by the ‗coloured revolutions‘ and to use the apparent ‗orange‘ threat as a catalyst for 
achieving its ambition of political domination.  In a wry appraisal of the role played by Nashi 
activists, the ‗creeping authoritarianism‘ discourse holds that, through Nashi, the state sought 
to use young Russians themselves to close down any opportunity for independent youth 
political participation. In this way, the state‘s interest in youth after the ‗Orange Revolution‘ 
was only a ploy to incorporate potentially subversive young Russians into the service of the 
state, boosting regime support and diverting vital energy, resources and attention away from 
genuinely engaging youth political endeavours.  Instead, an aggressive patriotic solidarity was 
encouraged amongst Nashi activists, which could be manipulated and directed against any 
perceived potential political rivals at the behest of the state. The Soviet Komsomol Youth 
League and the Hitler Youth have been used as points of reference in ‗creeping 
authoritarianism‘ analyses of Nashi, thus betraying the sinister and rather grandiose dynamic 
bestowed upon Nashi by proponents of this discourse: ―For most people around the world, an 
organisation like [Nashi] evokes the worst aspects of totalitarianism – where youth are 
mobilized to blindly fulfil the whims of a repressive regime.‖166  Following this logic, should 
the state no longer have any need for Nashi, then, as a hub of youth activity in an otherwise 
barren political landscape, it would begin to view the movement as a threat to its authority and 
Nashi would become the latest victim of the highly repressive, authoritarian regime that it 
helped to strengthen. 
                                                 
166 Sean Guillory, ‘Nashi: Is it really the end?’, The Exile (22 April 2008) available at 
http://www.exile.ru/articles/detail.php?ARTICLE_ID=18776&IBLOCK_ID=35&PAGE=4, last accessed 2 February 
2011. Schwirtz also highlights similarities between Nashi and the Komsomol (2007, p.80). 
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The ‗defending Russia‘ discourse invokes a more positive perspective on Russia‘s 
political course than the ‗creeping authoritarianism‘ discourse discussed above. Whereas the 
‗creeping authoritarianism‘ narrative views Nashi first and foremost as a means of extending 
the incumbent regime‘s political dominance within Russia instigated by the Kremlin itself, 
according to the ‗defending Russia‘ narrative, Nashi simply represents a defensive strategy 
adopted in response to external threats to the beleaguered Russian nation.  In this way, 
advocates of the ‗defending Russia‘ discourse assert that Nashi‘s development was supported 
by the state solely in order to resist attacks on Russia from foreign enemies, as opposed to 
itself representing part of an offensive on legitimate political alternatives within Russia. As 
such, Nashi declared its enemy not to be Russian opposition parties alone, but rather the 
loosely identified external threat of a Western-sponsored ‗liberal-fascist alliance‘ who are 
against a strong, autonomous Russia.  According to Nashi‘s manifesto, the West hopes to gain 
control over Russia by inciting a ‗coloured revolution‘ to overthrow the incumbent regime 
and ―return [Russia] to the era of ineffective and weak government and collapsed society.‖167 
Consistent with the urgent and imperialist nature of the threat to Russian state sovereignty set 
out by the ‗defending Russia‘ narrative,  Nashi‘s rightful priority and best means of defence 
was to gather together as large a number of young Russians as possible and instil them with a 
sense of patriotic duty to protect Russia from immediate danger.  Consequently, during this 
period young Russians acquired a unique importance in the defence of the Russian nation. 
However, at the same time, the necessity of young Russians‘ unity and unquestioning support 
during this time was underlined, thus sacrificing the development of autonomous political 
thinking amongst Nashi activists and consequently their active engagement.  The terms of 
play, the identity of the enemy as well as the nature of the threat were already predefined and 
                                                 
167 Nashi, 2005, ‘Manifest’, available at: http://nashi.su/manifest, last accessed 16 June 2010. 
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Nashi called upon young Russians to stand united against this external threat to the well-being 
of the entire nation.  According to Nashi‘s former leader, Vasilii Yakemenko, Nashi activists 
had a ―thorough understanding of whom they should fight and how.‖168  In this way, the onus 
is placed on the ‗enemy‘ rather than on any desire on the part of the regime itself to maintain a 
politically disengaged populace. Yet again, like the ‗creeping authoritarianism‘ discourse, the 
‗defending Russia‘ discourse infers Nashi‘s post-election demise at the hands of the state. By 
contending that Nashi received state support by virtue of its value in terms of a defensive 
strategy, the ‗defending Russia‘ discourse renders continued state support for Nashi 
contingent on the movement‘s status as guardian of state sovereignty and thus dependent on 
the continued existence of the perceived external threat to the Russian nation in the form of a 
youth-sponsored electoral revolution. With the passing of the period of risk, state support for 
the movement would naturally come to an end and, as a result, Nashi activists, mobilised 
solely on the basis of the specific threat posed to the nation by the ‗orange threat‘, would 
simply dissipate.   
Thus, despite their opposing stance on the motivation behind state-support for Nashi‘s 
development, both dominant discourses presume the passivity of Nashi activists and the 
absolute ability of the state to determine the movement‘s development. For this reason, their 
expectations of Nashi‘s post-election demise were ill-conceived and have not been realised. 
The fact that Nashi has continued to flourish in the post-election environment in the face of 
dwindling state interest is further testimony to the significance of factors other than state-
sponsorship in shaping the outcomes of participation, not least the agency of participants 
themselves. 
 
                                                 
168 Izvestiya, 2 March 2005, cited in Topalova, 2006, p.32 
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Personal political engagement 
Both of the dominant discourses identified above regarding Nashi assume that because the 
state did not desire the development of youth political engagement or did not consider it 
necessary in order to prevent a Russian ‗coloured revolution‘, therefore Nashi activists are 
categorically not politically engaged.  According to the ‗creeping authoritarianism‘ discourse, 
the political engagement of Nashi activists would have been necessarily suppressed by the 
state because the consequent emergence of genuine political debate and accountability would 
have been anathema to the authoritarian ambitions driving Nashi.  Following an inverse logic, 
the ‗defending Russia‘ discourse contends that activists‘ political engagement would have 
been suppressed by the state because Russia‘s interests would be best served at this time by 
portraying unity and strength in the face of external threats to the nation. However, despite the 
reality of the Kremlin‘s disinclination towards mass youth political engagement for reasons 
discussed previously in Chapter 4, there are many indications that, on an individual basis, 
young participants have become politically engaged. In drawing attention to the ways in 
which Nashi and the Young Guard have supported youth political engagement, this study 
emphasises not only that it would be incorrect to assume that Nashi and Young Guard 
activists are not politically engaged but also that whether or not participants become 
genuinely engaged in the political process cannot be determined by the state or the youth 
movements‘ strategies alone. Such an assumption represents a simplistic, one-dimensional 
reading of the relationship that exists between the Russian state and its subjects, imagining 
that the state has the power to prevent or even to reverse the political engagement of Nashi 
activists and/or that activists themselves are incapable of becoming politically engaged 
without the state‘s direction. This author asserts that political engagement can be nurtured or 
discouraged by its environment, but never decisively created or prevented.  
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 Regardless of the motivations or intentions that may have been behind Nashi and the 
Young Guard‘s development, simply by virtue of their identification of youth as the critical 
agent in preventing a ‗coloured revolution‘ and propelling Russia‘s future development, the 
youth movements have helped to boost the internal political efficacy of participants.
169
 
Having been disregarded as a valuable political subject in post-Soviet Russia prior to the 
‗Orange Revolution‘, following the events in Ukraine young Russians found themselves 
bestowed with a new status as political vanguard of the nation. In what has been described as 
their ―political coming of age‖ (Topalova, 2006, p.23), power and responsibility were thrust 
upon young Russians: 
Two years ago there existed a very powerful stereotype in Russia, a widely held 
perception that pensioners were the most important political force. But I would 
say that over the past two years the situation has changed towards youth, not only 
as regards the level of attention received by youth from the state and from the 
authorities, but also in terms of society‘s attitude towards youth.170 
Characteristic of their emergent political engagement at this time, in the run up to the 2007-8 
electoral cycle many Nashi activists went above and beyond assisting the prevention of a 
Russian ‗coloured revolution‘ and set about actively carving a political niche for themselves 
and pursuing a career in politics. Many Nashi and Young Guard activists (as well as young 
people not affiliated to either youth movement) have sought to pursue a career in politics by 
                                                 
169 According to Karaman, internal political efficacy refers to a person’s perception of his own ability to 
understand and participate in politics, while external political efficacy refers to a person’s perception of the 
ability of political institutions to respond effectively to and satisfy their needs (2004, p.31-2). It is participants’ 
internal political efficacy that interests this analysis of the developmental democratic effects of Nashi and the 
Young Guard. 
170 Author’s interview with Roman Romanov, Federal Staff of the Young Guard of United Russia, Moscow, 10 
July 2008. 
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participating in PolitZavod.
171
 Moreover, as noted previously, a number of Nashi commissars 
and Young Guard leaders have gone on to take up positions in formal political institutions 
including the Federal State Duma. In testimony to activists‘ political engagement as well as 
the unanticipated nature of their dynamism and political aptitude, Nashi commissar Maria 
Drokova asserts that the youth movement‘s purpose transformed from the singular and short-
term task of organising mass rallies of patriotic young people who support the current 
political course and doing everything possible to prevent an ‗orange revolution‘ from 
happening in Russia, to helping activists carve political careers for themselves and position 
themselves at the forefront of Russia‘s development.  
[...] As far as I am aware, at the beginning at least, [Nashi‘s] sole task was to 
prevent an ‗orange revolution‘[...] but then there was so much power and energy 
and bright, young political personalities began to emerge from Nashi that it 
became clear that this was not the organisation‘s only task ....172 
Further indicative of their genuine engagement, beyond the thrill of participating in the 
pomp and spectacle of mass rallies in Moscow, many Nashi activists have worked hard at a 
local level, using the movement‘s funding and network of similar-minded young people in 
order to support social issues that affect them personally, such as the need for better housing 
and education as well as to provoke discussion on the military conscript, Russia‘s 
demographic crisis and other political questions.  For instance, Nashi has actively campaigned 
to raise awareness of the problems of corruption in the education system (as noted in Chapter 
2). Yet, this is not to say that all of Nashi‘s activities on a local level are driven by members‘ 
                                                 
171 Discussed previously in Part 2 of this thesis, PolitZavod (‘Political Factory’) is the competition organised 
annually by the Young Guard, in which the winners become assistants to parliamentary deputies or else are 
themselves awarded a place on United Russia’s party list as part of its youth quota with the prospect of 
potentially becoming regional or even federal parliamentary deputies. 
172 Author’s interview with Maria Drokova, Lake Seliger, 24 July 2008  
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interests. A brief look at the movement‘s activity over a defined period of time in one region 
illustrates this point: During April 2007 in Voronezh Nashi activists organised at least  nine 
seminars/roundtables on politics including the development of civil society, the meaning of 
democracy, Putin‘s Munich speech and Russia‘s political course; seven training sessions 
aimed at developing activists political skills such as public speaking; 18 actions aimed at 
reducing racism, 17 actions to denounce the opposition and incite patriotism, four actions to 
encourage healthy living, and scores of incidents of volunteering and helping society in one 
way or another (in particular children‘s homes, the elderly, blood donation and giving free 
legal advice).
173
 While some of these actions have clearly been determined by the social needs 
of that particular community or the interests of young people, others appear to have been 
‗artificially‘ stimulated from above, such as discussion on the ‗meaning of democracy‘ or 
Putin‘s Munich speech! Evidently, Nashi members are aware of their obligations towards 
their sponsors and of the political reason for the youth movement‘s development. 
Nonetheless, the sheer volume of activity in Voronezh alone attests to the level of 
participation and input by Nashi activists above and beyond any campaign to marginalise the 
opposition that may have been foisted upon them from above. 
 
Autonomy and agency 
Finally, in a way that has not been possible for Young Guard members, this thesis asserts that 
Nashi activists have gained a degree of autonomy from the state. Moreover, this degree of 
autonomy stems from activists‘ political engagement (noted in the previous section), which 
itself extends Kremlin support beyond its initial intentions. Before proceeding any further, it 
                                                 
173 Author’s own reckoning based on reports of Nashi’s activity in Voronezh published on Nashi’s official 
website, available at http://www.nashi.su/voronezh, last accessed 8 January 2009. 
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is important to make it clear that this element of a growing autonomy from the state of Nashi 
activists operates strictly within certain limits, which result from having state sponsorship. 
Emphasising the role of activists‘ agency here is not intended to deny the ultimate ability of 
the Kremlin to shut the youth movement down or hinder its activity (although the potential 
repercussions may cause it to think twice before doing so). Discussion of Nashi activists‘ 
growing autonomy refers only to their emergent ability to increasingly shape the course of the 
movement‘s development and to set the agenda for regional activity – an ability which 
nonetheless fundamentally challenges existing perceptions of state-sponsored participation. 
While confirming the unexpected nature of activists‘ political engagement, in the 
afore-mentioned quotation, Nashi commissar, Maria Drokova, also portrays this as a positive 
and revitalising development, which has seen activists themselves become the driving force 
with Nashi as a structure serving simply as the vehicle or means of activists‘ self-realisation. 
However, although it may be that the emergence of political engagement among Nashi 
activists was genuinely welcomed by Nashi leaders, in fact, at least until the elections were 
over, neither Nashi leaders nor the state had much choice but to accept this development as 
part of the course for  preventing a Russian ‗coloured revolution‘.  Having enabled the youth 
movement‘s rapid mobilisation, the Kremlin was rendered powerless to take any aggressive 
action to halt the development of activists‘ political engagement before the elections were 
over for fear of triggering instability. Being thus unable to clamp down on the movement‘s 
development at this time, it became in the state‘s best interests to be seen to support the 
promotion of youth political engagement through Nashi on some level in an attempt to 
channel its powerful energy into support for the incumbent regime and to maintain some 
control over the movement during the elections.  Similarly, for Nashi leaders, reflecting 
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activists‘ aspirations for political self-realisation became essential in order to sustain activists‘ 
interest and support.  
Nevertheless, it is argued that the welcoming response of Nashi leaders to the 
emergence of political engagement among its members represented more than just a need to 
accommodate this turn of events and pay lip service to young Russians‘ political self-
realisation until the completion of the elections. Once they realised that the state was 
powerless to suppress the development of activists‘ political engagement or rein in the 
movement before the elections were over, Nashi leaders took immediate steps to take 
advantage of this opportunity by reorganising the movement with the aim of strengthening its 
position in relation to the state and hence securing its future.
174
 Discussing the movement‘s 
reorganisation in an interview with this author, Nikita Borovikov (Yakemenko‘s successor as 
Nashi leader) explained:  
The state should only act as a facilitator for youth politics. It should not try to 
over-organise things. The State Committee for Youth Affairs should not 
implement measures at the regional level; it should only provide the opportunities 
for youth‘s self-realisation by creating institutions for development and not try to 
do everything itself.
175
 
However, while seeking to reduce the state‘s ability to control the movement, the action taken 
by Nashi‘s leadership has simultaneously undermined its own influence over Nashi activists 
and has thus provided the conditions for the development of bottom up youth participation in 
Russia. Having delegated oversight of the movement‘s development in the regions to federal 
                                                 
174 The significance of Nashi’s reorganisation for the democratic effects of participation has been discussed at 
various points in this study as appropriate to the particular area of democratic effects focused on.  
175 Author’s interview with Nikita Borovikov, Lake Seliger, 21 July 2008 
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project coordinators and abolished almost all regional branches from which Nashi commissars 
previously monitored activists at close quarters (as described in Chapter 2‘s discussion of the 
movement‘s reorganisation), Nashi leaders have set up a chain of command which distances 
not only the state but also themselves from grass root activism. In this way, the same 
difficulty of controlling the movement‘s development in the regions following the 
dismantling of the movement‘s centralised structure befalls Nashi‘s leaders as well as the 
state. As Drokova acknowledges, it is ―simply not possible for all of the projects in the 
regions to answer to the centre.‖176 Released from the pressure of direct oversight, Nashi 
activists are thus able to take advantage of the opportunities provided by the youth movement 
while having the space to develop as politically autonomous individuals.
177
 
There is a notable difference between the centre and the regions in this respect. With 
the development of Nashi‘s projects in Moscow, St. Petersburg and the central regions it 
seems that many of those involved were members of Nashi during the 2007-8 electoral cycle 
and have simply taken on a different role in the newly-configured movement. Moreover, the 
close-knit nature of Nashi‘s central group has invariably resulted in some reliance on 
friendship networks for recruiting federal heads for the new projects.  However, in the 
regions, to where Nashi extended its activity following its 2008 reorganisation, many 
participants are relatively new to Nashi.  In these regions, Nashi‘s projects have often 
attracted young Russians already involved in some kind of youth initiative in their hometown 
or possessing expertise in relevant fields such as business or economics. These new activists, 
or at least a significant number of those present at the movement‘s annual camp at Lake 
                                                 
176 Author’s interview with Maria Drokova, Lake Seliger, 21 July 2008 
177 As always, in the case of these Kremlin-sponsored organisations, any such ‘autonomy’ operates strictly 
within certain limits. If Nashi activists in a particular region developed a project that the Kremlin did not 
approve or which contravened Nashi’s political stance on a particular issue and this was discovered, then their 
activities would be curtailed by Nashi’s leadership if not by the Kremlin. 
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Seliger in 2008, take what they want from Nashi according to their own agendas, not 
necessarily subscribing to the movement‘s political stance on certain issues or its methods. 
For example, some participants at Seliger 2008 went as far as to say that they came to the 
camp to network and learn about funding opportunities for youth initiatives in their region, 
and were willing to put up with Nashi‘s ―ridiculous artifice and regimented approach so as to 
receive Nashi‘s support and funding for their regional projects‖, after all they ―believe in 
Russia‘s future and the potential which they personally possess to improve things.‖178   
As noted in Chapter 3, as a result of Nashi‘s reorganisation much of the movement‘s 
activity is now conducted at the micro-level with limited coordination by federal Nashi staff 
beyond securing funding and development support. Activists are thus able to steer their own 
course of political participation, not only opting in or out of various Nashi projects but also 
feeling free to adapt the projects to the needs of their area as they perceive them. For example, 
on return from Nashi‘s 2008 summer camp, young people from Novosibirsk already involved 
in working with youth in their region decided to develop only three of Nashi‘s projects: 
Mishki (Little Bears – a project aimed at working with children), Cadres for the 
Modernisation of the Country and Start-Up. As one young activist from Novosibirsk put it, 
―we shouldn't think that it is our duty to do everything exactly as [Belokonev] or other 
managers of Nashi want us to do. It is enough just to catch an idea and update it for our 
region.‖179 Ironically, contravening Western portrayals of the youth movement as well as 
Kremlin and even Nashi leaders‘ accounts, one of the participants at Seliger 2008 (among the 
12 with whom this author set up camp) revealed that she was receiving funding from both 
Nashi and a prominent American NGO to continue developing youth initiatives in her region 
after witnessing the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. 
                                                 
178 Informal talks with participants at Nashi’s annual camp, Lake Seliger, 21 July 2008 
179 Author’s personal correspondence with Nashi activists from Novosibirsk, 22 December 2008 
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Seeking to ensure young activists remain loyal to the regime by effectively buying 
their allegiance to Nashi and by implication also to the state, Nashi‘s role now is increasingly 
that of a facilitator, providing access to a vast network of support and sponsorship that 
activists themselves can employ to develop youth initiatives in their region as they see fit. At 
Seliger 2008 hundreds of initiatives developed by participants found sponsors from within the 
government, regional authorities or the business community. For example, the project 
Molodezhnaia Shkola Predprinimatel’stva (Youth School of Enterprise) managed to secure 
funding to enable it to ―begin training 100,000 young people in 2009. These young people 
[were to] be trained in starting up their own business and business planning and the winners 
[were to] receive credits to begin their own business venture.‖180 In this way, it is possible to 
note the willingness of the Kremlin and Nashi leaders to allow participants a degree of 
autonomy in order to retain youth support. 
 
Conclusion 
Above all else, Chapter 6 has demonstrated the limits of the state‘s ability to control the 
outcomes of participation in the case of Nashi and the Young Guard. While other chapters in 
this thesis have highlighted the significance of factors other than having state support in 
shaping the democratic effects of state-sponsored participation and/or have demonstrated the 
capacity of state sponsorship to support some positive democratic effects of participation 
alongside exploring the constraints of state sponsorship (conclusions which are all 
corroborated in this chapter too), it is only really this chapter that has pushed the assertion of 
the inability of the state to fully control the outcomes of participation that was put forward in 
                                                 
180 Nashi ‘Itogom foruma Seliger-2008 stali sotni partnerskikh soglashennii s pervymi litsami gosudarstva’, 25 
July 2008, available at: http://www.nashi.su/news/25658, last accessed 12 January 2009. 
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Chapter 1. Rejecting dominant depictions of Nashi members as passive vehicles of the 
Kremlin‘s will, this chapter has contended that many Nashi and Young Guard participants 
have become politically engaged regardless of the lack of state support for mass political 
engagement: They are active participants who are genuinely interested in politics, whether 
that be in terms of becoming a politician or in terms of community work tackling social issues 
of concern to them in their local region. However much the Kremlin is able to direct the 
nature and results of participation, as has been demonstrated on numerous occasions in the 
course of this study, it cannot determine the value attached to participation by young people 
themselves.  
 Further unique to this chapter is the evidence of participants themselves influencing 
the democratic effects of participation. Previously, discussion of the significance of agency 
has referred only to decisions made and actions taken by the youth movements‘ leaders; the 
input of rank and file activists themselves has not factored in investigation of the impact of 
state support on the public sphere or institutional democratic effects of Nashi and the Young 
Guard. In contrast, Chapter 6 has identified the growing autonomy of Nashi activists from the 
state. Enabled by the emergence of activists‘ political engagement, measures taken by Nashi 
leaders to reorganise the movement with the aim of securing its future have contributed to a 
discernible shift in the balance of power away from both the state and Nashi leaders in favour 
of Nashi activists. Given the decreased ability of the state and Nashi leaders to assert top-
down control over the movement, activists have a unique opportunity to influence the 
movement‘s development and the terms of their own participation within certain limits. 
Should Nashi leaders seek to secure their own positions and preserve the movement‘s 
integrity they would need to take their direction from below now and act in accordance with 
activists‘ interests and desires. In the absence of heavy handed state intervention or the 
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withdrawal of state support, in the foreseeable future Nashi would then act as an umbrella 
organisation offering support and oversight from afar and effectively providing politically 
engaged young Russians with a framework within which they can develop their own 
initiatives. 
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CHAPTER 7 – CIVIC VIRTUES: FROM STREET POLITICS TO PARTY POLITICS? 
Chapter 7 considers the democratic credentials of Nashi and the Young Guard themselves in 
terms of the youth movements‘ ethos, i.e. what the youth movements stand for and the way 
that they go about trying to achieve this. Though this might perhaps have been a more 
obvious starting point for considering the democratic effects of participation in Nashi and the 
Young Guard than an end point, one of the central tenets of this thesis is that the democratic 
effects of participation should not be prejudged based on the intentions of those involved in 
initiating participation. In the same way that the Kremlin‘s motivations for supporting the 
development of Nashi and the Young Guard alone cannot determine the democratic effects of 
participation, so the designs of the youth movements‘ leadership do not dictate the outcomes 
of participation. As noted in Chapter 1, the best of intentions may fail to achieve the positive 
results expected of it and even have a negative impact if factors such as the socio-political 
environment and the agency of participants themselves are not taken into account. Similarly, 
it has been asserted that the pursuit of non-democratic ends may unintentionally support or 
even necessitate some positive democratic effects. For this reason, analysis of the democratic 
credentials of Nashi and the Young Guard‘s ethos and methods has been deliberately left until 
the end of this thesis in order to reinforce the message that the democratic effects of 
participation in the case of Nashi and the Young Guard are not dependent on this and also to 
avoid prejudicing the earlier analysis of public sphere and institutional democratic effects. 
Rather than offer a breakdown of the youth movements‘ declared goals and formal 
setup, this chapter takes Rosenblum‘s lead and focuses on ―the way the day-to-day activities 
of [Nashi and the Young Guard] promote or inhibit characteristically liberal democratic 
virtues – tolerance, say, or fairness‖ (1998, p.4). According to Rosenblum, previous studies of 
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civil society and the effects of associational life have been ―disturbingly inattentive to the 
dynamics of membership [....] Standard approaches assume that a group‘s formative effects on 
members can be predicted on the basis of its express purpose or formal organisation‖ (1998, 
p.47).
181
 There is a certain degree of overlap with the previous chapter in the sense that Nashi 
and the Young Guard‘s contribution to civic engagement and promoting young people‘s 
rights and responsibilities, working in the community with voluntary projects and so on might 
all be considered civic virtues. Moreover, the lack of scope for internal dissent and the 
practice of stifling debate on political issues within Nashi and the Young Guard as well as the 
youth movements‘ intolerance towards the opposition, all considered previously in this study, 
could also come under the heading of the youth movements‘ day to day activities and 
certainly have implications for their contribution to the development of ‗liberal-democratic 
virtues‘.  
In order to avoid repetition and to put forward a coherent and persuasive analysis of 
the impact of state support on the developmental democratic effects of Nashi and the Young 
Guard as far as civic virtues are concerned, this chapter adopts a more specific approach to the 
subject. It explores the development of Nashi and the Young Guard from the perspective of 
the political behaviour and associated norms cultivated by the youth movements. Their 
political activity between 2005 and 2010 is tracked in order to build up a profile of the forms 
of political participation which they promote. Three distinct chronological phases in the youth 
movements‘ development over this period are outlined and analysed in turn.  
 Firstly, the period 2005-7 when Nashi and to a far lesser extent the Young Guard were 
engaged in street politics. Newly organised and keen to make their mark, at this time 
                                                 
181 “The significance of association depends on the experiences individuals bring to it [....] So I caution against 
the unwarranted assumption that the effects of an association on members can be predicted on the basis of a 
group’s formal purpose or system of internal governance” (Rosenblum, 1998, p.7). 
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the youth movements‘ actions were to a large extent driven by the recent experience of 
the ‗Orange Revolution‘ in Ukraine.  
 Secondly, the period 2007-8 when the event of the elections to the State Duma and the 
completion of the youth movements‘ task to thwart any potential youth-sponsored 
‗coloured revolution‘ appeared to offer the potential for the youth movements‘ to 
retire from street politics and settle into the world of party politics with all the rules 
and restrictions that accompany entry into the formal political arena. 
 Thirdly, the period 2008-10 when, struggling to adapt to the post-election 
environment, Nashi has sought to confer a sense of legitimacy and authority to its 
actions, but at times has resorted to tried and tested tactics of intimidation in order to 
achieve its goals and draw attention to its cause.  
Variations in the methods employed by the youth movements are investigated in order to 
identify the relative significance of state-sponsorship in shaping the youth movements‘ 
developmental democratic effects as far as their ‗civic virtues‘ are concerned.  
 
Street warfare (2005-7) 
Several analyses of politics in Russia since 2005 have drawn attention to the rising 
significance of ‗street politics‘.182  For example, Ilya Yashin (former leader of Yabloko 
Youth) asserts that young political leaders today need to be ‗street orators‘, able to lead 
                                                 
182 For example, see Vremia Novostei, Ulichnaia Politika (2 April 2007) available at 
www.vremya.ru/2007/56/13/175169.html, last accessed 19 June 2010; Schwirtz 2007; Yashin 2006; and 
Yashin, 2007 ‘Rossii segodnia nuzhny ulichnye oratory’, Rosbalt, (19 March 2007) available at 
yabloko.ru/Publ/2007/2007_03/070320_rosb_yashin.html, last accessed 19 June 2010.  
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people onto the street and to stand in front of police cordons.
183
  The origins of the rise in 
street politics at this time appear to be straightforward: Firstly, their engineered exclusion 
from the formal political arena forced opposition groups onto the streets in an attempt to gain 
publicity for their cause and the pro-Kremlin youth organisations followed as a Kremlin-
sponsored counter-measure. Speaking in April 2007, Alexei Mitrofanov, LDPR State Duma 
deputy offered an interesting commentary on street politics in contemporary Russia noting: 
―In normal countries a person runs around on the street for 10-15 years and then becomes 
prime-minister, but [in Russia] we have someone who used to be prime-minster and now runs 
around on the streets.‖184  Secondly, the example of the potential power of ordinary people 
taking to the streets en masse during the ‗Orange Revolution‘ set a precedent and opened up 
opportunities for mobilisation in the run up to the elections that proved too tempting to be 
denied by the opposition or the Kremlin alike. In demonstration of its power and resources 
Nashi launched its mass actions with a gathering of around 50,000 young people in Moscow 
on 15
th
 May 2005 entitled Nasha Pobeda (Our Victory) in a symbolic act of veterans of the 
‗Great Patriotic War‘ handing over the baton of the struggle to maintain Russia‘s 
independence to Russia‘s youth. Since then the youth movement has regularly staged such 
mass actions, including organising a ‗Russian March‘ to celebrate National Unity Day in 
Moscow on November 4
th
 2009 which attracted 20,000-30,000 participants
185
 and also 
continuing its annual ‗Our Victory‘ rally by reportedly gathering more than 65,000 young 
                                                 
183 Yashin, 2007 ‘Rossii segodnia nuzhny ulichnye oratory’, Rosbalt, (19 March 2007) available at 
yabloko.ru/Publ/2007/2007_03/070320_rosb_yashin.html, last accessed 19 June 2010. 
184 Vremia Novostei, Ulichnaia Politika (2 April 2007) available at www.vremya.ru/2007/56/13/175169.html, 
last accessed 19 June 2010 – presumably Mitrofanov is referring to Mikhail Kasyanov (former prime-minister of 
the Russian Federation 2000-2004) or Boris Nemtsov (deputy prime-minister 1997-8). 
185 Nashi, Na russkom marche Dvizheniia Nashi Vse Svoi (4 Nov 2009) available at www.nashi.su/news/27600, 
last accessed 19 June 2010. 
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Russians to commemorate the 65
th
 anniversary of Victory Day on May 15
th
 2010.
186
  In 
accordance with its lesser size and stature as well as its emphasis on attracting a certain 
calibre of young cadres capable of pursuing a successful political career rather than on taking 
the battle to the opposition on the streets, the Young Guard has held fewer mass street actions 
than Nashi and these have been attended by fewer participants. Nonetheless, the Young Guard 
did hold rallies and marches in the run up to the 2007-8 electoral cycle, most notably its 
‗March of the Contented‘ rally in April 2007, which gathered around 10,000 supporters on the 
outskirts of Moscow in response to the series of ‗Dissenters Marches‘ organised by the 
opposition. The Young Guard also staged a protest on the highway in Vladivostok in July 
2007 against the state of Russia‘s roads, complete with a monument of a broken wheel.  
In the above sense, ‗street politics‘ refers simply to mass rallies and public 
demonstrations that make use of slogans, posters, symbols and other theatrical elements, and 
would include incidents such as the pensioners‘ protest against the monetisation of welfare 
benefits in January 2005. Moreover, it is in this sense of the term that the Young Guard may 
be said to have engaged in ‗street politics‘. However, with regard to youth politics in 
contemporary Russia, and more specifically the role of groups such as Nashi in street politics, 
it is the physicality of the battle between the opposition and Kremlin loyalists that stands out. 
Street politics in this sense alludes to the rough, no-holds-barred politics of the street 
compared to the ‗columned halls‘ and privileges of party politics (Schwirtz, 2007, p.75). Head 
of the analytical department of VTsIOM, Leonti Byzov, suggests as much in his 2007 
assessment of the rise in street politics in Russia, where he identifies the purpose of street 
politics for pro-Kremlin groups to be combative and destructive: 
                                                 
186 Nashi, Na aktsii ‘Nashi Pobeda’ razdali 70 tysiach patronov (15 May 2010), available at 
www.nashi.su/news/31633, last accessed 19 June 2010. 
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If we analyse which political forces benefit from holding marches then it becomes 
evident that for United Russia, for example, such marches are not necessary. 
However, [United Russia] has combat youth brigades such as Nashi, which are 
able to specialise in precisely that which United Russia is unable to. Mostly, 
though, their slogans are negative – always trying to deal someone a blow.187 
The Young Guard‘s position as youth branch of United Russia subjects the youth movement 
to many of the constraints and rules of decorum of the formal political arena. For this reason, 
the Young Guard has played no part in the tactics of intimidation bordering on the illegal, 
discussed below, that Nashi has engaged in under the heading of ‗street politics‘ broadly 
defined. In contrast, the true essence of Nashi‘s role in street politics in Russia has been its 
more contentious activities when the movement has pursued a strategy of direct conflict with 
and intimidation of the opposition. The most likely explanation for this initial variation 
between the methods employed by Nashi and the Young Guard is the Kremlin‘s desire to 
have a powerful youth presence on the streets in the run up to the 2007-8 electoral cycle in 
order to intimidate protest groups inspired by the Orange Revolution in Ukraine without 
harming United Russia‘s standing by association to any potential civic disorder. In this sense, 
it could be argued that it suited the Kremlin for Nashi to act in a more intolerant and 
aggressive way than the Young Guard for fear of tainting United Russia in the process of 
seeking to eliminate opposition to the regime. 
 
 
                                                 
187 Leontii Byzov, Ulichnaia Politika, (2 April 2007: VTsIOM) available at wciom.ru/arkhiv/tematicheskii-
arkhiv/item/single/4317.html?no_cache=1&L%5B1%5D=&cHash=cb781b60f6, last accessed 19 June 2010. 
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Intimidation: Policing the streets 
Under the task heading of ‗developing a functioning civil society‘ in Nashi‘s manifesto, the 
following statement revealing Nashi‘s explicit strategy of intimidation can be found:  
We must set an example of social solidarity. Every oligarch or civil servant, street 
punk or member of a totalitarian organisation that raises its hand to one of our 
members should know that tomorrow he will have to deal with all of us.
188
 
Infamously, after speaking at a conference of the opposition coalition Drugaia Rossiia (Other 
Russia) in July 2006, British ambassador, Anthony Brenton, was repeatedly followed and 
harassed by Nashi activists in a prolonged campaign of intimidation over a period of a year 
and a half. Nashi demanded an apology from Brenton for apparently ‗insulting Russia‘ by 
suggesting that the club of ‗fascists, totalitarians and thieves were a part of civil society‘ and 
for allegedly pledging a million pounds to support their cause. Nashi celebrated victory when 
Brenton was finally replaced by Anne Pringle as British Ambassador in March 2008.
189
  In a 
similar incident, in May 2007, Nashi activists staged protests outside the Estonian embassy in 
Moscow and harassed Estonian ambassador Marina Kaljurand. Nashi protestors tore down the 
Estonian flag from the embassy building, forced entry into a hall where the Estonian 
ambassador was speaking and bombarded her car, physically intimidating the ambassador 
until she also left her post. 
In addition to the campaigns against specific individuals carried out by the youth 
movement in reaction to a particular incident, Nashi also formed two groups – Dobrovol’naia 
                                                 
188 3rd task stated on manifesto - Nashi Manifest, available at: 
http://img.nashi.su/nashi.su/admin/data/3/9/manifest1.doc, last accessed 31/01/10 . 
189 Nashi, ReBrentding Britanskovo Posolstvo (31 March 2007), available at http://nashi.su/news/23678, last 
accessed 19 June 2010. 
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Molodezhnaia Druzhina (Voluntary Youth Militia – hereafter ‗DMD‘) and Molodezhnoe 
Patrioticheskoe Dvizhenie - Stal’ (Youth Patriotic Movement – Steel – hereafter ‗Stal’)190 – 
both dedicated to intimidating the opposition on the streets. DMD is a splinter organisation of 
Nashi, established by the youth movement under Vasily Yakemenko‘s leadership in 2005 and 
remaining very much Nashi‘s project, despite formally being a separate entity.191 Ostensibly 
created to work with law enforcement agencies in order to reduce crime, DMD‘s activities 
have included patrolling the streets with police officers and engaging with disaffected gangs 
of youths to help them to turn away from drugs and crime. Unofficially, DMD acts as Nashi‘s 
‗muscle‘ providing security and maintaining order at Nashi‘s mass actions and major 
events.
192
 DMD has been at the centre of numerous allegations of provocation and violence 
carried out by Nashi against the opposition.
193
 Nashi patrols were mobilised by the authorities 
to counter opposition activity on the streets in the run up to the 2007-8 electoral cycle. More 
significantly, according to Moscow city law, Nashi‘s patrols were legally empowered to use 
force as a last resort should a lawbreaker be ‗actively disobedient‘.194 
Whereas DMD focuses on enforcing civic order in the loosest possible sense, Stal is of 
a more political bent and could be described as a radical nationalistic group. Stal views 
patriotism as a ‗matter of national security‘ and demands that patriotism should be active not 
passive.
195
 In practice, this translates into the adoption of wartime rhetoric and the 
                                                 
190 Despite its name, Stal’ is currently still recognised as being a project within Nashi. 
191 DMD’s website is available at: http://druzhina.su/  
192 At Nashi’s summer camp ‘Seliger 2008’, some of the participants themselves felt intimidated by DMD who, 
tasked with the responsibility of ensuring that everyone was following the rules of the camp, patrolled the 
camp with uniforms with the slogan Ia vizhu kak vy ne rabotaete! (I see that you are not working!). 
193 For details of DMD’s alleged violence and provocation of peaceful opposition rallies, see Guillory, ‘Nashi: Is it 
really the end?’, The Exile (22 April 2008) available at 
http://www.exile.ru/articles/detail.php?ARTICLE_ID=18776&IBLOCK_ID=35&PAGE=4, last accessed 2 Feb 2011. 
194 David Nowak, ‘Nashi brigades to enforce public order’, Moscow Times (24 September 2007) available at 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/nashi-brigades-to-enforce-public-order/194123.html, last 
accessed 20 September 2010. 
195 Stal, O Proekte, available at http://nashi.su/projects/51, last accessed 20 September 2010.  
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justification of violence and all means necessary in the ‗defence‘ of Russia. According to the 
movement itself, Stal is dedicated to using all methods and technologies available to ‗control 
street politics‘ and thus secure Russia‘s future as a global power and world leader.196 
According to the internet blog entry of one Stal activist, the group‘s name is ‗no accident‘: 
Steel is a very strong metal used to make weapons and armour [....] Stal‘ is 
Russia‘s armour, protecting her from encroachments on her sovereignty. It is also 
Russia‘s weapon in the modern world [....] providing the support of active 
patriotic youth who are not afraid of taking decisive action.
197
 
Commissar of the Estonian division of Stal, Mark Siryk, was arrested by police in Tallinn in 
April 2007 on charges of inciting disorder. The charges relate to the riots that took place in 
Tallinn known as the ‗Bronze nights‘ on April 26-28th 2007 when ethnic Russians protested 
against the decision to relocate a Soviet war memorial and burial site in the city.  The protest 
rapidly deteriorated into riots, which were dispersed by the Special Forces and resulted in the 
death of one ethnic Russian. Siryk was held in custody for 2 months before being released on 
parole. He was subsequently acquitted in court in January 2009 on the grounds that there was 
insufficient evidence that the defendant had been involved in organising the continuation of 
the riots on 27
th
 and 28
th
 April, which according to the Judge was the point at which the 
activities became unlawful.  
Thus Nashi has contributed to the militarisation of street politics in contemporary 
Russia such that the term ‗street politics‘ no longer refers only to the locus of political activity 
but also to the combative and often brutal methods employed by many of those involved. In a 
bid to silence the opposition during this period, Nashi‘s tactics revolved around the 
                                                 
196 Stal, O Proekte, available at http://nashi.su/projects/51, last accessed 20 September 2010.   
197 http://community.livejournal.com/stal_ru  
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persecution of anyone who challenged or offended the incumbent regime as well as the 
systematic intimidation of all political opposition. The boldness of Nashi‘s actions peaked in 
2007 when, acting with impunity, the youth movements launched its vicious campaign against 
the Estonian government and stepped up its assault on opposition rallies in advance of the 
parliamentary elections.  
 
Cyber attacks 
In addition to physical intimidation, Nashi‘s efforts to eradicate all active political opposition 
to the incumbent regime have taken on an electronic form. Not content with impeding 
opposition activities and harassing certain prominent individuals, Nashi has been linked to 
cyber attacks on the websites of groups unsympathetic to the youth movement‘s cause.   
In May 2007, the work of the Estonian government was impeded by a sustained attack 
on the country‘s internet network lasting more than 3 weeks and prompting a response from 
NATO. The websites of government ministries, parliament, prominent media distributors and 
banks were all severely disrupted by the cyber attack, which followed the afore-mentioned 
repositioning of the Soviet Bronze Soldier war memorial from central Tallinn to a local 
cemetery.  Estonian officials pointed the finger at the Russian government, which had been 
vociferous in condemning what it considered to be the desecration of the Soviet war memorial 
and burial site, but such accusations were repeatedly denied by the Russians. Although, at 
present, NATO does not consider cyber attacks to constitute a military action for which 
Article 5 would be invoked (extending the principles of collective self-defence to the NATO 
member under attack), a NATO press-release confirmed that the organisation pledged its 
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political support for Estonia and considered the matter to be ‗an operational security issue‘.198 
NATO sent at least one expert to help efforts to repel the attacks and, in May 2008, set up the 
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn. Nashi commissar and Duma 
deputy aide, Konstantin Goloskokov, subsequently claimed to have organised the DDoS 
(Distributed Denial of Service) attack, which crashed the Estonian government‘s internet 
network by overloading it with multiple requests. Goloskokov claims that he carried out the 
‗act of civil disobedience‘ together with a network of loyal sympathisers and without the 
knowledge of Nashi or the authorities.
199
  For their part, the Kremlin and Nashi deny any 
involvement in the cyber attack on Estonia, yet neither has explicitly condemned the attack 
and no action has been taken against Goloskokov.  
On a far smaller scale, following an article published by Kommersant in January 2008, 
Kommersant‘s website was the victim of a cyber attack which crashed the website for 5 
hours. The article in question, published on January 29
th
 2008 suggested that Nashi was 
becoming an embarrassment for the Kremlin and had outlived its purpose.
200
  The attack on 
Kommersant‘s website in March 2008 was combined with the distribution of rolls of toilet 
paper printed with the Kommersant logo, quotes from the newspaper article in question and 
the phone number of the article‘s author, leading Kommersant to accuse Nashi of 
responsibility for hacking into its website. Although Nashi denies any involvement in these 
incidents, according to a leaked internal email allegedly written by Nashi‘s press secretary 
Khristina Potupchik, Nashi called upon its activists to ‗block [Kommersant‘s] work‘ and to 
                                                 
198 NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 173 DSCFC 09 E bis - NATO and Cyber Defence (2009) available at 
http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=1782, last accessed 19 June 2010. 
199 RFERL, Kremlin loyalist says launched Estonia cyberattack, (12 March 2009) available at 
http://www.rferl.org/content/Kremlin_Loyalist_Says_Launched_Estonia_Cyberattack/1508923.html, last 
accessed 20 September 2010. 
200 For the original article in Russian, see Ekaterina Savina, Yuliya Taratura, and Mikhail Shevchuk, ‘Nashi stali 
chuzhimi’, Kommersant (29 Jan 2008) available at http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=846635, last 
accessed 20 Sept 2010. 
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‗psychologically and physically pester them‘. ‗Revenge is essential‘, the email reportedly 
read.
201
 
 
Nashi and the far right 
Finally under the heading of ‗street politics‘, despite officially calling itself a ‗democratic, 
anti-fascist youth movement‘, Nashi has been frequently compared to radical far-right groups 
and at times referred to as a fascist group itself. While Nashi is infamous for its aggressive 
campaigns against non-patriotic elements‘ and its unrelenting political stance, it is not a racist 
organisation by any stretch of the imagination. Under the heading of securing Russia‘s 
sovereignty in the movement‘s manifesto, Nashi declares: 
Cultural diversity is Russia‘s greatest asset in the modern world. Religious and 
ethnic cooperation empowers our country to develop further [....] Our generation‘s 
task is to prevent the spread of fascist ideas, aggressive nationalism, religious 
intolerance and separatism that threatens the unity and territorial integrity of 
Russia.
202
 
On November 4
th
 2010 Nashi staged mass anti-fascist rallies in Moscow in honour of National 
Unity Day. In a significant show of strength 20-30,000 young Russians came together in 
Moscow for Nashi‘s ‗Russian March‘ in defiance of right-wing and extreme nationalist 
organisations marching under the same banner elsewhere in Moscow. According to Nashi, the 
                                                 
201 For further information on this incident see Sean Guillory, ‘Nashi: Is it really the end?’, The Exile (22 April 
2008) available at http://www.exile.ru/articles/detail.php?ARTICLE_ID=18776&IBLOCK_ID=35&PAGE=4, last 
accessed 2 February 2011 and Shaun Walker, ‘Pro-Kremlin youth group blamed for attacking paper’, The 
Independent (6 March 2008) available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/prokremlin-
youth-group-blamed-for-attacking-paper-792074.html, last accessed 2 February 2011.  
202 Nashi, 2005, ‘Manifest’, available at: http://nashi.su/manifest, last accessed 16 June 2010. 
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march underscored the youth movement‘s commitment to defending human rights in Russia 
by undermining extreme-right wing groups that it alleges have been overlooked by human-
rights watchdogs, who prefer to focus on Nashi‘s methods. Nashi is keen to dispel any 
suggestion that it a far-right movement and for this reason has clamped down on media use of 
the term ‗nationalistic‘ to refer to Nashi.  
 The confusion over Nashi‘s fascist/anti-fascist credentials becomes apparent when one 
considers the youth movement‘s utter intolerance of alternative political ideas coupled with its 
appropriation of the concept of patriotism to refer to support for the incumbent regime. 
Nashi‘s declared strategy of tackling fascism by increasing the dominance of its ideas among 
the younger generation further muddies the issue:  
Only by spreading our ideological influence over the younger generation can we 
prevent young people from being drawn into extremist organisations of a fascist and 
liberal tendency [....] We must fight fascism in all its manifestations and support 
ethnic, religious and cultural unity for the good of our common home – Russia. The 
war on fascism is part of the fight for Russia‘s integrity and sovereignty.203 
Conflating fascism and extremism with liberalism and indeed any political opposition to the 
regime, Nashi‘s anti-fascist drive becomes primarily a campaign to shut out any alternatives 
and thus takes on a fascist element of its own. ―A closer look at the rhetoric of the leaders of 
Nashi shows that anti-orange and anti-fascist definitions are often used in their arguments as 
synonymous‖ (Topalova, 2006, p.33).  This is no mistake. While seeking to promote inter-
ethnic tolerance and cooperation within Russia, Nashi‘s brand of anti-fascism denounces all 
foreign influence.  
                                                 
203 Nashi, 2005, ‘Manifest’, available at: http://nashi.su/manifest, last accessed 16 June 2010. 
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 Furthermore, the sincerity of Nashi‘s apparent efforts to quell radicalism and 
extremism at all is questioned, as the youth movement appears to deliberately play on 
nationalistic sentiment in order to attract and inspire young Russians to its cause. In this way, 
Nashi taps into and cultivates nationalism, despite the danger which it acknowledges youth 
chauvinism presents to Russia. Academics such as Pilkington, Zorkaia & Diuk and others 
note the development of a radical youth sub-culture in Russia, with an increasing propensity 
for aggressive nationalism and susceptibility to militaristic rhetoric.
204
 According to the State 
Youth Policy (referred to previously in Chapters 4 and 6), 51% of 18-35 year olds said that 
they would support evicting certain ethnic groups from their region.
205
 Moreover, according 
to the latest crime statistics for Russia, radical nationalism is already exhibiting its potential to 
develop outside the Kremlin‘s control. In its most recent report in July 2007, the Panorama 
group reported an average 25-30% annual increase in reported racially motivated acts of 
violence, with spring 2007 alone already showing a 14% increase on the previous year‘s 
total.
206
 Yet, despite this real threat, Nashi consciously courts nationalistic sentiment. The 
youth movement‘s combined effort with the Young Guard to counter the series of opposition 
‗Dissenters‘ Marches‘ in 2007 was entitled ‗Russia for the Russians‘, which although 
representing the movements‘ desire to keep out foreign influences on Russian politics and to 
associate the opposition marches with Western sponsorship, is also known to be a slogan of 
extremist far-right groups: A poll of young Russians conducted in 2004 in order to identify 
the ―latent presence of openly xenophobic, nationalistic, and chauvinistic sentiments among 
                                                 
204 See Pilkington et.al. 2002, p.113; Topalova, 2006, p.32, Zorkaia & Diuk, 2004, p.5, and Smith, 2005, Putin’s 
Nationalist Challenge. UK Defence Academy Russian Series Paper, 5 (20), May, available at 
http://da.mod.uk/CSRC, last accessed 16 August 2007. In addition, the Panorama Group maintains a wealth of 
up-to-date information on nationalism in Russia (http://www.panorama.ru/).  
205 Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation, 2006, Strategiia gosudarstvennoi molodezhnoi 
politiki v Rossiiskoi Federatsii, No. 1760, p.4. Available at: http://ed.gov.ru/files/materials/393/strat.doc, last 
accessed 1 September 2008. 
206 Panorama Group, summary of report available at http://xeno.sova.center.ru/29481C8/96A2I47#r1, last 
accessed 25 July 2007. 
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the young‖ asked respondents whether they supported the same slogan ‗Russia for the 
Russians‘ (Zorkaia & Diuk, 2004, p.24). Thus, being used to encapsulate and measure 
chauvinistic tendencies, this slogan is commonly perceived to represent a nationalistic 
sentiment. In contrast, the rally organised by the Young Guard alone in response to the 
Dissenters‘ Marches was called the March of the Contented. It is possible to argue that Nashi 
may seek to appropriate such nationalistic rhetoric in order to channel patriotic and militant 
sentiment in a pro-regime fashion and ultimately to draw young people away from 
xenophobic and other hate-based groups. However, a more cynical approach would be that 
Nashi, with Kremlin support, is happy to attract and promote nationalism as long as it is 
expressed in a pro-regime fashion. In this way, Nashi‘s strategy is a means for the Kremlin of 
embracing Russian patriotism and nationalism in its own ranks in order to reduce the 
likelihood of nationalism becoming a force capable of uniting Russia‘s youth in a subversive 
manner.
 Either way, Nashi‘s explicit adoption of an ‗anti-fascist‘ stance is used as a front to 
justify moves by pro-regime forces to secure their own political dominance.  
 
Incorporation into Party Politics? (2007-8) 
With the completion of the elections to the State Duma in December 2007 and the passing of 
the period of intense campaigning and rivalry between the opposition and pro-regime forces 
there seemed to be an opportunity for Nashi and the Young Guard to retire from street politics 
and for its more prominent members to graduate to the formal political arena and to the world 
of party politics.
207
 Both Nashi and the Young Guard supported the progression of its 
                                                 
207 The term ‘party politics’ is used here as a spatial and behavioural concept to refer to the structure and rules 
associated with inclusion in the formal political arena as distinguished from the informal and relatively 
unrestrained politics of the street. 
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members into positions of political power, having promoted efforts to increase the proportion 
of young people in political office (discussed in Part 2), and thus both ostensibly viewed entry 
into the formal political arena as desirable. During this period, Nashi and the Young Guard 
initiated changes (discussed previously in this thesis), which might be described as an attempt 
to rebrand themselves and which have a bearing on the democratic credentials of the youth 
movements in terms of their strategies and the methods they employ: Nashi reorganised itself 
structurally and the Young Guard issued a new manifesto. These changes represent a response 
by the youth movements‘ leaders to the potential decline of state support in the changing 
socio-political environment. Consequently, their impact on the developmental democratic 
effects of participation is attributed to the agency of youth movement leaders and the socio-
political environment as much as to state-sponsorship. 
 
A more constructive Nashi?  
Nashi‘s 2008 reorganisation has been referred to at different points in this thesis for its 
strategic design to position the movement so as to continue to be a useful tool for the Kremlin 
beyond the completion of the 2007–2008 electoral cycle as well as for its impact on the 
development of ‗social capital‘ and on the emergence of some degree of autonomy from the 
state for Nashi activists. Yet, the youth movement‘s reorganisation holds further significance 
pertaining to this analysis of Nashi‘s methods, because it represents a decision on the part of 
Nashi‘s leadership to attempt to move away from the contentious street politics of old with its 
sheer physicality and tactics of intimidation and to embrace the formal political arena and the 
associated adoption of a more consensual approach along with an agreement to play by the 
rules (written or unwritten).  
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Firstly, Nashi‘s restructuring signified the youth movement‘s decentralisation.208 This 
was a deliberate decision on the part of Nashi leaders to not only prevent the youth movement 
from being over-organised by the state, but also to prepare it to carry out a different role in the 
post-electoral environment. Prior to the movement‘s restructuring in 2008, Nashi was a highly 
centralised force geared to the rapid mobilisation of masses of young people. The youth 
movement‘s activities were coordinated from Moscow and its commissars recruited bands of 
sympathetic young people from university campuses, sports clubs and other youth venues to 
be bussed to the capital to participate in Nashi‘s mass actions. Directly answerable to the 
centre as well as often dependent on funding from the youth movement to support their 
education, Nashi commissars in the regions effectively took orders from the centre and 
mobilised their troops accordingly to support the movement‘s latest campaign. Nashi‘s 
reconfiguration drastically scaled back the role of the central leadership, facilitating local 
initiative and stimulating micro-level activity. That is not to say that Nashi is no longer 
capable of organising mass rallies, as the gathering of 65,000 young people in honour of the 
65
th
 anniversary of victory in the Great Patriotic War in May 2010 attests to. Moreover, it is 
not the intention of this author to imply that the motivations of Nashi‘s leadership in driving 
the movement‘s decentralisation process are necessarily honourable or based on a desire for 
greater democracy. After all, as noted previously, by undergoing a process of decentralisation 
Nashi sought to capitalise on the emergence of activists‘ political engagement to make it more 
difficult for the Kremlin to clamp down on the youth movement, but equally Nashi 
remodelled itself around new projects derived largely from state priorities rather than from 
consultation with members. Nevertheless, regardless of the motivations behind this, the 
positive democratic outcomes of decentralisation and greater bottom-up participation remain 
                                                 
208 The significance of the decentralisation drive that formed part of Nashi’s reorganisation for the autonomy of 
Nashi activists as well as its implications for the movement’s relationship with the state and ultimately its 
future sustainability has been discussed previously in Chapters 6 and 3 respectively. 
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and these are ultimately attributed to the decisions of Nashi leaders taken within the context of 
the confines of state-sponsorship and the restrictive political environment that exists in Russia 
as well as the reality of activists‘ emerging political engagement. 
Secondly, although the movement‘s official manifesto did not change, Nashi‘s new 
emphasis on modernisation, enterprise and innovation indicated a far less combative 
approach. Nashi now sought to support the government‘s plans for modernisation in a 
constructive manner through promoting the development of innovative new business ideas. In 
this way, Borovikov‘s announcement of the movement‘s reorganisation in January 2008 
marked the beginning of a period in which Nashi would seek to diversify its activities and 
seemed set to leave behind its former destructive practices. Nashi commissar, Maria Drokova, 
sums up this shift from a combative strategy to a constructive approach in her assessment of 
the youth movement‘s changing purpose: ―At the beginning Nashi‘s sole task was to prevent 
an ‗Orange Revolution‘ [....] Now in Russia it is imperative to create something new.‖209 
While Nashi‘s 2007 summer camp was infamous for its hard-line political ideology and 
ruthless degradation of the opposition, one year later the primary focus of Seliger 2008 was 
on finding sponsors to support the development of youth enterprise initiatives. Although 
Nashi‘s new focus on innovation and modernisation following its reorganisation is aligned 
with the Kremlin‘s own priorities in the post-election period and thus represents a blatant 
attempt by the youth movement to retain state support, this shift in emphasis was instigated by 
the youth movement itself in response to the changing socio-political environment.  
 
 
                                                 
209Author’s interview with Maria Drokova, Lake Seliger, 24 July 2008 – emphasis added. 
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A more conformist Young Guard? 
At its third congress in summer 2008 the Young Guard passed a new manifesto emphasising 
its proximity to the party of power, United Russia, and positioning the youth movement 
firmly in the field of party politics rather than street politics:  
The Young Guard together with United Russia has triumphed in the 
parliamentary elections of 2007 – among the elected deputies of the State Duma 
now there are numerous young people [....] We are the young supporters of 
United Russia and so the party‘s debate on modernising the country and Russia‘s 
political future is our task too.
210
 
In terms of its democratic effects, at first glance, the Young Guard‘s new emphasis on 
publicly asserting its relation to the formal political arena and distancing itself further from 
Nashi‘s aggressive street politics (which has been commonly associated with all state-
sponsored pro-regime youth movements in contemporary Russia) is less of a change than 
Nashi‘s re-organisation. After all, the Young Guard‘s new manifesto did not alter the structure 
of the youth movement or diversify its activities by setting out new goals as Nashi‘s 
reorganisation did.  Instead, the revised manifesto emphasised the ongoing pursuit of its goals 
by working with United Russia. However, the significance here rests on what the Young 
Guard omitted during its revision and what this signifies for the democratic implications of 
the youth movement‘s new-found desire to acknowledge its status as youth branch of United 
Russia.  
                                                 
210 Young Guard, 2008, ‘Manifest Molodoi Gvardii Edinoi Rossii 2008, available at 
www.molgvardia.ru/convention/manifest, last accessed 13 September 2010 – emphasis added 
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As noted previously in Chapter 2, in contrast to its original manifesto, the Young 
Guard‘s revised manifesto dropped all criticism of the existing elite and the older generation 
of politicians. While this may simply indicate that the youth movement‘s fervent criticism of 
the existing polity in its original manifesto was a ploy to draw disillusioned young Russians 
away from potentially subversive anti-regime groups, it seems to also suggest the Young 
Guard‘s realisation of the need to ingratiate itself with United Russia in order to secure its 
support in the post-election environment and its realisation that entry into the formal political 
arena requires a certain degree of conformism. This is particularly interesting when it is 
considered that Nashi‘s 2008 reorganisation represented a positive democratic outcome in 
replacing the contentious politics of old with a far more constructive approach: Here the 
Young Guard‘s adjustment to the post-electoral environment represents a negative democratic 
effect because of its replacement of contention (to whatever degree) with utter conformity. 
While Nashi‘s reconfiguration is notable for its apparent move away from ‗street politics‘ and 
the associated tactics of intimidation and aggression, the Young Guard‘s embrace of party 
politics is notable for its acceptance of the status-quo. Where the significance of the Young 
Guard‘s revised manifesto echoes that of Nashi‘s reorganisation is in its reinforcement of the 
significance of agency, in addition to having state sponsorship, for determining the 
developmental democratic effects of participation. The conformist approach evident in the 
Young Guard‘s revised manifesto is the product of the youth movement‘s decision that the 
best course of action to ensure its success in the post-electoral environment would be to ally 
itself more closely with United Russia. Again, this change in strategy recognises the 
importance of maintaining state support and operating within the constraints of the repressive 
socio-political environment in Russia, but nevertheless represents a decision taken by the 
youth movement itself. 
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Law and order? (2009-10) 
In recent times there have been several incidents which indicate that, despite Nashi‘s apparent 
reorientation towards more constructive activities and desire to present itself as a reliable 
political force suitable for entry into the formal political arena, on occasion the youth 
movement has reverted to the aggressive street politics practised in the run up to the 2007-8 
electoral cycle. The most notable incident has been the Podrabinek affair in October 2009, 
which saw the return of Nashi using physical intimidation to stifle alternative views by 
targeting ‗unpatriotic‘ individuals. This time the target of the campaign was Moscow-based 
journalist and human rights activist Aleksandr Podrabinek - author of a controversial article 
published online on Ezhednevnyi Zhurnal (Daily Journal), which criticised what it saw as the 
Russian authorities‘ systematic and enforced glorification of the Soviet period. Nashi viewed 
Podrabinek‘s article as offensive to war veterans and the youth movement‘s ensuing 
campaign against the journalist was condemned by human rights watchdogs for amounting to 
harassment and physical intimidation. This was accompanied by a series of violent street 
fighting and attacks between rival youth organisations (Nashi and the National Bolshevik 
Party allegedly being the main protagonists) culminating in an arson attack on Nashi‘s 
Moscow headquarters in the early hours of November 3
rd
 2009.  
Thus, despite taking the opportunity to gain influence in the formal political arena as a 
reward for its loyalty to the incumbent regime in 2007-8, Nashi has not eschewed its former 
aggressive street politics methods altogether. Yet, this should not be perceived as indicative of 
the movement‘s rejection of the formal political arena or of its failure in this respect, but 
rather as further evidence that Nashi‘s strength and relative influence originates from its 
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power on the streets. Nashi‘s function has been and continues to be to engage in activities that 
United Russia and even the Young Guard are unable to owing to the constraints of operating 
within the formal political arena. For this reason, Nashi has deliberately sought to keep one 
foot in ‗street politics‘ while dipping its other in the world of ‗party politics‘ in order to 
maximise its advantage and corresponding influence in both spheres. In contrast to the 
movement‘s original tactics of intimidation in the period 2005-7, Nashi‘s ongoing use of such 
methods is attributable to the agency of Nashi leaders themselves, seeking to attract attention 
and assert the movement‘s significance in the post-electoral environment, rather than to the 
Kremlin‘s afore-mentioned desire for a powerful presence on the streets following the Orange 
Revolution in Ukraine.  
Significantly, Nashi‘s latest controversial antics have publicly failed to receive the full 
support of the authorities. In March 2009 Mark Siryk‘s solitary protest outside the Estonian 
embassy in Moscow was stopped by police and Siryk arrested (Siryk is the Estonian 
commissar for Nashi‘s ‗Stal‘ program and was noted above for his involvement in the Bronze 
Nights riots in Tallinn in April 2007).  The Kremlin‘s own Human Rights Council issued a 
statement criticising Nashi‘s campaign against Podrabinek and accusing the movement of 
violating four articles of the Russian constitution. Moreover, despite calls for Ella Pamfilova 
to be dismissed from her post as chair of the Council on Human Rights, Medvedev refused to 
sack Pamfilova on the basis of the council‘s investigation into the legality of Nashi‘s 
activities.  Ultimately, however, it is difficult to judge the significance or indeed sincerity of 
Medvedev‘s attempts to publicly distance himself from Nashi. In both of the cases referred to 
here where the Kremlin has not openly supported Nashi‘s actions and has made a show of 
seeking to quell the youth movement‘s excesses, this might be explained by Medvedev‘s 
possible desire to avoid reigniting previous diplomatic tensions with Estonia or with Western 
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European countries. Nonetheless, whether in response to Medvedev‘s signals or simply in 
recognition of changes in the political environment in Russia post-2008, Nashi has begun to 
adopt a new strategy which seeks to move away from the informality if not the brutality of 
street politics by seeking to legitimise the movement‘s activities through formal political and 
legal accreditation.  It is in this light that Nashi‘s latest strategy of taking to the courts should 
be seen – as an attempt by the youth movement to provide some sense of legitimacy and 
formality to what remains a mission to intimidate the opposition and to control the streets. 
 
Taking to the courts  
Although Nashi previously sued the newspaper Kommersant in 2006 for publishing 
inaccurate information about the youth movement, the use of litigation against unsympathetic 
media outlets only became Nashi‘s preferred modus operandi in 2009. Since 2009 Nashi has 
been using the legal system and the threat of litigation as a thinly-veiled means of continuing 
to stifle alternative views and to intimidate the opposition behind a facade of righteousness 
and the letter of the law. On 6
th
 November 2009 Nashi won its case against Gazeta.ru for 
allegations published on its website that Nashi activists were involved in a physical assault on 
the prominent liberal opposition leader Boris Nemtsov that took place in Sochi on 23
rd
 March 
2009. The editors of Gazeta.ru were ordered to publish a retraction of their statement and pay 
the youth movement 20,000 roubles compensation.  Yet, the real turning point came in the 
aftermath of the Podrabinek affair when, for the first time, Nashi filed lawsuits against 
Western as well as Russian media outlets for their coverage of the youth movement‘s 
campaign against the journalist. In late October 2009, amidst a blizzard of legal action taken 
by the youth movement relating to the Podrabinek affair, Nashi launched libel suits against 4 
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international newspapers including France‘s LeMonde and the U.K.‘s Independent for their 
apparent misrepresentation of the youth movement and its campaign against the journalist. 
While the youth movement‘s campaign of intimidation against Podrabinek was reminiscent of 
its actions in its earlier years, the legal foray that followed was more significant in appearing 
to mark the emergence of a new strategy by the pro-Kremlin youth movement and one which 
raises many questions as to the values and norms promoted by Nashi as well as the extent of 
the youth movement‘s influence and political sway. As a result of Nashi‘s legal action, in 
January 2010, Podrabinek was ordered by the courts to make an official apology to veterans 
offended by his article. On 1
st
 March 2010, ‗Russian Newsweek‘ was ordered to pay $5000 
compensation to Nashi for tarnishing the movement‘s reputation and to retract their claims 
that the youth movement had hounded Podrabinek. Moreover, in a groundbreaking ruling, in 
April 2010, the Russian courts ordered the French Le Journal du Dimanche to retract its 
previous comments about Nashi and to pay the youth movement 250,000 roubles as 
compensation for printing defamatory information about the youth movement. Britain‘s 
Independent newspaper has settled out of court with Nashi and published a retraction of its 
article likening Nashi to the Hitler Youth. Damages of 500,000 roubles (about £10,500) are 
still being sought from France‘s Le Monde and Germany‘s Frankfurter Rundshau for ‗insults 
to [Nashi‘s] dignity and honour‘. Nashi‘s recent recourse to litigation is thus an extension of 
its previous attempts to silence its critics, but one which seeks the facade of going through the 
proper channels in accordance with the law. 
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All-Russia Voluntary Militia 211 
In a rather different and perhaps more ambitious attempt to provide a semblance of legitimacy 
to the tactics of intimidation and persecution of the opposition practised by the youth 
movement, at Nashi‘s 2009 summer camp DMD and representatives of other groups linked to 
law enforcement held the inaugural conference of the new ‗All-Russia Association of 
Volunteers‘.212  The creation of this new organisation marked the expansion of Nashi‘s youth 
militia (noted above) and represented a bid to legalise the youth militia and enable it to work 
in an official capacity alongside the police in the prevention of crime. Were this to be 
achieved, then the impunity enjoyed by Nashi patrols policing the streets in Moscow in the 
run up to the December 2007 parliamentary elections would effectively be routinised 
indefinitely across the Russian Federation. At the end of 2009 the ‗All-Russia Association of 
Volunteers claimed to have established branches in more than 45 of Russia‘s regions – this 
represents more than half of Russia‘s regions and is the requirement imposed by the ‗Law on 
Public Associations‘ for an organisation to be allowed to call itself an ‗All-Russia‘ association 
and to be able to work with the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Ultimately, the ‗All-Russia 
Association of Volunteers‘ aims to have 100,000 volunteers patrolling the streets and working 
with the community to prevent crime by 2012. As far as legalising the youth militia, Nashi 
has been pushing for the adoption of a bill on ‗the participation of citizens in ensuring the rule 
of law‘, which was first proposed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs back in 2007 and which 
would give Nashi activists belonging to the new ‗All-Russia Association of Volunteers‘ the 
                                                 
211 For further details of the voluntary youth militia group see the organisation’s website available at 
http://druzhina.su/.  
212 On the occasion of the agreement to set up the new organisation on 3 August 2009, Vasily Yakemenko 
(founder of Nashi, head of the Federal Agency for Youth Affairs and reported to be the head of the new 
association of volunteers) declared that RosMolodezh would supply funding to launch the organisation as well 
as provide administrative support in the regions (Nashi, RosMolodezh podderzhit’ DMD, 3 August 2009, 
available at http://www.nashi.su/news/27124, last accessed 20 September 2010). 
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right to stop members of the public, inspect vehicles, and generally carry out duties associated 
with the prevention of crime in the presence of a police officer as well as to carry non-lethal 
weapons to be used in self-defence.
213
 Following the launch of the new all-Russia youth 
militia at Seliger 2009, United Russia promised to look at the law, but as of summer 2010 
there is still no sign that the law has been officially been submitted to the State Duma for 
consideration. Though the apparent lack of success in progressing the Duma‘s consideration 
of the proposed bill might indicate that this is a step too far for Nashi and is unlikely to be 
approved by the parliament, the fact that Nashi is pursuing this legislation demonstrates 
Nashi‘s new-found desire to be seen to be on the side of law and order whilst continuing to 
pursue a form of vigilante justice to groups and individuals whose only ‗crime‘ was to 
challenge or offend the incumbent Russian regime. 
It is difficult to say whether these latest strategies of taking to the courts and seeking official 
legitimisation for its actions are indicative of Nashi‘s show of strength and demonstration of 
the extent of its backing from the authorities, or whether they represent the youth movement‘s 
efforts to regain a sense of legitimacy and security in the increasing absence of active state 
support. The latter seems more likely. 
   
Conclusion 
Chapter 7‘s investigation of the democratic credentials of Nashi and the Young Guard, in 
terms of the youth movements‘ ethos and contribution to the development of civic virtues, has 
uncovered significant differences between the methods employed by the two youth 
                                                 
213 Details of the proposed bill on are available on the website of the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
(http://www.mvd.ru/news/12234/). A commentary on the proposed bill is available from ‘Rossiiskaya Gazeta’ 
(http://www.rg.ru/2009/01/20/drujiny.html). 
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movements as well as variance over time. This alone supports the conclusion that state-
sponsorship for the development of Nashi and the Young Guard is not the only, and indeed at 
times not the primary, factor in determining the youth movements‘ developmental democratic 
effects.  The three distinct chronological phases in the strategies employed by Nashi and the 
Young Guard between 2005 and 2010, discussed in this chapter, demonstrate the importance 
of the changing socio-political environment in shaping the impact of state sponsorship on the 
youth movements‘ behaviour and the civic virtues thereof. As far as the variation in methods 
between the two state-sponsored youth movements is concerned, while this may have 
originally (in 2005) resulted from differences in the Kremlin‘s designs for each of the youth 
movements, in the more recent period (since 2007) this variation is due largely to decisions 
taken by the youth movements‘ leaders based on their reckoning of the best way to secure 
ongoing state-sponsorship in the future and to adapt to lesser Kremlin attention and support in 
the post-electoral environment.  
 However, unlike the investigation of youth engagement and the significance of 
participation for activists themselves in the previous chapter, this chapter‘s analysis of Nashi 
and the Young Guard‘s methods does not find that the impact of state sponsorship is lessened 
with regard to the developmental democratic effects of participation in this case. While 
supporting the conclusion that the changing socio-political environment in Russia following 
the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the agency of youth leaders and activists themselves 
have impacted upon the democratic effects of Nashi and the Young Guard (in both a positive 
and negative manner), this chapter recognises the fundamental role of the Kremlin in shaping 
the youth movements‘ initial development and behaviour and the subsequent precedent that 
this set for the movements‘ future path. Although the state cannot dictate Nashi or the Young 
Guard‘s behaviour, as with the youth movement‘s impact on opportunities for contestation 
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discussed in Chapter 3, the Kremlin is ultimately able to ensure that Nashi and the Young 
Guard‘s behaviour meets its approval under threat of withdrawing its support for the youth 
movements and curtailing their activities. This is a powerful incentive for Nashi and the 
Young Guard to adhere to the Kremlin‘s wishes and to try to favourably influence the 
Kremlin‘s attitude towards them as they see fit. 
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OVERALL EVALUATION OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL DEMOCRATIC 
EFFECTS OF NASHI AND THE YOUNG GUARD 
Investigation of the impact of state sponsorship on the developmental democratic effects of 
Nashi and the Young Guard in Part 3 has confirmed the findings from Parts 1 and 2 and has 
further made its own contribution to this thesis by identifying the limits of state control over 
the democratic effects of participation. In particular, Part 3 has noted the inability of the state 
to control the value of participation for those involved as well as the distinction between the 
growing autonomy of Nashi activists and the increasing conformity of the Young Guard.  
In the introduction to Part 3 of this thesis it was suggested that the developmental 
democratic effects of state-sponsored participation are not the centre of controversy for 
scholars precisely because the impact of state support may be less important in this field than 
other factors, such as the decisions and actions taken by the youth movements and activists 
themselves. Upon reflection, investigation of the developmental democratic effects of 
participation in the case of Nashi and the Young Guard has found that the notion of the 
relative inability of the state to determine the developmental democratic effects of 
participation compared to the public sphere or institutional democratic effects only holds for 
those developmental effects that are concerned with individual autonomy, as compared to the 
focus on the collective that is characteristic of the public sphere and institutional democratic 
effects of participation.
214
 While the Kremlin was unable to prevent Nashi activists from 
becoming politically engaged or the knock-on effect of this on Nashi activists gaining a 
                                                 
214 Warren notes how the public sphere and the institutional democratic effects of participation tend to focus 
on the ‘collective’ (“developing public opinion and forming collective judgments” and being able to influence 
the “institutions through which collective decisions are made and collective actions are organised” respectively 
– Warren, 2001, p.82), while the developmental democratic effects focus more on ‘individual disposition’ 
(Warren, 2001, p.91). 
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degree of autonomy from the state in Chapter 6 (where the emphasis was on the value 
attached to participation by activists personally and on an individual basis), it was able to 
influence the behaviour and methods employed by Nashi in Chapter 7‘s discussion of the 
youth movement‘s mass actions.  
Nonetheless, this discovery of the limits of state control is highly significant given 
that, up until Part 3, the main conclusion of this study was that the impact of state-sponsorship 
on the democratic effects of participation is affected by the socio-political environment and 
the agency of youth movement leaders. Any positive democratic effects of state-sponsored 
participation in the case of Nashi and the Young Guard noted in Parts 1 and 2 of this thesis 
were examples of the state having a vested interest in supporting such outcomes. For example, 
Nashi and the Young Guard‘s ability to gain publicity in Part1 was the direct result of the 
state‘s desire to stimulate the development of pro-regime youth movements in order to 
sideline opposition efforts to attract youth in the run up to the 2007-8 electoral cycle. 
Although the socio-political environment and the actions of youth movement leaders 
influenced the Kremlin‘s interests, the final decision lay with the state and thus it was able to 
exercise a large degree of control over the public sphere democratic effects of participation. 
Similarly, in Part 2, the elevation of Nashi and Young Guard leaders to political office at a 
federal level was directly attributable to the Kremlin‘s desire to perpetuate its use of a 
patronage strategy to reward its most loyal young supporters, although in this instance the 
youth movements‘ leaders had little opportunity to exert any influence over the state‘s actions 
with regard to the institutional democratic effects of participation. In contrast, the impotence 
of the state to prevent Nashi or Young Guard activists from becoming politically engaged, 
noted in Part 3, supports the conclusion that the state is unable to determine the significance 
of participation for those involved and is thereby unable to fully control the democratic effects 
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of participation on a personal or individual level. These represent democratic effects that are 
beyond state control and thus emphatically affirm the folly of dismissing the democratic 
effects of participation on the sole basis of state involvement. 
Furthermore, although differences in the nature of participation between Nashi and the 
Young Guard and also in the relationship between each of the youth movements and the state 
have been noted at various points over the course of this study, the extent of the limitations 
imposed on the Young Guard as a result of having state-sponsorship compared to Nashi has 
only become clear in Part 3. In Chapter 2 it was suggested that the Young Guard was unable 
to adopt some of the more controversial tactics used by Nashi to attract media attention in the 
post-electoral environment, but also that it had no need to do so because of the security and 
stability afforded to it as youth branch of the ‗party of power‘. However, in Chapters 6 and 7 
it became apparent that the Young Guard has been unable to assert itself in its relations with 
the state in the same way as Nashi has. While Nashi activists have demonstrated an emerging 
degree of autonomy from the state and are able to develop regional and local initiatives based 
around their own interests and concerns, the Young Guard has aligned itself more closely with 
the United Russia party and routinely subordinates the interests of its members to those of the 
party. A key example of this was the Radov incident when, being unable to acknowledge that 
United Russia had let them down by failing to implement its promised youth quota, the 
Young Guard lost one of its more prominent members. The Young Guard‘s position as youth 
branch of United Russia no longer seems adequate explanation for this distinction between 
itself and Nashi: Instead, the precedent set by ‗Youth Unity‘ (United Russia‘s former youth 
wing) might offer a further explanation for the restrictions imposed on the Young Guard‘s 
behaviour. While Nashi was a new youth development, which only came in to existence as a 
result of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and was not bound to any pre-existing structures, 
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methods or ideas, the Young Guard represented a revamp of an existing Kremlin creation. 
This meant that the dynamics between the Young Guard and the Kremlin were based on the 
foundations laid by the former youth branch of United Russia and thus were not as open to 
influence at this favourable juncture in Russian youth politics following the ‗Orange 
Revolution‘ in Ukraine. In contrast, Nashi‘s relationship with the Kremlin at the time of its 
creation in 2005 was as yet undetermined and the youth movement has developed beyond the 
Kremlin‘s expectations or desires.  
Speaking in 2008, United Russia deputy, Sergei Markov, commented on the ‗danger 
posed by an unsupervised Nashi‘: ―They will survive, because the Kremlin understands very 
well that if you give people a political education and then abandon them, they will move on to 
a different political groups, including the radical opposition."
215
 This idea of Nashi being 
some kind of Frankenstein‘s monster evokes images of the youth movement being physically 
out of control, particularly when the continuation of its aggressive tactics of intimidation, 
noted in Chapter 7, is considered. However, the reality of comments about the ‗dangers of an 
unsupervised Nashi‘ refers predominantly to the emergence of activists‘ political engagement 
and growing autonomy from the state. While the state can control Nashi‘s behaviour en masse 
and could shut the youth movement down, it has been unable to prevent participants‘ from 
becoming politically engaged and could not determine the significance of participation for 
those involved even if it did shut down the youth movement.  
 
                                                 
215 Matt Siegel, ‘Nashi’s summer camp tries a new message’, Moscow Times (21 July 2008) available at 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/nashi-summer-camp-tries-a-new-message/369047.html, last 
accessed 24 March 2011. 
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 CHAPTER 8 - CONCLUSIONS  
 
 Having begun this thesis by justifying the need for research into the democratic effects of 
Nashi and the Young Guard and setting out the starting point for this investigation, this 
conclusion reflects upon the finished research project and considers its value and wider 
significance as well as draws together its main findings.  
In Chapter 1, it was emphasised that this thesis sought to establish the relative impact 
of state support on the democratic effects of Nashi and the Young Guard, and was not 
dependent on uncovering positive democratic effects in order to denounce the practice of 
dismissing state-sponsored participation from academic scrutiny.
216
 Having completed my 
research into the youth movements, it is fair to say that many aspects of existing negative 
portrayals of Nashi and the Young Guard are accurate. Moreover, this thesis should by no 
means be perceived as an attempt to contend that Nashi and the Young Guard have had a 
positive democratic impact overall or as being in favour of Kremlin-sponsorship for youth 
participation. Although there are some positive democratic effects of state-sponsored 
participation in the case of Nashi and the Young Guard (most notably the development of 
social capital and the potential for young people to become politically engaged), there are 
many more examples of the negative impact of state support on the youth movements‘ 
democratic effects, such as the movements‘ dominance at the expense of alternative groups, 
                                                 
216 As set out in Chapter 1, the term ‘democratic effects’ has been used in this study to refer to the youth 
movements’ impact on democracy, of which there may be both positive and/or negative democratic effects. 
The framework used to assess the democratic effects of participation in this study was borrowed from 
Warren’s categorisation of the potential democratic effects of association into 3 broad areas – public sphere, 
institutional and developmental (Warren 2001).  
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state restrictions on the development of a public agenda, and the sanctioned thuggery of Nashi 
towards political opponents.   
Nonetheless, when I embarked upon my research into Nashi and the Young Guard I 
instinctively began to look for positive examples out of a desire to more forcefully counter the 
noted bias against investigating these Kremlin-sponsored movements among the literature on 
youth participation in Russia. Yet, as the research progressed, it became increasingly evident 
that what was more compelling than any positive democratic effects of Nashi and the Young 
Guard was the nature and variance of the relationship between each of these youth 
movements and the state.  Not only was the initial impact of state support on the democratic 
effects of participation different with regard to Nashi compared to the Young Guard in some 
areas, but in 2008 the youth movements each adopted different survival strategies for the post-
electoral environment, which saw their corresponding relations with the Kremlin dramatically 
diverge: Nashi asserted its authority while the Young Guard became more subservient. As 
such, the primary value of this research is not only that it provides a unique in-depth 
understanding of these state-sponsored youth movements and their relationship with the 
Kremlin (hitherto overlooked by Western academic literature), but also that it documents and 
analyses the dynamics between Nashi and the Kremlin over a very interesting period 
following the completion of the 2007-8 electoral cycle. At this time, there was some 
uncertainty as to the youth movement‘s future and Nashi leaders responded by reorganising 
the movement with far reaching implications for its potential democratic effects.  
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Rather than reiterate the dominant democratic effects (both positive and negative) of 
Nashi and the Young Guard discovered during this course of this study, the emphasis is 
placed instead on the conclusions that they have supported throughout this thesis, the two 
central arguments of which are as follows: 
 The potential democratic effects of state-sponsored participation should not be 
disregarded solely on the basis of the state‘s involvement. Whether participation is state-
sponsored or NGO-led, it is unrealistic to imagine that any architect of a participatory 
initiative is able to fully control the outcomes or significance of participation. Other 
factors have influenced the impact of state support on the democratic effects of 
participation in the case of Nashi and the Young Guard,  in particular, the socio-political 
environment and the agency of youth leaders and activists‘ themselves. 
 While state sponsorship imposes certain constraints on participation, particularly in terms 
of restricting the development of a public agenda independent from the state, its impact is 
not necessarily entirely negative. State-sponsorship may support some positive 
democratic effects of participation and has done so in the case of Nashi and the Young 
Guard. 
The relative impact of state-sponsorship on the dominant democratic effects of Nashi and the 
Young Guard is presented graphically below. It is not intended to be a general framework of 
the impact of state support on the democratic effects of participation, but rather a visual 
summary of the main findings of this investigation into Nashi and the Young Guard. 
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aspiring young politicians within 
United Russia 
 
 
 
        Young Guard’s   
increasing  
             conformity &  
          subordination 
           to United  
             Russia 
Artificial 
stimulation   
    of regime  
   support via  
      tactics of  
    bribery and  
   intimidation  
Agency – impact of the decisions made by youth movement 
leaders on the public sphere democratic effects 
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In addition to the primary democratic effects of Nashi and the Young Guard, which were the 
direct and deliberate result of state support for the youth movements, this thesis has also 
identified secondary democratic effects of participation, some of which were the result of the 
strategies employed by the youth movements in 2008 in anticipation of the different  political 
climate and shift in Kremlin priorities following the completion of the 2007-8 electoral cycle 
– namely, the Young Guard‘s revision of its manifesto and Nashi‘s reorganisation, which 
have been discussed at length at various points in this thesis. In addition, the propensity for 
Nashi and Young Guard members to become politically engaged regardless of the state‘s 
intentions demonstrates the inability of the state to fully control the outcomes of participation, 
although it is true that state support for the youth movements enabled youth political 
engagement regardless of whether this was the Kremlin‘s primary intention or desire. The 
emergence of Nashi‘s activists‘ growing autonomy from the state, arguably the most 
contentious finding of this thesis, further illustrates the limits of state influence and also 
indicates the dynamic relationship between Nashi and the Kremlin.  
At times in this thesis, especially chapters 3, 6 and 7, I have focused more on Nashi 
and used the Young Guard instead as a point of comparison. This is, firstly, because a number 
of the democratic effects of participation discussed (both negative and positive) were stronger 
for Nashi than for the Young Guard. For example, Nashi has employed a much more 
aggressive and far-reaching approach towards intimidating the opposition than the Young 
Guard, but has equally made a more significant contribution to the development of social 
capital by building networks of reciprocity among young participants. Secondly, it is because, 
during the course of this research, the dynamics of the relationship between Nashi and the 
Kremlin have developed in a more interesting manner than for the Young Guard, which has 
followed a more predictable path of increased conformism with the passing of 2007-8 
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electoral cycle. While Nashi is by no means impervious to the influence of the Kremlin and 
remains vulnerable to the potential for Kremlin disapproval and castigatory action to shut 
down the movement, it has developed a certain degree of ownership over the democratic 
outcomes of participation in the sense that decisions made by its leaders have influenced the 
course of the movement‘s development beyond that dictated solely by the state‘s agenda.  
Nashi has become more than just a vehicle for the Kremlin to mobilise youth in support of the 
incumbent regime. Many Nashi members are active participants, pushing for greater 
involvement in politics (beyond that being asked of them in order to secure the incumbent 
regime) or else seeking to shape the development of youth projects in their region and tackle 
social issues of concern to them in their local region.  Furthermore, in a way that has not been 
possible for Young Guard members, Nashi activists have gained a degree of autonomy from 
the state. Enabled by the emergence of activists‘ political engagement, measures taken by 
Nashi leaders to reorganise the movement with the aim of securing its future have contributed 
to a discernible shift in the balance of power away from both the state and Nashi leaders in 
favour of Nashi activists. Having delegated oversight of the movement‘s development in the 
regions to federal project coordinators and abolished almost all regional branches from which 
Nashi commissars previously monitored activists at close quarters, much of Nashi‘s activity 
now is conducted at the micro-level with limited coordination by federal Nashi staff beyond 
securing funding and development support. Freed from direct oversight, Nashi activists are 
thus increasingly able to shape the course of the movement‘s development and to set the 
agenda for regional activity, albeit always within certain limits set by the Kremlin. The fact 
that the state could, and would, shut down Nashi or the Young Guard if it so wished does not 
equate to state control over the nature and direction of the youth movements‘ development. 
Although the Kremlin is entirely capable of curtailing Nashi‘s activities and influence, it does 
8 
 
not have the power to ensure that the youth movement develops in the way that it wants it to. 
In fact, state action to clamp-down on the Village Scout Movement in Thailand in 1976 
following rising conflict between movement activists and local government officials (noted in 
Chapter 1) demonstrated the ultimate inability of the Thai state to dictate the outcomes of 
participation according to its own intentions.
217
  
In terms of the broader significance of this study and what it tells us about the nature 
of the Russian political system, the findings of this thesis support the idea that the Kremlin is 
not necessarily as powerful as depictions of Putin‘s iron fist would have us believe. In chapter 
1 it was argued that the belief that state-sponsored participatory initiatives have an inherently 
negative democratic effect was in part founded on overblown assessments of the power of the 
state. Certainly, perceptions of the omnipotent state are rife with regard to Russia. Moreover, 
worsening assessments of the democratic credentials of the Russian regime increase fear of 
the ‗active state‘ in civil society in the Russian context in particular. The fact that the Kremlin 
has been unable to fully control the outcomes and significance of participation in the case of 
Nashi, and to a lesser extent the Young Guard, calls into question such perceptions of the 
omnipotent state. That Nashi activists, mobilised on the Kremlin‘s terms in order to secure the 
incumbent regime, have become increasingly able to shape the movement‘s development in 
their region away from direct oversight by the Kremlin or Nashi leaders belies existing 
depictions of the relationship between the Russian state and society. The ability of any state to 
set the terms of participation or shape its future course is limited by socio-cultural norms and 
power structures as well as the political environment and participants‘ own agendas. The idea 
                                                 
217 In the period before it was shut down by the state, the Village Scout Movement had begun to take on its 
own dynamic. The movement had begun to be used as a “political base for various politicians seeking national-
level positions of power in the capital and increasingly caused political complications for the state rather than 
offering solutions” (Bowie, 2005, p. 56). Therefore, although the Thai state played a key role in both 
establishing and halting the activity of the Village Scout Movement, it could not control the direction of the 
movement’s development. 
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of Nashi as some kind of ‗Frankenstein‘s monster‘ – created, unleashed, and ultimately 
representing a dangerous element for its creator – provides a powerful image of the limits of 
Kremlin control over the youth movement.  
 At the beginning of this thesis it was stressed that the case-studies used here would 
generally be considered to be the epitome of the negative democratic effects of state-
sponsored participation owing to the repressive nature of the Russian regime. Yet, while this 
remains true, it does not necessarily imply that any positive democratic effects of Nashi or the 
Young Guard uncovered here represent a greater challenge to prevalent perceptions of the 
negative impact of state sponsorship than any such positive effects of state-sponsored citizen 
consultative bodies in, for instance, the Netherlands would (as was suggested previously in 
the introduction to Part 1). At times, the relative positive democratic effects of state-
sponsored participation in the case of Nashi and the Young Guard, such as the youth 
movements‘ ability to gain publicity or their contribution to the development of social capital, 
were more significant precisely because of the repressive socio-political environment that 
exists in contemporary Russia. Thus, using state-sponsored youth participation in Russia as 
the case study for this thesis unexpectedly turned out to make the discovery of the relative 
positive impact of state-sponsorship on the democratic effects of participation in some areas 
more likely! For example, in the absence of alternative means of access to the mass media, the 
logic of rejecting state support on the basis that this prevents the expression of public interests 
is less persuasive. Nashi and the Young Guard‘s abilities to communicate their message to the 
public have not only benefitted from state support but have been entirely dependent on it. The 
repressive actions of the state towards other groups have boosted the relative benefit of state 
sponsorship for Nashi and the Young Guard. 
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It cannot be emphasised enough that this study is not an attempt to reject existing 
commentary on Nashi and the Young Guard or to argue that having state-sponsorship does 
not impinge upon the youth movements‘ potential democratic effects. Nashi and the Young 
Guard are dependent on maintaining state support for their survival. Yet, there is much more 
to these Kremlin-sponsored youth movements than existing portrayals allow. State-
sponsorship is not the only factor influencing the democratic effects of participation in the 
case of Nashi and the Young Guard. Accounts that dismiss these youth movements from 
academic scrutiny because they are sponsored by the Kremlin are based on facile arguments, 
which deny the complexity and variety of state-sponsored participation. The central point 
around which assumptions of the negative impact of state involvement in participation appear 
to converge is that proximity to the state impedes an organisation‘s ability to act in the 
interests of its members. While it is true that state-sponsorship does necessarily denote a 
dominant top-down influence and the subordination of societal interests to those of the state, 
this does not preclude the potential for some positive democratic effects where it is in the 
state‘s vested interests to support such outcomes, such as Nashi and the Young Guard‘s 
ability to gain publicity for their cause or the youth movements‘ contribution to the 
development of social capital. Furthermore, the state is unable to control the value attached to 
participation by activists personally on an individual basis and, consequently, beyond 
threatening punitive action and the withdrawal of state support, the subsequent development 
of participatory initiatives and the democratic effects thereof are far more complex than 
simple top-down control would imply.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1– Political engagement in Russia in comparative 
perspective 
 
Table 1 - Political actions: Attending lawful/peaceful demonstrations by country 
(percent by row) 
   
Attend political meeting or rally 
 
Have done  Might do  Would never do  N 
 
Country 
 
    
United States 15.1 54.8 30.2 1216 
France 37.5 31.8 30.7 992 
Great Britain 16.6 44.8 38.6 998 
Russia 15.9 28.5 55.6 1367 
Poland 10.2 30.4 59.4 948 
    
All 
 
18.5 37.3 44.2 6068 
 
 
 
Table 2 - Level of personal interest in politics by country (percent by row) 
 
    
Level of personal interest in politics 
 
Very 
interested  
Somewhat 
interested  
Not very 
interested  
Not at all 
interested  
N 
 
Country 
 
     
United States 13.7 45.4 27.0 13.9 1225 
Great Britain 11.2 32.9 27.0 28.9 1038 
France 9.0 27.9 32.1 31.1 1000 
Russia 6.9 32.0 41.0 20.2 1997 
Poland 5.1 35.1 35.0 24.7 1262 
      
All 
 
9.0 34.6 33.6 22.8 6253 
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Table 3 - Political actions: Attend lawful/peaceful demonstrations by age and 
country (percent by row) 
 
   
Attend political meeting or rally 
 
Have done  Might do  Would never do  N 
 
Country     
     
United States 
 
youth (15-29 yrs) 9.4 60.8 29.8 262 
all ages 15.1 
 
54.8 30.2 1216 
France 
 
 40.7 35.6 23.6 191 
 37.5 
 
31.8 30.7 992 
Great Britain 
 
 13.1 50.5 36.5 216 
 16.6 
 
44.8 38.6 998 
Russia 
 
 8.2 29.5 62.3 527 
 15.9 
 
28.5 55.6 1913 
Poland 
 
 8.4 38.5 53.0 236 
 10.2 30.4 59.4 948 
 
 
 
youth (15-29 yrs) 
 
13.5 40.7 45.8 1433 
All all ages 18.5 
 
37.3 44.2 6068 
 
 
Table 4 - Level of personal interest in politics by age and country (percent by row) 
 
   
Level of personal interest in politics 
 
Very 
interested  
Somewhat 
interested  
Not very 
interested  
Not at all 
interested  
N 
 
Country 
 
     
United States 
 
youth (15-29 yrs) 8.4 38.7 32.6 20.1 264 
all ages 13.7 
 
45.4 27.0 13.9 1225 
France 
 
 5.3 25.8 32.4 36.5 191 
 9.0 
 
27.9 32.1 31.1 1000 
Great Britain 
 
 7.5 25.2 27.2 40.0 228 
 11.2 
 
32.9 27.0 28.9 1038 
Russia 
 
 2.3 23.7 46.8 27.3 551 
 6.9 
 
32.0 41.0 20.2 1997 
Poland 
 
 4.8 23.2 42.7 29.4 243 
 5.1 35.1 35.0 24.7 993 
 
 
 
youth (15-29 yrs) 
 
5.0 26.8 38.7 29.5 1478 
All 
 
all ages 9.0 34.6 33.6 22.8 6253 
 
Source: World Values Survey – online analysis of data from fifth wave of surveys 2005-8, available at 
http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSAnalizeQuestion.jsp, last accessed 4 March 2011. 
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Appendix 2– Electoral Data 
 
Table 5 – Trends in voting for presidential elections 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 – Trends in voting for State Duma Party Lists 
  1995 1999 2003 2007 
Electorate 107,496,558 108,072,348 108,906,249 109,145,517 
Total votes cast  69,204,819 66,667,647 60,633,177 69,537,065 
Voter turnout 64.38% 61.69% 55.67% 63.71% 
Total valid votes 67,884,200 65,370,655 59,684,742 68,777,136 
Number of votes for party of power 7,009,291 15,548,707 22,776,294 44,714,241 
Number of votes against all 1,918,151 2,198,667 2,851,958 n/a 
 
 
Table 7 – Breakdown of voting for State Duma Party Lists in 1995  
Parties gaining over 3% of the vote Number of list votes %  of list votes  Political allegiance 
CPRF 15,432,963 22.3 Opposition 
LDPR  7,737,431 11.18 Opposition 
Our Home is Russia 7,009,291 10.13 Supporter 
Yabloko 4,767,384 6.89 Opposition 
Women of Russia 3,188,813 4.61 Supporter 
Communists & Working Russia – 
for the Soviet Union 
3,137,406 4.53 Opposition 
Congress of Russian communities 2,980,137 4.31 Opposition 
Party of workers‘ self-government 2,756,954 3.98 Opposition 
Democratic Russia‘s Choice – 
United Democrats 
2,674,084 3.86 Opposition 
Agrarian Party of Russia 2,613,127 3.78 Opposition 
Total votes won by supporters = 10,198,104 
Total votes won by opposition = 42,099,486 
 
  1996  (1st round) 2000 2004 2008 
Electorate  108,495,023 109,372,046 108,064,281 107,222,016 
Total votes cast 75,587,139 75,070,776 69,504,278 74,746,649 
Voter turnout  69.67% 68.64% 64.32% 69.71% 
Total valid votes 74,515,019 74,369,773 68,925,431 73,731,116 
Number of votes for 
Yeltsin/Putin/Medvedev 26,665,495 39,740,434 49,563,020 
 
52,530,712 
Number of votes against all 1,163,921 1,414,648 2,396,550 n/a 
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Table 8 – Breakdown of voting for State Duma party lists in 1999  
Parties gaining over 3% of votes Number of list votes % of list votes Political allegiance 
CPRF 16,195,569 24.29 Opposition 
Medved (Unity) 15,548,707 23.32 Supporter, Party of Power 
Fatherland-All Russia 8,886,697 13.33 Opposition 
SPS 5,676,982 8.52 Supporter 
Zhirinovsky Bloc 3,989,932 5.98 Supporter 
Yabloko 3,955,457 5.93 Opposition 
Total votes won by supporters = 25,215,621 
Total votes won by opposition = 29,037,723 
 
 
Table 9 – Breakdown of voting for State Duma party lists in 2003  
Parties gaining over 3% of votes Number of list votes % of list votes Political allegiance 
United Russia 22,776,294 37.56 Supporter, Party of Power 
CPRF 7,647,820 12.61 Opposition 
LDPR 6,944,322 11.45 Supporter 
Rodina 5,470,429 9.02 Supporter 
Yabloko 2,610,087 4.30 Opposition 
SPS 2,408,535 3.97 Opposition 
Agrarian Party of Russia 2,205,850 3.63 Supporter 
Russian Party of Pensioners and 
party of Social Justice 
1,874,973 3.09 Supporter 
Total votes won by supporters = 39,271,868 
Total votes won by opposition = 12,666,442 
 
 
Table 10 – Breakdown of voting for State Duma party lists in 2007  
Parties gaining over 3% of votes Number of list votes % of list votes Political allegiance 
United Russia 44,714,241 64.3 Supporter, Party of Power  
CPRF 8,046,886 11.6 Opposition 
LDPR 5,660,823 8.1 Supporter 
A Just Russia 5,383,639 7.7 Supporter 
Total votes won by supporters = 55,758,703 
Total votes won by opposition = 8,046,886 
 
 
Source for Appendix Two: Collated from data available at Central Electoral Commission of the Russian 
Federation, available at http://www.vybory.izbirkom.ru/region/izbirkom for elections from 2003 onwards, 
http://www.cikrf.ru/vib_arhiv/president/index.jsp for earlier presidential elections, and 
http://www.cikrf.ru/vib_arhiv/gosduma/index.jsp for earlier parliamentary elections,  last accessed 24/7/09
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Appendix 3 – Implementation of United Russia’s youth quota since its announcement in April 2006 until April 2010  
      Candidates Elected deputies Success rates Comparison with previous elections 
Regional Legislative 
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Republic of Karelia 08/10/2006 mixed  0 4 0 0 1 0 0 25 
  
  
 
  
Republic of Tiva 08/10/2006 mixed 6 116 5.2 4 55 7.3 66.7 47.4 
  
  
 
  
Republic of 
Chuvashia 08/10/2006 mixed 1 22 4.5 1 17 5.9 100 77.3 
  
  
 
  
Primorskii Krai 08/10/2006 mixed  0 12 0 0 9 0 0 75 
  
  
 
  
Astrakhan region 08/10/2006 mixed 3 28 10.7 1 18 5.6 33.3 60.7 
  
  
 
  
Lipetsk region 08/10/2006 mixed 1 28 3.6 1 25 4 100 89.3 
  
  
 
  
Novgorod region 08/10/2006 mixed 0 13 0 0 9 0 0 69.2 
  
  
 
  
Sverdlovsk region 08/10/2006 proportional 5 20 25 1 7 5.9 20 35 
  
  
 
  
Evresiskii 
autonomous okrug 08/10/2006 mixed 1 7 14.3 0 6 0 0 85.7 
  
  
 
  
Perm krai 03/12/2006 mixed 1 24 4.2 0 17 0 0 70.8 
  
  
 
  
Republic of Dagestan 11/03/2007 proportional 19 175 10.9 1 47 2.1 5.3 26.9 
  
  
 
  
Republic of Komi 11/03/2007 mixed 0 15 0 0 12 0 0 80 
  
  
 
  
Stavropol Krai 11/03/2007 mixed 3 23 13 2 9 22.2 66.7 39.1 
  
  
 
  
Vologod region 11/03/2007 mixed 1 17 5.9 1 15 6.7 100 88.2 
  
  
 
  
Leningrad region 11/03/2007 mixed 1 25 4 1 13 7.7 100 52 
  
  
 
  
Moscow region 11/03/2007 proportional 9 60 15 2 33 6.1 22.2 55 
  
  
 
  
Murmansk region 11/03/2007 mixed 0 16 0 0 11 0 0 68.8 
  
  
 
  
Omsk region 11/03/2007 mixed 0 22 0 0 22 0 0 100 
  
  
 
  
Orlov region 11/03/2007 mixed 1 13 7.7 0 3 0 0 23.1 
  
  
 
  
Pskov region 11/03/2007 mixed 1 22 4.5 1 18 5.6 100 81.8 
  
  
 
  
Samara region 11/03/2007 mixed 2 24 8.3 1 14 7.1 50 58.3 
  
  
 
  
Tomsk region 11/03/2007 mixed 0 16 0 0 16 0 0 100 
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Tyumen region 11/03/2007 mixed 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  
  
 
  
City of St. Petersburg 11/03/2007 proportional 6 53 11.3 4 24 16.7 66.7 45.3 
  
  
 
  
Krasnoyarsk Krai 15/04/2007 mixed 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  
  
 
  
Federal State Duma 02/12/2007 proportional 73 600 12.2 23 315 7.3 31.5 52.5 07/12/2003 269 no data 121 no data 
Republic of Buryatiya 02/12/2007 mixed 8 50 16 2 24 8.3 25 48 pre 2003 
 
  
 
  
Republic of Mordovia 02/12/2007 mixed 17 120 14.2 1 22 4.6 5.9 18.3 07/12/2003 24 no data 16 no data 
Republic of 
N.Ossetia-Alania 02/12/2007 mixed 9 37 21.6 4 25 16 44.4 67.6 pre 2003 
 
  
 
  
Udmurtia Republic 02/12/2007 mixed 18 99 18.2 6 31 19.4 33.3 31.3 pre 2003 
 
  
 
  
Krasnodar Krai 02/12/2007 mixed 9 36 25 3 26 11.5 33.3 72.2 pre 2003 
 
  
 
  
Penza region 02/12/2007 mixed 6 30 20 0 10 0 0 33.3 pre 2003 
 
  
 
  
Saratov region 02/12/2007 mixed 7 33 21.2 2 14 14.3 28.6 42.4 pre 2003 
 
  
 
  
Smolensk region 02/12/2007 mixed 13 51 25.5 3 15 20 23.1 29.4 pre 2003 
 
  
 
  
Kamchatka Krai 02/12/2007 mixed 10 54 18.5 0 18 0 0 33.3 pre 2003 
 
  
 
  
Republic of 
Bashkortostan 02/03/2008 mixed 6 182 3.3 1 55 1.8 16.7 30.2 pre 2003 
 
  
 
  
Republic of 
Ingushetia 02/03/2008 proportional 2 39 5.1 1 20 5 50 51 07/12/2003 6 no data 6 no data 
Republic of Kalmikiya 02/03/2008 proportional 9 30 30 4 17 23.5 44.4 56.7 07/12/2003 16 no data 11 no data 
Republic of Saha 
(Yakutiya) 02/03/2008 mixed 6 49 12.2 2 20 10 33.3 40.8 pre 2003 
 
  
 
  
Altai Krai 02/03/2008 mixed 7 38 18.4 2 18 11.1 28.6 47.4 14/03/2004 29 3.4 10 10 
Amursk region 02/03/2008 proportional 11 49 22.5 3 25 12 27.3 51 27/03/2005 18 0 4 0 
Ivanovo region 02/03/2008 mixed 3 24 12.5 3 14 21.4 100 58.3 04/12/2005 
 
no data  
 
  
Rostov region 02/03/2008 mixed 4 44 9.1 1 20 5 25 45.5 pre 2003 
 
  
 
  
Sverdlovsk region 02/03/2008 proportional 2 22 9.1 0 10 0 0 45.5 08/10/2006 14 42.9 6 16.7 
Ulyanovsk region 02/03/2008 mixed 1 21 4.8 0 10 0 0 47.6 07/12/2003 13 no data 4 no data 
Yaroslavl region 02/03/2008 mixed 3 25 12 1 15 6.7 33.3 60 14/03/2004 7 0 3 0 
Republic of Chechnya 12/10/2008 proportional 9 61 14.8 2 37 5.4 22.2 60.7 27/11/2005 16 6.3 9 0 
Irkutsk region 12/10/2008 mixed 15 42 35.7 6 15 40 40 35.7 10/10/2004 21 no data 9 no data 
Kemerovo region 12/10/2008 mixed 5 30 16.7 1 17 5.9 20 56.7 pre 2003 
 
  
 
  
Sakhalin region 12/10/2008 mixed 6 19 31.6 3 9 33.3 50 47.4 10/10/2004 9 no data 2 no data 
Zabaikal krai 12/10/2008 mixed 4 48 8.3 0 14 0 0 29.2 pre 2003 
 
  
 
  
Republic of 
Kabardino-Balkarsky 01/03/2009 proportional 11 121 9.1 2 50 4 18.2 41.3 07/12/2003 43 2.3 29 3.4 
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Republic of 
Karachevo-
Cherkessiya 01/03/2009 mixed 8 69 11.6 4 29 13.8 50 42 14/03/2004 17 17.7 7 14.3 
Republic of Tatarstan 01/03/2009 proportional 8 53 15.1 6 44 13.6 75 83 14/03/2004 41 0 38 0 
Republic of 
Khakhasia 01/03/2009 mixed 6 49 12.2 3 22 13.6 59 44.9 26/12/2004 29 3.4 12 8.3 
Archangel region 01/03/2009 mixed 16 61 26.2 0 20 0 0 32.8 19/12/2004 27 14.8 10 20 
Bryansk region 01/03/2009 mixed 6 39 15.4 1 19 5.3 16.7 48.7 05/12/2004 
 
no data  
 
  
Vladimir region 01/03/2009 mixed 7 23 30.4 4 11 36.4 57.1 47.8 20/03/2005 14 21.4 5 20 
Volgograd region 01/03/2009 mixed 10 44 22.7 1 12 8.3 10 27.3 07/12/2003 
 
no data  
 
  
Nenetsk autonomous 
okrug 
01/03/2009 proportional 
1 15 6.7 0 6 0 0 40 06/02/2005 5 40 3 33.3 
Republic of Mary-El 11/10/2009 mixed 4 40 10.0 1 18 5.6 25.0 45.0 10/10/2004 24 0 17 0 
Tula Republic 11/10/2009 proportional 7 73 9.6 2 29 6.9 28.6 39.7 03/10/2004 16 6.3 3 0 
Moscow city Duma 11/10/2009 mixed 7 47 14.9 2 15 13.3 28.6 31.9 04/12/2005 15 6.7 15 6.7 
Republic of Altai 14/03/2010 mixed 6 36 16.7 0 10 0 0 27.8 12/03/2006 11 0 5 0 
Khabarovsk Krai 14/03/2010 mixed 2 39 5.1 0 6 0 0 15.4 11/12/2005 11 0 11 0 
Voronezh region 14/03/2010 mixed 8 57 14 3 20 15 37.5 35.1 20/03/2005 18 5.6 12 0 
Kaluga region 14/03/2010 proportional 7 65 10.8 2 22 9.1 28.6 33.8 14/11/2004 9 11.1 4 0 
Kurgan region 14/03/2010 mixed 5 105 4.8 0 8 0 0 7.6 28/11/2004 13 0 5 0 
Ryazan region 14/03/2010 mixed 10 52 19.2 2 10 20 20 19.2 20/03/2005 13 7.8 6 16.7 
Sverdlovsk region 14/03/2010 proportional 4 40 10 0 6 0 0 15 02/03/2008 22 9.1 10 0 
Yamal-Nenetsk 
autonomous okrug 
14/03/2010 proportional 
4 22 18.2 0 7 0 0 31.8 27/03/2005 6 0 2 0 
 
Source: Author‘s own calculations based on information available at http://www.izbirkom.ru/izbirkom.html, last accessed 8/08/10. 
